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ABSTRACT 
Growing Industrial Sickness has caused great 
anxiety to Government, Financial Institutions and 
Labour. Considerable volume of financial resources 
have been unnecessary tied up resulting in wastage of 
capital assets, decline in production and employment. 
Both the large stjrale sector and small scale sector are 
proned to industrial sickness. This is particularly 
true in small scale sector and it is generally felt 
that almost 90 per cent in small scale sector can be 
reckoned as sick. So serious, it is felt that the 
prospects of reviving them is considered to be remote 
and recovery of locked bulk finances out of question. 
The sickness in the small scale sector is 
multiplying year by year. rJumber of sick units has 
increased aver a period of time and many had been 
closed down because of continuing losses, obsolete 
machinery and labour trouble. This phenomenon, though 
not new, has assumed serious proportions in recent 
years. As a result, there is not onlv 1OSF> O< 
production but alos displacemnct of labour engaged. in 
such units. These are matter of national concern. 
Since, Industrialisation is considered as the 
appropriate strategy for the development of a nation 
and being a developing country, India's urgent need is 
to raise the productivity of present available 
resources. In this context the study to diagnose the 
malady of growinq sickness and a proper remedy has to 
be found out. 
Many writers, policy mnkr?rr., JJ 1 anner-i., 
academicians, administrators and social scientists have 
been trying to find out the panecea for the very 
problem. Inspite of individual studies undertaken in 
the Country and abroad, various Government Institutions 
and Committees have been periodically set liave also 
failed to deal with the subject. 
Scope of the Study 
The studies conducted for predicting 
company's failure are scanty in India. Voi^y little 
progress has been made in empirical testing of 
financial ratios with a view to showing which of them 
really reflect a company's state of health, its chances 
of survival or failure. 
It is necessary to undertake further 
research to show the way towards a more systematic and 
scientific financial ratio analysis for predicting the 
chances of survival or failure of a company. 
Furthermore, the present work is an endevour to 
investigate the causes of Industrial Sickness in Cotton 
Textile Mills of U.P. at micro level. 
Objectives of the Study 
The main objectives of the study may be 
summarised below. 
i) to review the concept of Industrial Sickness 
ii) to examine the Government policies for-
rehabilitating the industrial sickness 
iii) to analyse the growth and development of Cotton 
Textile Mills of India 
iv> to analyse the performance of sick cotton textile 
mi 1Is of U.P. 
v) to evaluate the financial position of sick cotton 
textile mills taken over by ^4TC with an abject to 
predict sickness through ratio analysis, 
v) to identifying the factor/factors causing sickness 
in cotton textile mills of U.P. and suggesting 
rP!(nodial measures to avc?»-cc)iiie? thern-
Methodology 
A nan - random sampling i.e. judgement 
sampling of Cotton textile Mills of U.P. may provide 
better picture of whole development. For this reason 
I have selected six sick cotton mills of Uttar- Pradosti 
namely, Atherton Cotton Textile Mills, Kanpur^; Bijli 
Cotton Textile Mills, Hathras; New Victoria Mills, 
Kanpur; Swadeshi Cotton Mills, Kanpur; Swadeshi Cotton 
Mills, ^4aini; The Elgin Mills, Kanpur. These Cotton 
Textile Mills under review exhibit the general 
characteristics of other cotton textile mills of U.P. 
Sources of Data 
The study involvefs mli.Tncr on puh I i ntitKl iu-
secandry sources such as periodical reports of RUi, 
IDBI, ICICI, IRCI, NTC, RFC, Directorate of Industries. 
Pub 1 t'.^l»<'(.t rcpat'ta \^nd ofticial data al cut, I D M textiJ*^ 
mills of U.P. are generally very scanty. Hence, field 
investigation and spot study of the selected mills of 
U.P. has been undertaken to collect the necessary data 
to fill the gaps in the available infot^mation an*! 
gather statistics on the j^ehab i 1 i ta t ion schemes 
implemented by the administration. For the very 
purpose, the interview—cum questionnaire method was 
employed to assess the opinion of selected officials of 
the mills on the financial and managerial problems of 
• these mills and progress of their rehabilitating 
act ivi tles. 
Methods of Analysis 
The study has been both descriptive and 
analytical. The status and progress of the mills have 
been described at some length. This information has 
been subjected to critical analysis and evaluation of 
i^-
the relevant data (are production of fininshed 
material) its trend and financial t^atios. Ihis data 
has been computerised and the relative effects of 
various causes of sickness has been worked out. 
Magnitude of changes from year to year have been 
calculated in terms of percentage variations. 
Limitation of the Study 
Initially it was proposed to under tal-:e the 
study of all the cotton textile mills of Uttar Pradesh. 
Later,in view of certain (time and financial assistance 
from any source) constraints, nan—availabi1ity of data, 
tiTe study has to be confined to the six cotton textile 
mills of U.P. My approach to the present study is to 
undertake an intensive study of a few cases. ihis is 
the only feasible method for investigating a social 
phenomenon of a country of the size and complexity as 
Ind ia. 
It may be emphasised here that most of the 
data w.nn cnllnctnd by hf^ rn<-.( •.•*»•(. hr?r hnr'-.t'lf dt.u-inM 
personal visits to various offices, departments and 
mills of U.P. 
The study covers the period from 1961 to 
1990. Because of industrial sickness in India, since it 
become pronounced in the late sixties, has been 
spreading at an alarming p a c e , particularly, during the 
period from Uocombor 19/6 to Soptombor IV/y. 
Scheme of the Chapterisation 
To diagnose the Industrial Sickness in cotton 
textile mills of U.P. by identifying the main causes, 
the entire study has been divided into seven different 
chapters. 
In the Introduction, a brief statement of the 
nature of the problem, objective of study, the scope of 
the study, sources of data, methods of collecting data 
have been described. 
As the topic entitled " A Study of Industrial 
Sickness in Cotton Textile Mills of U.P.", described 
that Sickness in industry has not developed all of a 
sudden. This is a slow process which has set in about 
two decade ago. While the country made significant 
progress over the years and diversified its industrial 
activities, certain structut^ai weaknesses set . .in 
particularly in the case of cotton textiles did not 
carry out replacement and modernisation in time. As a 
result, they were saddled with obsolete plant and 
machinery. 
in the first chapter, the concept at 
industrial sickness has been reviewed. It revealed 
that sick unit is one which bears one or more of the 
following symptoms. 
<i) a unit having negative equity; (ii) a 
unit incurring continous cash losses; (iii) the chances 
of recouping losses are either low or negative; <iv> a 
unit starts eating away its capital; (v) a unit stopped 
its production activities; <vi) Current liabilities 
exceeds current assets; (vii> irregular accounts with 
Banks; (viii) a unit closed permanently; (i:<> a unit 
utilising its capacity below 20 percent; (x> rate of 
return on investment is less than the cost of capital; 
(xi> increased customers complaints; <Kii> ability to 
face competition and ability to exist in the market is 
low; (xiii) a unit fails to meet its social and 
economic obligations; (xiv) a unit is not in a position 
to survive; <xv) low employees morale due to 
mismanagement; (xvi) decline in the quality and 
service; (xvii) a sick unit is one that has incurred 
cash losses in the immediately preceding two years and 
in the judgement of credit institutions is expected to 
incur these losses during the current year; (xviii) a 
sick unit is one whose net worth has been eroded to the 
extent of at least 50 percent; (xix) a sick unit is one 
whose working capital advance account with the bank was 
irregular and this persisted over a longer period of 
time 12 to 18 months and is likely to become moi^e 
persistent; and (;<;<> a sick unit is one wliich ha^i 
defaulted in paying four consecutive half—yearly (or 
two consecutive annual) instalments of principal and 
interest on terms loans, if any. 
The second chapter has been devoted to review 
the Government Policies towards rehabilitation of 
sickness in industries. This chapter shows that there 
cannot be one single solution for the revival of 
sickness. Problems have to be identified industrywise 
and unitwise. The units which have been mis—managed 
will have to change hands, and a proper scheme of 
reconstruction would have to be devised. In deserving 
cases, mergers and amalgamation should be aiiovMed 
rather than take—over of the management by Government. 
Wherever Government poicy is responsible for making an 
industry sick, it would be advisable to modify the 
policy taking into account the broader objectives of 
growth. In some cases a unity may not be viable 
inspite of any assistance. Such units should be 
allowed to close down. Of course, this will create 
the problem of displacement of labour, but this will 
have to be sorted out rather than creating further-
difficulties by merely keeping the units alive. 
In the revival of sick units banks and 
financial institutions have a great role to play. 
They have to strengthen their monitoring system and 
initiate early steps before the units reach a stage 
that they cannot be revived. In fact, the banks and 
financial institutions have not been properly able to 
organise their monitoring system and they do not have 
up-to-date information about the assisted units. 
Since the causes for" sickness could be 
different for diffrent units, there cannot be a 
specific formula to rehabilitate a sick unit. Each 
case will have to be diagnosed separately and proper 
remedies should be found for it. Hov-jever, some broad 
guidelines Sife suggeseted to nurse and rehabilitate a 
sick industrial unit. The following.may be considered 
important in this regard. 
(a) I he causes tor sicknu-ss must be clearly 
identified, preferably through a diagnostic study by a 
competent independent agency. Also the potential 
viability of the unit must be analysed considering the 
size of the unit, the stock of a bank and the 
complexities or sophistication of operation. 
(b) The assets and liabilities of unit must be 
ascertained from the borrowers and this information 
must be put to the scrutiny of auditors. 
(c) The assets charged—both current and fixed should 
be evaluated, parlicularly when it is estimated that 
there is a wide gap between the outstanding amount and 
the declared book value of assets. 
(d) An assessment of fund required both long term and 
short term, should be made. Normally, a bank will 
provide additional funds for working capital, but some 
amount on a long-term basis may also be made available 
depending upon the urgency of the situation. In other 
words the long—term capital base of small units must be 
improved. 
(e) Necessary >resources must be made available to 
install additional machinery to modernise the unit and 
improve its productivity. 
(f) Managerial deficiencies must be detected and the 
units must be asked to induct professionals on the 
Board of Directors. Competent technical and managerial 
personnel must be appointed to the key positions in 
production, finance and marketing. 
(g) Sick units need time to generate surplus and 
build themselves up when remedial measures ait-e applied. 
They would, therefore, need concessions in interest, 
margin money and time for the repayment of debts. 
Depending upon the merits of each case, a bank will 
have to consider : 
(i) The funding of unpaid interest/instaIment/ 
uncovered part of the advance; 
(ii) easy repayment instalment ot long —ter-di 
loans with reasonable moratorium; 
(iii) reducing interest and margin; 
(h> the Government may come up with proposals, if 
l i t 
necessary through legislation to protect the interest 
of the small industry. 
Third chapter analysed the growth and 
developmentt of cotton textile mills of India, in which 
it discussed that, after Independence, especially after 
Partition, the textile industry was badly affected due 
to acute shortage of raw material because 30 per cent 
of cotton growing area went to Pakistan. Inspite of 
this fact, the organised sector had 1056 textile mills 
out of which 733 were spinning mills and 283 composite 
mills which consist of handloom and powerloom. 
At the end of the year 1988—89 there were 
9.18 lakhs powerlooms and 33.04 lakhs handlooms. Out 
of 9.18 lakhs powerlooms, 5.27 lakhs were working on 
cotton of this 3.26 lakhs looms were in Maharashtra and 
2.06 lakhs were in Gujrat. These powerlooms produced 
over 3680 million metres of cotton cloth per annum at 
the end of year 1988—89, which constituted 41 per cent 
of total quantity of cotton cloth produced in the 
country. Majority of looms do not function strictly on 
standard shift basis. Thus, the capacity of production 
was under utilisation of the total investment in 
textile industry (Rs.1500 crore), the share of 
powerloom was Rs. 300 crores. 
In decentraslised sector, there were 33.04 
lakhs handlaoms and nearly *?.18 lakhs were cotton 
handlooms. The handloom industry provide employment to 
nearly lO million people and an equal number of people 
B.re employed in its auxiliary activities. The capital 
investment in this sector was estimated to be of the 
order of Rs- 150 crores. The total production of 
handloom cloth has increased from 8582 million metres 
in 1984-85 to 10473 million metres in 1988-89, 
accounting an increase of 122.03 per cent. The highest 
number of handloom i.e. 5.56 lakhs were in Tamil Nadu 
followed by Andhra Pradesh (5.29 lakhs) and Uttar 
Pradesh <5.09 lakhs). From this fact^iit can be said 
that handloom industry is mainly concentrated in Tamil 
Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh with the 
increase in the capital investment a number of mills, 
the consumption of cotton has also gone up from 1001.30 
thousands tons in 1961 to 1344.02 thousands tons in 
1988—89, recording an increase of 134.72 per cent. The 
consumption of fibre has also increased during the last 
two decade due to diverse growth and development of 
te;;tile sector. 
The production of yarn has gone up from 907 
million kgs in 1966 to 1461.89 million Kqs in 1988, 
with an increase of 161. uU pc»" cent. As < a»' as ti^u 
production of mill made cotton is concerned, it has 
increased from 7073 million metres in 1961 to 10940 
million metres in 1988, an increase of 154.67 per cent. 
n 
Likewise the export went up from Rs. 60 crores in 1961 
to 2472 crores in 1988, recording an increase of 412 
per cent. The study has revealed that Tamil Nadu and 
Maharashtra having highest number of mills in the 
country. These states have 451 and 123 mills 
respectively. Likewise, installed spindles s^re also 
highest in Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra i.e., 7604 and 
5164 thousands installed spindles respectively. 
.1 
Thug, to sum up, it can bo highlighted thttt: 
during the last decade the textile sector has got a 
favourable environment for its growth and development. 
The Government, financial institutions and other 
coordinating agencies aire paying their due attention 
for its growth because, the textile industry has become 
a vital sector of the economy. 
It has been observed that the textile 
industry in U.P- and particularly xn Kanpur has been 
witnessed severe industrial sickness as compared to its 
counterpart in other states of the country. The study 
has revealed that the consumption of raw material and 
sale has increased in Atherton mills but the company is 
incurring losses. The continuous loss is the .main 
reason of the financial constraints of the company. As 
regards the performance of Victoria mills is concerned, 
the consumption of raw materials has increased by 
56.38 per cent during 1984—85. This company is also 
earning a continuous losses and this loss has increased 
n 
to the tune of Rs. 500.51 lakhs in 1985-86. Hence this 
mill is ailso subject to rehabilitate. 
The consumption of raxn materials of Swadeshi 
mill has increased by 96.5 per cent in 1985—86. But 
this company also incurred a loss of Rs. 1667.63 lakhs 
in 1985-86. Therefore, due to huge losses the company 
has become sick and needs to be rahabilated. The Elgin 
mills has 48,484 spindles out of which 47,092 spindles 
Are working. 1,194 plain looms have been installed in 
the company. The average total of wages bill 
including fringe benefit come to Rs. 64.43 lakhs- The 
average daily production of yarn is 16,709 kg and the 
average daily production of cloth is 80,000 metres. 
The Elgin mill No.2 is a composite textile 
processing and works in three shifts. Ihe labour 
employment per thousand spindles is 9.27 per looms is 
46.65 and the total wage per bill including fringe 
benefits comes to Rs. 61.11 lakhs. The average daily 
production of yarns is 17.844 kg and average daily 
production of cloth is 83,700 metres. The survey of 
the mill have revealed that there is no material change 
in the consumption of raw material except in 1983—84 
and the income from the sale do not show any increasing 
trend. These mills have been continuously running in 
losses since 1980-81 and the loss is increasing year 
after year. Therefore, it is desirable to note that 
1'. 
Elgin mill is a sick unit which needs to 
rehab i1i tated. 
To conduct the survey of such textile mills 
six units were selected at non—random basis. The 
survey revealed that out of these mills, the production 
of two mills i.e. Swadeshi mills and Elgin mills 
showing an increasing trend. The total production of 
cloth of the New Victoria mills has come down from 
ZQl.ia lakhs metres in 1985-86 to 86.10 lakh meters in 
1*?90 indicating a decline of 69.-37 per cent. 
Similarly, the production of Elgin mills has decreased 
from 418.97 lakhs metres in 1985 to 416.33 lakhs metres 
in 1989—90 representing a decrease of 0.63 per cent. 
It is interesting to refer that the production of 
Swadeshi cotton mills went up from 261.58 lakhs metres 
to 873.43 lakhs metres in 1989~90 showing an increase 
of 70.05 per cent. Thus it can be said that out of 
these N.T.C. mills three spinning mills are sick due to 
continuous fall in the level of product and the other 
composite mills can be said viable. 
In order to assess the financial performance 
of sick cotton textile mills of N.T.C. solvency ratios, 
liquidity ratios and turn over ratios were calculated 
and the results of this ratios are as follows. 
The main objectives of solvency ratio is to 
indicate the company's ability to meet its long term 
1 
obligation. lo judge the solvency of the mills tour 
ratios were calculated which shows that total tangible 
assets to long term debts, total tangible assets to 
total debts, net worth to total debts and net worth to 
long term debts are continuously decreasing during the 
year 1986-87, 1987-88 and 1988-89 and are also less 
than the standard norm 1:1. It leads to a conclusion 
that these mills are not in solvent position. 
The general objective of liquidity ratio is 
to indicate the company's ability to meet its short 
term financial obligation. To assess the liquidity of 
sick cotton textile mills of N.T.C, five ratios were 
calculated which indicates that current assets to 
current liabilities, current assets to total tangible 
assets, quick assets to total tangible assets, cash to 
current liabilities and quick assets to current 
liabilities are continuously decreasing durin the 
period 1986-87, 1987-88, 1988-89 are less than the 
standard norm 2:1. This leads to a conclusion that 
liquidity of cotton textile mills of N.T.C is very poor 
which displays sickness of the mills. 
Turn over ratio usually consists of ^ales 
figures in numerator and the balance of assets are used 
to indicate various aspects of operational efficiency. 
Six turn over ratios were calculated for N.T.C. mills, 
sales to working capital shows sales is higher than the 
working capital. In case of net sales to quick assets. 
the net •sales has higher rates than the quick assets 
except in the year 1987—88. Net sales to current 
astaets is very satisfactory. in regards tu net salt"n 
to total tangible assets, the degree of efficiency in 
the utilisation of resources is not higher. Net sales 
to fi;<ed assets, ratio shoMS that in 1986—87 and 1987 — 
88 the N.T.C's mills had more idle capacity and excess 
investment in fixed trading assets. 
The sixth chapter identify the main causes of 
industrial sickness in cotton textile mills of U.P. 
with the help of weighted score. Factors generally 
responsible for sickness, broadly divided into internal 
and external. Internal factors again divided into 1iv<p 
different heads viz. managerial, financial, marketing, 
productivity and personnel to know the exact factors 
causing sickness in cotton textile mills of U.P. 
In order to analyse the managerial factors 
influencing sickness, a ranking table has been prepared 
by taking upto eight rank of different managerial 
factors. In that it revealed from the data that among 
the ranking factors no proper manpower development 
program has been considered as the first cause of 
sickness by 19.84 per cent of the mills lack of 
management expertise and supervision has been ranking 
secondly by 15.87 per cent of the mills. Timely and 
adequate modernisation has the th i rd,,,vip'^nl<'flg/i^feh> a rating 
::!^^^.u:^(^^^ 
12.3 per cent as a factors influencing sickness in 
cotton textile mills of uttar pradesh. 
Therefore management of mills should make an 
arrangement to send their employees for training and 
should recruit experienced professional besides they 
should have a research and development cell for finding 
out the possibility of modernisation of the mills. 
To assess the productivity factors causing 
Sickness in Cotton Textile Mills of U.P. We have 
analysed the priority ranking of sample units. 
Priority ranking with weighted score shows, that three 
most important factors such as poor maintanance and 
replacement of machinery, poor quality of products and 
power shortage have score 47 points, 33 points and 23 
points respectively. We can conclude from the above 
that poor maintance of machinery , poor quality of 
product and power shortage has been the main cause of 
sickness in Cotton Textile Mills of Uttar Pradesh. 
Keeping in view the above noted finding into 
consideration it can be suggested that management of 
these seyen Cotton Textile Mills should give due 
attention to maintenance of machinery and quality of 
product. Similarly the Gavernmeht should care forward 
to solve the problem of poor shortage. 
In order to get weighted score or 'content 
score' for each personnel factors we have assigned 
weiQht to each rank and got the weighted score for 
i'AC-tors. Sincej we have taken upto <i>th »"«ntr. wa haivn 
assigned 6 points to first rank, 5 points to second 
rank, 4 points to third rank, 3 point to fourth rank, .i 
points to fifth rank and paints to sixth rank. 
From the calculated weighted sum of the 
ranking. It can be concluded that absence of manpower 
planning has been the first cause of sickness, bad 
labour relation as the second cause and weak 
organisational set—up has be^n the thij-d causr» of 
w i r knrrvr. In iri)«<;i In mi \ I ta n f (M.«..-»r I "i atlt-?'-,!». 
Keeping in view the above finding into 
consideration it can be suggested that the management 
of textile mills should give due attention to proper 
manpower planning and should maintain good industrial 
ralation. 
In order to analyse the financial factors 
causing sickness, we have prepared ranking table by 
taking upto 10 ranks of different financial factors. 
It is revealed from the data presented in the 
table that lack of finance and working capital has been 
considered as the first cause of sickness by 5 units 
out of 7 units and secured 50 points. The second most 
important factor ( second Rank) was continuous loss and 
poor cash management which has been the cause of the 
K 
sickness in cattan textile mills of Uttar Pr-adesh. loo 
much dependence on borrowed money has been the third 
cause of sickness and secured 35 points according to 
the weighted score. Inappropriate financial structure 
and too much bad debts have got fourth and fifth rani: 
among the causes of sickness. Thus it can be said that 
lack of finance and working capital, continuous losses/ 
poor cash management and too much dependence on 
borrowed money have been the main causes of sickness. 
Therefore, the management of mills should 
find some solution to the problem. Sick units need 
time to generate surplus and build up themselves when 
remedial measures are applied. They would, therefore, 
need concessions in interest, margin money and time for 
the repayment of debts. 
The Government may come up with the 
proposals, if necessary through legislation to protect 
the interest of small industry. 
Marketing factors are one of the main factors 
causing sickness in industries. We have therefore 
attempted to assess the influence of marketing factors 
on cotton textile mills of U.P. A limited sample ot 
sick cotton textile mills has been drav^ jn from Uttar 
Pradesh. According to the calculated weigtited score 
lack of sales promotion has been the fir'st cause ot 
sickness (1st rank) followed by selection at 
inadequate product mix (Ilnd rank) inaccurate demand 
forcasting <111rd rank) and lack of market feed back 
(IVth rank). 
Thus, it can be said that lack of sales 
promotion, selection of inadequate product mix, 
inaiccurate demand forcasting and lack of mar-ket feed 
U«ck ar«tt th» rnaln cauaoo of olcl'.nonn in cot. i.on t«f)<<. j I <> 
mills of Uttar Pradesh. "Iherefot^e, the management of 
these mills should give due importance to sale 
promotion programmes and product mix- They must also 
make necessary arangement to forecast the demand and 
other market information. 
The external factors causing sickness in 
cotton textile mills of U.P. has been observed through 
weighted score that diversification/expansion imposed 
by the Government has emerged as the first cause of 
sickness by scoring 69 points. The second highest point 
was secured by market recession (50 points). The third 
and fourth position according to weighted score went 
to non availability of skilled manpower (49 points) and 
change in economic and social policies of the 
6avernment <46 points). It is therefore, revealed that 
restraint on diversification/expansion imposed by the 
government, market recession, non availability of 
skilled manpower and change in economic and social 
policies of the Government secured 214 points having 
2: 
emerged as the most important factors causing sickness 
in the cotton textile mills of Uttar Pradesh-
It seems from the above discussion that the 
phenomenon of sickness among industries is a complex 
one and a number of factors ranging from disparrities 
between costs and prices to mis—management and some 
Government policies Are involved. There cannot be one 
single solution for revival of sickness. Problems have 
to be identify industrywise and unitwise and remedial 
measures initiated. The units which have been mis-
managed will have to change hands, and a proper scheme 
of reconstruction would have to be devised. In 
deserving cases, mergers and amalgamation should be 
allowed rather than take—over of the management by 
Government. Wherever Government policy is responsible 
for making an industry sick, it would be advisable to 
modify the policy taking into account the broader 
objecttives of growth. In some case a unit may not be 
viable inspite of any assistance that can be given for 
temporary sustenace. Such units should be allowed to 
close down. Of course, this will create thf? prnhlRJu of 
d isp 1 c*CF«mp>n t of K-xhour, !>Mt. t.hitr^  wi ) J h,->v«- »,t» In-' 
sorted out rather than creating further difficulties by 
merely keeping the units alive. 
In the revival of sick , units banks and 
financial institutions have a great role to piaiy. 
They have to strengthen their monitoring system and 
initiate early steps before the units reach a stacie 
that they cannot be revived. In fact, the banks and 
financial institutions have not been properly able to 
organise their monitoring system and they do not have 
up-to-date information about the assisted units. 
What is required is closer cooperatiati 
through mutual' assistance between management. 
Government, banks and financial institutions to restore 
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Jntrobuctt i^" 
INTRODUCTION 
The pr'oblem of gt^owinQ sickness m industry 
has bnrn a mattoi- of qt^oat conanrn to i»»<? ut >vni-nmon t; , 
Reserve Bank of India, financial institution and 
commercial banks. The gravity of the cause by 
industrial sickness may be judged from the locking up 
of financial resotfrces, wastage of capital asr.ets and 
loss of production when we at^s faced with the overall 
problem of constraint of resources. No less important 
is the risk of loss of employment caused by industrial 
sickness. Thus the number of sicl^: units in the country 
and the outstanding bank advances in respect of them, 
are as 1ollows. 
Among Small Scale Sectoi' about 90 per cent 
units At^G sick. The representatives of some commercial 
banks told at the meet 1989 on 14th January that 90 per 
cent of the sick units in the small scale sector could 
be revived as they were no mot^n economical Iv viable 
and the prospect of recovery of the large sum of banl-: 
finance locked up in tfiese unitr, was ver^y blr.^k.'-
(\mon«j lart^c unit'i th** luunhr'i ol .ii \ yu\\\.\ 
rose from 409 at the end of December 1986. The 
outstanding bank credit t^o'st^ from f<':i. 1 3-42. "1 / t.ror-er. in 
December 1V80 to Rs.3287.02 crores at tho end of 
December 1986."^ 
i. 
Ill tlm cmr* (.) f mncl i luii •.( .ilc nnil.'., I.IH' iitiinl)i'i-
At the end of December 19SO was 992 with outstanding 
bank credit of Rs. 178.42 crores. This number rose to 
1250 at the end nf Denemher 1 ^ R^ witli ni 11 s (:ar\(l i IMI 
crRdll: n\' l<«s. 201 . '>/ r-rn»^ r>'-,, 
Lr\ case of small scale industrial units, the 
number rose from 23149 to a staggering 145776 during 
l.ht^  pt:<iii)il friuu '!)<-'( «-mlH:^ i' ! V( l< > (.<i 1)*M «-iiilH'r l';Ml<'i. IIM* 
outstanding bank credit rose from Rs. 305.77 crores to 
Rs.1306.10 crores during the same period. The tota] 
nnmhMr ot airt' nnil.'n n<j «t <.hi» IMU* •>< n»M t>n»i)i<f tvii/. 
);hnn rtt-in <:n 14//'1«> fi«»(ti VISTit' .i « «.lir« r-nH <>( Dt-i ..•mln-i 
1980. fhe total bank credit outstanding on account of 
sick units rose from Rs. 18U8.66 cr^or'es at thr» nnd a I 
December 1980 to Rs. 4874.49 crores at the end of 
December 1986.^ 
According to one estimate^ nearly 130 
composite mills out of the 279 working made cash 
losses of over Rs. IIO crore in the year ended June 
1987. During 1987-88, the losses s^re e;;pected to swell 
to around Rs. 125 crore,if not more-
The spreading sicl.'.ncs5 in the te:<tile 
industry has resulted in the nationalisation of as many 
as 106 mills by the National Textile Corporation and 
its subsidiaries, besides taking over the management of 
I /, in 11 I M U\ (M f f H» HI) t I m i t ' lit' I ItH Itltntlx I < t I -ill 
millha t\r^ <4 iMi-i eatied -ateacJilv (i.t'i a (itji i<i(l uilti m<.u t ,-
u n i t s c l o s i n g d o w n b e c a u s e of c o n t i n u i n g lo^<30'3, 
o b s o l e t e m a c h i n e r y o r l a b o u r tr^ouble. I h e dr'cision tn 
nr'^  t i on I 1 »-.n in J I I n h.-ul .n I '".n hi« 1 ->l I'n t < >i n»»I « M t ^ I 
<.( Hit-» I (l«M '»I I o n n . 
The maximum number of nationalised sicl' mills 
IS in Maharashtra, with the total at 22 in 1986—87. 
lamil Nadu and West Bengal had 14 mills each, Gujarat 
12 mills and Uttar Pradesh 9 mills. Even tairly well 
run mills like Anglo French Te;:tiles in Pondicherry 
became sick due to various factors and had to be 
eventually taken over by the government. However, the 
NIC and its subsidiaries havp not hnr>n nnrr r"-."-, f u I in 
r e v i v m n many unit^. .->nd t:t->r> ,n< c-i uiu t I .\ I.TMI lie. .<••. l>v 
themselves have had a devitalising effect on tJio 
operations of different unitn. 
Keeping in view the above noted facts into 
consideration, it was felt necessary to study the 
causQs pf sickness in cotton textile mills o1 Uttar 
Pradesh at micro level. In this content, it is 
necessary to have a brief review of earlier studies. 
3 
Review of Literature 
Many scholars have studied various tinaneiai 
ratios as predictors of corporate sickness in India and 
abr^oad. Therefore, it will be necessary to have a brief 
review of some of the work done so far in the 
industrial sickness. 
Studies Abroad 
Patrick conducted a study of I'? f ai led 
companies and 19 successful companies to predict the 
financial soundness. It was observed that all thr> 
ratios of failed firms were per^^ i n tnn 11 y ri i f f r->t'r»n t ft-rxn 
the non —failed firms at least three yeai-s prior to 
failure. The net worth to debt and net profit to net 
worth ratios were found the best indicators of failure 
among the ratios used. 
Winakor and Smith analysed twenty-one ratios 
for 1S3 firms. It was observed that the ratios of the 
failed firms were frequently below the mean value 
used for comparison and showed deterioration as .the 
date of failure drew near and also pointed out that 
the ratios of net working capital to total assets 
(NWC/TA) was the most Accurs^te and steady indicator of 
failure. Ramser and Foster e:;amined eleven types of 
financial ratios for 173 firms whose securities were 
r c Q I S t e t ' c d i n t h e S t a t e o f I l l i n o i s . I t w a s t a u n d t h a t 
f i r m s w h i c h t u r n e d o u t t o b e l e s s s u c c e s s f u l a n d t h o s e 
wh i< :h f . *« l l rK l t cn t f rM l t o h/»vr> i - . i t i i ) - ! w h i ( . h \rnui> J i iwr ' i -
t h a n t h e rnorts nut;cr?tifs f u i f l r m n . I l o w n v m ^ t w o t i n n o v n r ' 
r a t i o s , s a l e s t o n e t w o r t h a n d s a l e s t o t o t a l asse t r i s 
e x h i b i t e d a n o p p o s i t e t e n d e n c y -
o 
Merwin examined over 900 continuinoi and 
discontinuing firms which failed dui'inq tho pr»rin(t 
1926—36. Two methods of comparison were used. One was 
to determine a high—low range for each ratio for every 
year, by using the companies as indicators of what the 
highs and lows should be. The other method was to use 
an estimated normal ratio reflecting the success of 
surviving industry mean ratios of disappearing fir^ms 
against estimated normal ratios and the high—low range 
ratios, it was found that the ratios of the 
discontinuing firms were consistently below the 
established by the surviving firms. A persistent 
decline from the estimated normal was also found 
beginning with the sixth year prior to discontinuance. 
These three ratios were : (1) Net working capital to 
total assets; <2) The current ratio; and <3) Net worth 
to total debt. Net working capital to total assets 
ratio was found to be the best 'single indicator of 
failure'. 
Hickmen " found that the times interest 
earned r^atios and the net profits to sales ratios were 
useful predictors of the default e:<perience of 
corproate bond issues during 19uu-1913. Saulinier ^ 
found evidence from RFC lending experience during 
1934-51 that borrowing firms v-Jith poorer current ratios 
and net worth to debt ratios were more prone to loan 
default. 
Moore and Atkinson found that the ability 
to obtain credit 'was correlated with several ratios. 
Seiden "* reported that certain financial 
* 
ratios (e.g net working capital to total asset) were 
inversely correlated with an index of trade credit 
difficulties- Beaver made an attempt to predict 
corporate failure in 1966. Failure was defined as the 
inability of a firm to pay its financial obligations as 
they mature. He examined the predictive power of 30 
different financial ratios and tried to predict 
industrial failure up to 5 years in advance. A 
univariate prediction model of corporate failure was 
developed and tested on obser'va t ions of /V tailed and 
79 non—failed firms, selected by the paired sample <by 
industry and asset r.izo) tPchnKnin. 
He further, conducted three major- empirical 
experiments in order to establish the predictive pov;er 
of financial ratios. A comparison of mean values, (ii) 
a dichotomous classification test, and (lii) an 
6 
analysis of 1 il-rl ihaod ratios. A comparison of the 
mean ratios of failed and non—(ailed firm^ pt^ovided 
substantial evldnnrr? that thn financial r.-xtion nf 
failed firms showed deterioration and woro nof-jio tifian 
that of non—failed firms as early a five years prior to 
failure. Differences in ratio--, meafi do runt r.uijqnr. fc 
directly the existence and eiitcnt of predict ivn power. 
To examine the predictive power of ratios, the second 
type of a.n3Llysis (i.e. Dichotornaus Cl^ssi f icz^tion Test) 
was made which predicts the failure status of a unit, 
based solely upon a knowledge of the financial ratio. 
The ratio with the smallest percentage error was 
considered the best indicator. Dichotomous 
classification test indicated that the most successful 
predictof- was the cash flow to total debt ratio 
followed by the net income to total ,-A <-."". r t r. r.U.io- tin 
the basis of lowest percentage prediction Grrar for 
each group over the five year period, Beaver selected 
the following six variabes as best: (1) cash flow to 
total debt <2) net income to total assets (3) current 
plus long term liabilities to total assets <^) working 
capital to total assets (5) current ratio and (6) no 
credit interval ratio. 
However, Beaver was not satisfied with these 
results,because the choice was treated as dichotomous 
and, therefore, the magnitude of the difference between 
the ratios and the cut off point was not considered 
while predicting the probability of failure. to 
overcome these problems, Beaver undertook ^n analvsi"^ 
of 111 lilujod i'atlu«\. Ilx^  1 11'. I'i 1 htjud ru I i n an.t 1 ys J i.* 
indicates the extent to which a decision-maker's 
assessments of the probability of failure p\m filterrri 
by looking at the financial ratios. The conclusion of 
thw nnnlynim of llkolihoocj I-.T t « •i'-. '-.n()pnr 1:f»(l 1;l»n(: t.lir" 
ratios were useful indicator of failure of the firm at 
least five years prior to failure. 
15 Tamari developed a multivariate model to 
predict Industial sickness. In this model he weighted 
composite of several ratios were used to indicate the 
possibility of failure. Profit trend and equity 
capital and reserves to total liabilities ratios were 
given maximum weights relatively shov>»inq that these 
ratios were canaidai'd tn hra {,\\P* t)p§nt tnttn .'^ t.nr t * <" 
fai. 1 uro. 
Altman suggested a multiple discriminant 
analysis (MAD) technique to assess the quality of ratio 
analysis as an analytical technique using corporate 
bankruptcy as an example. Multiple discriminant 
analysis is a statistical technique designed to 
classify an observation into onn of sever'al a prior 
groupings, dependent upon the observation's individual 
characteristics. This technique is primarily used to 
classify and/or make prediction in problems where the 
dependent variable appears in qualitative form e.g. 
8 
male or female, bankrupt or non—bankrupt. The MDA 
technique derives a linear combiantion of various 
characteristics <e.q. liquidity, profitability, sirr? 
etr.) titafc hraeit d i nr r 1 ml i>n tf»n hntiwnrn tin* urunp*"., M w 
d 1 s«zf i III 1 Hf-sn t functiDn i C3 of ihr? (oiin: 
where Z= overall index 
V * , V K I = ' t h e d i s c r e m i n a n t c o e f f c i e n t s 
X . , X o X . ^ " ' i r\dopr>rMiF»n t v n r i a 11> I o r i 
( a . c j . t a t l a s ) . 
Altman used a paired sample consisting of 
thirty—three failed and thirty—three non-failed 
manufacturing firms where industry and siss were 
considered as the matching criteria. Initially 22 
financial ratios were considered as predictors of 
failure and they were classified into 5 cateoories e.g. 
liquidity, profitability, solvency, leverage and 
activity ratios. Only 5 ratios out of the 22 were 
finanlly selected on the basis of their relevancy in 
predicting corporate failure. The final set of ratios 
was determined by F-tests and computer runs analysing 
the possible alternatives. The final discriminant 
function doing the best overall job in discriminating 
between the failed and non—failed firms was: 
Z=. 012X ^-t-. 014X3+ . 033X3+. OU6X4+. 999X5 
where 
X j^—Wni-I; i n p c a p i t.n 1 / t o 1;a J .-\'-.'-,r-1. •, 
X->=Re ta inBd e a r n I I I Q S / t o t a 1 a s s e t s 
X - T = E a r n i n g s b e f o r e i n t e r e s t a n d 
t a x e s / t o t a l a s s e t s 
X / i = M a r k e t v a l u e o f e q u i t y / t a o o l ' . v a l u e o f 
t o t a l d e b t 
Xg=Sales/total assets 
Z~ Overall indeu 
A cut all point for- the Z cicure was 
determined in such a way as to minimise the overlap 
between bankrupt and non—bankrupt firms. He concluded 
that Z —score of 2.675 was the br»'~.t cut nft r>'>»nt v^ tiirli 
maintained minimum mi sc 1 ass i 1 ica t i on . I h(3 ^ i ve 
variable model using data of one year before bankruptcy 
correctly ciassifed 95 percent of the total sample 
which reduced to 36 percent when data of five yeai's 
prior to bankruptcy were used. 
Doakin made the attempt to develop s.\-\ 
alternative to Beaver Altman developments. A sample of 
thiry—two failed firms and a matching sample of thirty-
two non—failed fimrs was taken. The failed firms' 
sample included those which experienced failure between 
1964—1970. Each of the failed firms was matched v-jith a 
non—failed firm on the basis of industry, size and year 
of financial data. Deakin's original model included 14 
ratios and his revised model included only 5 ratios 
which could best predict corporate failure onc.Ji of tlie 
l a 
five years prior to failure. Deakin conducted two 
inajar- empirical e;;per imen ts. First, he adapted a 
method of analy^^is similar to Beaver's study applying 
ttiu (lichatomous classification test and precentage 
er-ror oT each ratio was ascertained. In the Second 
test, discriminant analysis technique was applied using 
the same sample of data and 1'I financial ratios as 
input to the disriminant analysis programme. It was 
conclt.ided that the discriminant analysis can be used to 
predict business failure using ratios as prediction 
variables three years in advance with a fairly high 
degree of accuracy. 
18 Myer and Pifer developed a linear 
regression model for the prediction of bank failures. 
He selected sample of 78 banks consisting 39 faied 
banlrs which e--.'pet"ienced failuure during the period 
194*?—(b5 and 39 solvent matching banks. The paired of 
sample was taken on the basis of location. size, age 
and requirements.Thirty—two financial ratios were used 
a independent variables in the various regression 
models tested. Financial ratios were computed for a 
period of s i:( years prior to failure. A stepwise 
regression programme, forward selection and backward 
reduction was used. A classification test used by Myer 
and Pifer correctly predicted SO percent of the initial 
sample banks and 7 percent of the hold out sample with 
<» li'.ul \. 1 jn(;' of (>n(' (ir \.\^n yij.u '^  tiulnri.- 1 .j i liu-u. Whujn 
11 
the lead time was three or more years, the model failed 
to discriminate between failed and nonfailed banks. 
Marc Blum developed a hailing Company 
Model <FCM) to assess the probability of business 
failure. Failure was defined as inability to pay debts 
a'-j thuy become due bankruptcy proceedings or an 
ejcpiicit agreement with creditors to reduce debts, 
discriminant and 115 non—failed firms to evaluate the 
predictive accuracy of the model. The pairing of firms 
wau m,*du on the basis of induutry, riaJeij, i-Mnp J oyeee and 
fiscal year. This model was considered more reliable 
on account of two reasons (a) the choice of each 
v.Mi.ihii.' I u .m>_>«. 1 t 1 L'd an t\\ui bassis of financial theory 
(i.e. cash flov^ f r a m e w o r k ) , and (b) the afore said 
tti'-suits are the product of a rigorous validation 
procedure. 
Edmister's*" purpose was to develop and test 
a number of methods of analysing finaacial ratio to 
predict the failure of small business. Nineteen ratios 
were tested and a 7 variable regression equation were 
developed. He concluded that the predictive power 
ratio analysis depends upon both the choice of 
analytical method and the selection of ratios. Unlike 
Altman, Beavar and Blum who found that one financial 
V. t. .> ti Min_M 11; 1'_. <_,n f t 1 c iL-n t lor accurate classification. 
lidmii::iter concluded that three consecutive statement B.re 
requjt-ed for effective analysis of small businesses. 
12 
Elam ^ conducted a study to determine if 
capitalisation ot nan—purchase leases enables financial 
statuments users to predict bankruptcy more accurately 
than without sui_h adjustment. He analysed 48 bankrupt 
firms ( 19<S<b—1972) with reported less information and a 
macthc'd sample of non—bankrupt firm according to data 
year, industry, sales and reported leases. MDA was 
applied to a set of 28 ratios. Single ratio and multi-
ratio predictions were made. It was concluded that 
models with leases data ^re not more accurate than ones 
without least data. 
laffler and Tishaw '~^ developed a "Z 
Model" for the prediction of company's insolvency and 
the evaluation of corporate credit worthiness by banks, 
investment houses and credit controllers. To construct 
a solvency model, a statistical technique known as 
lineal^ discrimination analysis was applied to a sample 
of 'Id failed firms and 46 finanicially sound firms 
matched by size and industry. Eighty different ratios 
were calculated for each of the 92 companies. Extensive 
statistical analysis finally resulted in the following 
discriminant function that best discriminates between 
IhL.' rat. nj uc'tbi u1 fn^ms: 
^ ~ 0^+C^ '^ +C'^ '^ 2->-C-^ *^ 3-+-c'^ '^ 4 
where Z = discriminant score 
U__ a constant 
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C^ Q.4 — ^^ the ratio weights or the 
coeffeclents 
f<l— profit before tax/current liabilities 
Ro — current assets/total liablities 
K-T _ current 1 i ab i 1 i t ies/tota 1 assets 
R/| _ no credit interval ratio <i.e. CA-
CL/operat lonal cost e;;cludinQ depreciation) 
It was concluded that the four ratios, taken 
together m the right proportions, measure the risk 
profile of the firm which was summarised by the single 
number i.e. its Z-scores. 
Ohlson—' developed a conditional logic model. 
Me used a sample of 105 firms which experienced 
t)onl i-nptcy durirtri l;fu:» period 1970-/6 rind 20SB nr)n-
ban}:rupt firms. Nine financial ratios were tested to 
form an opinion about the discriminatory power or 
tinancicil ratiovu- iliree set of estimates were computed 
lor ihu concJitjonal logic model. The res\>lts indicated 
t 
thai the four factors derived from financial statements 
were statistically signinficant in asssesing the 
pi^obability of bcJnJ^ruptcy. These are (i) size, (ii) he 
t 1 n.uu-1 a 1 s t rue Ouri-' a'-i rofluctcd by a measure of 
1 fvi I .uiu'( 11 U U , (J II) vjome pur < oi'mancu (iiciixiiiurwts <N1 I A) 
and /or <FUTl->, <iv> some mesures of cureent 
1iquidity(WCTA ar WCTA and CLCA jointly). 
Oambolena and V-tTOuny^ devu loped o modei 1 
H 
using stability and level of financial ratios as 
eKpianatory variables in the derivation of discriminant 
Tunction . ihe basic purpose of this study wa to test 
the effect of strability of financial raqtios on 
pediction of corporate failure it was concluded that 
ttie inclusion of stability of ratios in the analysis 
improved considerably the ability of the discriminant 
functin to predict failure. 
Wilcou"" constructed a model to show haw to 
quan t I fy the ri"^ l: of financial failure through the 
gainb I CM • ba ruin approach. He used net liquidation 
valiuj, avL-'rage ad.iu'jtcd cash flow and thti concept of 
'.;ii.-(.' (It hct' Ui'-, important variables in predicting 
fir^m's financial health. The net liquuidation value' 
or adjusted cash positin of firm is the liquidation 
value of assets less the liquidatin value of debts. The 
liquidation changes from year to year by inflows and 
outflows. Wilcox assumed that the change in financial 
state tal-es place always by a fiiced amount labelled as 
size of the bet. If the probability of the firm's 
gaining a bet is p' and that of its losing the bet is 
q' then unless 'p' exceeds "q', the firm is bound to 
fail. Me claimed great success for his predict in model 
on the basis of a sample study. The model is ,however, 
neither convincing nor realistic because of the several 
arbitrary assumptions on which it depends. 
15 
Del ton Chesser26 worked out a probability 
function for misc1 assification. He used five financial 
ratios and claimed a predictin accuracy of 75 per cent. 
Chesser's study was based upon the data collected for 
trade accounts of manufacturing concerns and consumer 
loans ru'spec t i ve 1 y . 
Frederikslust^ made an attempt to predict 
business failure based on testable financial theory of 
< i)r|i(M >il(! t ,I I I uf •(,.'. I |i_* (Ji.> t i nc'tl tuiluru au .» luj^ativu 
cash balance of the firm and pointed out that a firm 
will fail at a certain moment *t' when its cash balance 
is smaller than •z<^r-a. On the basis of financial theory 
he identified the following observable failure 
(JII_'L1 ii_ 1. 1 un var'iables: liquidity, profitability, 
solvability, variability of liquidity and variability 
of profitbility ove time, industry variables and 
general economic variables. The model predicted 
correctly 92.5 per cent one year prior to failure, 
VMhich reduced to 70 per cent when data of five years 
prior to failure were used. Hpwever, Frederikslust 
could achieve the abject of developing prediction model 
based on Testabe financial theory of corporate failure 
partially. As he dotined failure as a negative cash 
bali\nce, but changed this detinition to bankruptcy or 
liquidation when the empirical work was undrtaken. 
Apart ft'om the studies summarised above, 
28 there are other few empirical studies— Baruch Lev , 
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Aharony and Swary~- Walker"^"., Jahn Argenti"^ — which 
used alternative approachs to the problem of predicting 
indLtij Ir-1 al sicl'.ness. 
Studies in India 
In India few studies have been carried out to 
predict industrial sickness which are discussed in . the 
following pages. 
H.averi"^"" attempted to predict the borrower's 
health by using financial ratios a predictor variables. 
To predict the event a sample of 524 small units 
contpi • 1-J ing of good, regular and sick units was taken-
Ninety per cent of the units in the sample had 
investment up to R s . 3.75 lakhs. Twenty—two ratios wee 
considered for identifying the health of small scale 
indu'otf" 1 es. Of these only five significant ratios were 
'JU I t-M t.tjU un thu Ijasis of "t test. 1 he five ratios 
ar^e: the current ratio, stock/cost of goods sold, 
current assets/net sales, net profit before taxes/total 
capital employed and net worth/total outside 
liabilities. The multiple discriminant analysis 
technique was applied to assign in the sample to one of 
the groups viz. good, irregular and sick. Accuracy of 
prediction was found tobe 76> per cent inthe initial 
^amplfc5 and £,V per cent in the hold out ssample for one 
year before the event. 
17 
Chattergee and Roy"^"^ have trried to use the 
sset growth as an indicator forprediction of industrial 
sickness v^ lith a set of auto—regression equation, but 
the indicator has been chosen abitrarily. 
NCAER have also studied industrial sickness 
using multiple discriminant function. 
35 Rao and Sarma applied multiple discriminant 
analysis to a sample of 60 textile firms comprising 30 
failed and non—failed firms. The discriminant function 
found to be efficient included 5 financial ratios which 
were: net worth to total assets, debtors turnovers, 
wot-king capital to total assets, retained earnings to 
total assets, earnings before interest and taxes to 
total assets. 
Bhattacharya and Pande have also studied 




Gupta has carried out a study on "corporate 
sicknevis" using financial ratios. He has taken a sample 
of 41 textile companies of which 21 non sick and 20 
new sick. Fifty—six ratios, classified into two broad 
categories of profitabiity ratios and balance—sheet 
ratios, were tested for each year of 13 year p.eriod 
I.e. 1962-74. Five profitability ratios were finally 
selected vsihich individually had shown to possess 
IS 
Highest predictive power when appied to a homogeneous 
industry group. In order to minimise the 
classification error rates, he recommended a 
combination of the following four profitability ratios: 
(1) £BDIT/sales <2> OCF/sales (3> EBDIT/total assets 
plus accumulated depreciation. Ratio relating to net 
worth were found to be a worst predictor of bankruptcy 
among profitability rat is. The balance sheet ratios 
were not so accur-ate as the profitability ratios. It 
was observed that companies with an inadequate equity 
base had little 'reserve strength' to weather 
adversities and a.rej therefore, sickness—prone. 
Anoth(->r important: observation was that all liquidity 
ra(-iij_ pruvt.'U tu iiti very poor predictor contradicts the 
gr^eat impot'tance traditionally attached to liquidity 
analysis in appraising corporate health, the current 
ratio, for e;;ample, showed an average c lassi f ic t ion 
e»'ror' almost thretj times more than prafitahiity ratios 
in case of textile companies. However, the scope of 
this method in predicting industrial sickness is found 
lu lJ(_' liinlib-'d. In addition the financial institutions 
do not restrict their operations to any single group of 
industry. 
Srivastava used a combination of 
operational, technincal and financial parameters to 
d 1'-.ui-I ni 1 tiaie bu'lwL.'t?n the sick and he 1 thy units. He 
developed a linear discriminant function comprising 
seven ratio parameters— five financial, one technincal 
and one operational. These ratios were net worth/total 
assets, net block/net worth, net profit/total assets, 
total liabilities/net worth, current assets/current 
liabilities, capacity utilisation ratio and plant 
utilisation ratio. A computer model was built up using 
three financial ratios, and the predictive acuracy of 
the model was computed. The misclassifiation error was 
15 per cent which reduced to lO per cent when five 
financial ratios were used. It further reduced to 5 
per cent when first three finanial ratios were combined 
with technical and operational ratios. The model was 
enlarged to include all the seven variables which 
resulted in lOO per cent predictive accuracy at l.O per 
cent level of significance. 
Most of the studies dealing with corporate 
sickness have explored a number of financial ratios as 
predictors of corporate sickness and incoported a large 
number of ratios in their predictive models. In brief, 
the purpose of these studies has been: (i) to 
investigate whether financial ratios air^e the 
significant variables to predict the survival or 
failure of the firms: and (ii> to detect the ratio or a 
set of ratios tal-:en together which sire good predictors 
or* indicators of such an event. 
Of y 
The studies conducted for predicting company 
failure are scanty in India. Very little progress has 
been made in empirical testing of financial ratios with 
a view to showing which of them realy reflect a 
comp£U">y's state of health, its chances of survival or 
failure. Since no serious systematic attempt has been 
made in this direction, therefore, an attempt has beeen 
made in this study to show the way towards a more 
systematic and scientific financial ratio analysis for 
predicting the chances of survival or failure of' a 
company. Furthermore, an attempt has been made to know 
t^^^J cau'jiciG of Industrial Sickness xn Cotton Textile 
Mills of Uttar Pradesh. 
Objectives of the Study: 
The general objectives of the study is to 
diagnose the sickness in cotton textile mills of Uttar 
Pradesh by identifying the causes and to suggest 
preventive and curative measures. The specific 
objectives of the study are: 
1. To review the concept of Industrial Sickness. 
-". |«i ii.-.-vit3w i h w (h tvori uiiwM I. (nil H I (sej rni* 
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rehabilitating the Industrial Sickness-
3. To analyse the growth and development of 
Cotton Textile Mills of India. 
4. To analyse the performance of Sick Cotton 
Textile Mills of U.P. 
5- To evaluate the financial performance of 
SicU Cotton I extile mills of National 
Textile Corporation with an object to 
predict sickness through ratio analysis.. 
6. To idc?ntify the factors cauaing sicknetsa in 
Cotton Textile mills of U.p". 
7. To conclude the finding and to suggest 
remedial measures to arest the sickness for 
the revival of the units selected for the 
study. 
METHODOLOGY 
To fulfil the objectives of the study both 
the primary and secondary data were collected from the 
following sources. 
1. The Employers Association of Nothern India, 
Kanpur. 
2. National Textile Corporation , l^anpur. 
3. British India Corporation , Kanpur. 
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4. Chambers of Commerce, Kanpur. 
5. Directorate of Industries, Kanpur. 
6. National Handloom Development Corporation 
L-td. Lucknow. 
7. PHD House, Associate Chambers of Commerce, 
N.Delhi. 
8. Ministry of Textile, Udyog Bhavan, N .Delhi. 
9. Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce. 
N.Delhi. 
10. Elgin Mills. No.l, Kanpur. 
11. New Victoria Mills , Kanpur. 
12. Atherton Mills, Kanpur. 
13. Swadeshi Cotton Textile Mills, Kanpur. 
I'\ . iiwade-iih i Cotton Mills, N a m i . 
15. Bijli Cotton Mills, Hathras. 
16. Shri Vikram Cotton Mills , Lucknow. 
17. Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh. 
18. Seminar, Department of Commerce, AMU. 
fn au liic'vu iha B«vpjn «il) t1«c t J V4-JV< of 1;hw «1;ndy, 
field investigation has undertaken and primary data 
were collected from the selected sick cotton textile 
mills of Uttar Pradesh with the help of structured 
qut:fb>t lutiiiairti. 
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Limitation of the Study 
The limitation under which the study 
conducted are as follows. 
The first limitation was the cost 
consideration and time factor. The second limitation 
is that the study is confined to only seven sick cotton 
textile mills of U.P. Third limitation is that no 
scholarship and other financial support was given by 
the university for conducting the survey and collection 
of data-
Final ly, researcher faced many problems in 
collecting the primary data from the selected units. 
However*, the above mentioned limitations have hardly 
any significant effect on the quality of present study. 
Scheme of the Chapterisation. 
The study is presented in seven chapters. 
In the introduction a brief review of earlier studies," 
scope of the study, objectives of the study, method of 
collecting data and limitation of the study have been 
described- The first chapter is devoted to review the 
concept of sicJiness. The second chapter reviews the 
Government policies which have been designed to 
24 
rahabilitate the sick units in India. The third 
chapter deals with the growth and development of cotton 
Textile mills of India. Chapter fourth highlights the 
performance of cotton textile mills of Uttar Pradesh. 
Chapter fifth evaluates the financial analysis of 
National Textile Corporation's mills of Uttar Pradesh 
to identify the sickness in the mills. Chapter sixth 
has been devoted to identifying the Internal and 
Exter'nal causes of sickness and chapter seventh runs 
through the summary and conclusion. 
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INDUSTRIAL SICKNESS- A CONCEPTUAL APPROACH 
A person is treated as sick if any organ of 
its body (system or sub system) is not functioning 
normally. Similarly, if any functional area of an 
industrial unit (viz. production, finance, marketing, 
personnel management) develops any abnormality, the 
whole unit may became sick. 
The term "Sick Units" carries different 
meaning depending upon the content in which it is 
used. The person associated with the unit may look at 
it differently. For instance, the workers of a Sick 
Unit may consider it sick if they are not getting their 
wages and increments in time. The investors may 
consider it sick if the company is not declaring any 
dividends, the financial institutions may judge it from 
lis nrronnt and rinn — ptaymp?ri <; nf J nvw« Imcsn t.w, thw 
proiiM) t.tM'u dirty oiwaniufia H; from t.liuf rwfluct;irni Jn r(a»(;nrn 
on thoir investment etc. 
Thus, there are a number of definitions for 
sicknu"jjS wliich ar^e based on different norms viz. 
liquidity, solvency, erosion of equity, cash losses, 
amount of irregularity in bank accounts etc. some of 
the important definitions provided by different 
organisations and people have been discussed as 
follows. rja 
Industrial sickness is defined as "the 
situation where the revenue of a firm are insufficient 
to meet the cost and the rate of return on investment 
is less than firm's cost of capital' The study team 
of State Bank of India in its Report on Small Scale 
Industries Advances, 1975, defined a sick uint as "One 
which fails to generate an internal surplus on a 
continuing basis and depends for its survival upon a 
frequent infusions or external funds". 
The State Bank of India while defining a sick 
unit set the guidelines as s 
i) erosion of equity into negative, 
ii) continuous cash losses over a period of time 
resulting in slide down of its equity say 
less than 50 per cent, 
iii) persistent irregular drawings in working 
capital accounts, not converted by current 
assets say for a year reflecting increasing 
trend, 
iv) stoppage of production activity.-
The Development Commissioner of Small Scale 
Industries followed the under mentioned criteria for 
deforming their sicknesss 
i) capacity utilisation below 50 per cent in 
comparision to higher capacity utilised 
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during preceding five years, 
ii> closure of the unit for a period more than 
six months, 
iii) during the short period, the units running 
of irregular accounts with the bank 
continuously for a period of six to nine 
months reflects its distress, 
iv) over a period of time the sickness could be 
measured in terms of erosion of net worth 
of the unit and the rate at which it was 
eating away its capital which could be more 
than lO per cent per annum. 
Reserve Bank of India has defined the 
sickness as "a sick unit is one which incurs cash 
losses for one year and which in the judgement of the 
bank, is likely to continue to incur cash lasses for 
the current year as well as the following year, and 
which has an imbalance in its finance structure, such 
as a current ratio of less than Isl and a worsening 
rloh I. - f MiM i fcy ratio (lotial outaide liabilities to net 
w i M tti ) •• . '•'* 
" A unit may be considered sick in which a 
major part, say 50 per cent of its equity and reserves 
are t?r"oded by cash losses. In the case of the 
entrepreneurs scheme,a sick unit is one in which there 
are no owned funds, a depletion of 15 per cent in the 
total working funds of these units may be considered 
indication of sickness- A persistent irregularity in 
working capital advances (not on account of 
inadequacy of limits) for a period of 12 to 18 months 
or stoppage of production for a sufficiently long 
period, say, sii; months, may be taken to signify 
sickness". A sick unit is also defined as one which 
does not yield a reasonable return, say 15 per cent on 
capital and reserves after providing for depreciation-
An other view says that a sick unit is one which works 
below 20 per cent of its installed capacity or works at 
lower than break even point. 
According to ICICI, 'Sick Industry' is one 
whose financial viability is threatened by adverse 
factors present and continuing. The adverse factors 
might relate to management, market, fiscal burden, 
labour relations or any other. When the impact of these 
factors reaches a point when a company begins to incur 
ca^ti lost.c!3 leailing to erosion of its fund there i« a 
tlireat, to i ta financial viability. Th« rir»«ncl«l BJll, 
1977 contained a clause defining a sick unit as one 
whotjt-' tjO pfcjr cent ur more of the capital reserves were 
wiptid out by the losses. 
Industrial Development Bank of India(IDBI) 
defined Sick Unit as one which has incurred cash 
losses during the previous accounting year and is 
n 
likely to incur cash losses in the current year and 
there is erosion on its net worth to the extent of 50 
per cent or more. 
The National Institute of Bank Management 
defined Sick Units as "those where the operation 
results in continuous losses bring down the working 
capital available and ultimately affecting the 
borrowing potential almost permanently". In tune with 
this definition the Small Industries Development 
Organization observed "A Unit is sick if the capacity 
utilisation is less than 20 per cent of the installed 
capac i ty". 
The Small Industries Development Organisation 
while adopting the definition of Sick Units paid more 
emphasis on the capacity utilisation. It has pointed 
out that unit which is utilising its installed capacity 
below 20 per cent will be considered as sick unit. 
As per terms lending institutions a unit is 
c 1 aa«_. I f ied .JLB «iick after taking'into account any or 
moi'u! ul tlie following symptoms (a) continuous defaultes 
in meeting four consecutive half yearly instalments of 
intt^reut; or principal in respect of i nta11 tu11 onal 
luuni^ j (b) continuous losses for a period of two years 
or a continued erosion in the net worth, say by 50 per 
< t-M I (. (( ) nil Hill t i I i(j <Aiiwai!a un auLuunt of '^t<*tutary and 




The Government of India enacted the sick 
Industrial Companies <Special provisions). Act, 1985. 
According to it, "an Industrial company (being a 
company registered for not less than seven years) as 
sick when it has at the end of any financial year 
accumulated losses equal to, or exceeding its entire 
net work and has also suffered cash losses in such 
finani-ial year, and the financial year Immediately 
1 2 preceding such financial year". 
International Labour Organisation defines 
units as sick if it works below 25 per cent of the 
installed capacity. 
Ihu definition of sick industrial company as 
per the Sick Industrial Companies Act, 1985 is as under: 
"Sick Industrial Company means an industrial 
Company (being a company registered for not less than 
seven years) which has at the end of any financial 
year accumulated losses equal to or e>;ceeding its 
entire networth and has also suffered cash losses in 
such financial year immediately preceding such 
1 4 financial year". 
Under sec. 23 of this Act, those companies 
whose accumulated losses as at the end of 
any financial year have resulted in 
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erosion of fifty per cent of net worth 
would also attract the provisions of the 
Act.^^ 
Any industrial organisation would be treated 
as sick if it does not function normally. The lenders 
view a unit is sick, if <a) it fails in payment of 
interest on loan due to cash losses, and for <b) there 
is a financial imbalance that is to say the current 
ratio is lower than 'one' and the capital is heavily 
geared and/or (c> the sales (quantity and volume) and 
the profits and dwindling consistently- In this way a 
sick unit may be one in which current ratio is lower 
than one or current libilities exceeds current assets 
and profits are continuously going going down resulting 
to the failure in the payment of interest on loans and 
furtliur more the* »inlt fails to repay the loan in timfa. 
For its survival it began to look for freshers loans 
for meeting its obligations. 
In view of Ministry of Labour, an early 
warning of impending industrial sickness would be the 
first occasion of the managment defaulting in the 
payment of workers, dues constantly for a period of 
three months. Such defaults can serve as an advance 
warning to the state Government as also to the banks 
and financial institutions for being alert about such 
3G 
un i ts. 17 
According to another School of Thought, only 
such units may be deemed as sick where a major part, 
say, about a half of their equity and reserves is wiped 
out by way of continuing cash losses. In fact, the soft 
loan scheme of the Industrial Development Bank of India 
(IDBI) designed to tone up the financial viability 
through increased productivity of industrial units, 
would cover only weak unite, whose owned funde hove 
been wiped off to the extent of 50 per cent or more and 
which have incurred cash losses during the last two 
years. For the purpose of identifying the sick units, 
thta pare^mtitwra prtsscrlbed by thta RBI ar© usually 
adopted by banks including SBI, in order to ensure 
uniformity of apporach. 
Industrial sickness is defined as "the 
situation where the revenue of a firm are insufficient 
to meet the cost,and the rate of return on investment 
1 S is less than firm's cost of capital". 
I 
It means when the cost of capital exceeds, 
the expected or actual return of a firm, the unit 
becomes sick. It is a position where it is found 
unprofitable to run the industrial unit because the 
revenues of the firm are lesser than the cost of 
capital or investment. 
(a) At the "enterprise" level cash loss i.e.,loss 
^7 
before depreciation, over a continuous stretch of three 
years could form a practical yardstick for identifying 
sick units. Cash losses suffered for just one or -two 
years may be very temporary phenomena in the life of an 
organisation which has been in existence for over a 
period of around, say, ten years, after its gestation 
stage is over. An extension of this yardstick could 
be — a unit would be sick if cash losses were suffered 
by it for more than or equal to 50 per cent of the 
duration of the business cycle for that industry or for 
two successive cycles. Even if a firm does not incur 
cash losses, post depreciation losses could have eroded 
its net worth over a number of years. It may therefore 
be suggested that as soon as a firm's accumlated "share 
capital plus free reserve" become zero, it should be 
considered as a sick unit. A firm may have been 
incurring cash losses for three years, and yet ita net 
wnrih m^ y^ not t»ave» cnme> anywhere n««r x«rr>. fir, t:4*ffih 
losses for even two years may have turned the net worth 
to zero or negative. It is prudent therefor© to assess 
sickness by the joint use of both criteria. For us, 
l*c»lh t^  i Lua t loriL. tihould qualify for being called as 
(b) At the "industry" level, the proportion of 
indiviiidual units defined as sick in terms of the 
previous paragraph, to the total number of units 
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e>'. ist inq—both computed on the same date could be a 
measure of sickness afficting a given industry. As a 
starting point we may suggest that if such a ratio is 
40 percent or more, for a certain industry, it could be 
called sick. One may criticise this index by arguing 
that it may not ev;press the degree of affiction in an 
industry in terms of other parameters like installed 
capacity or capital employed. Thus, although 5 per cent 
of the units could be sick, in terms of the proportion 
of total installed capacity for that industry this may 
represent only 30 per cent. And there could be reverse 
situation also where only 30 per cent of the units 
could be sick which might constitute 50 per cent of the 
installed capacity or capital employed. While capital 
employed will have several definitional problems, 
installed capacity would be a more standardised 
parameters. Hence, one can suggest that a given 
industry may be called sick if 50'/. or more of its 
aggregate installed capacity consists of the installed 
capacities of enterprises which are sick as defined in 
the previous, paragraph. Besides, industry here would 
exclude small scale industry as defined today. This 
size group needs to be treated separately. 
<c) Lastly, at the "regional" level too one can 
suggest some index of sickness. The policy formulation 
cannot ignore this aspect. One can submit that the 
trend in the ratio of sick units defined as above to 
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the number^ of new units for each year over a period of, 
say, last ten years might be watched for measuring 
regional sickness. One should perhaps exclude from such 
calculations mammoth public sector units. It is also 
cidmitted that the new units may not have parity with 
sick units in terms of employment potential, vis—a—vis 
investment made, and so on. Such refinements shoulpf, 
await further research. 
Conclusion 
On the basis of above mentioned definitions 
and the criteria it may be concluded that sick unit is 
one which bears one or more of the following symptoms: 
<i> a unit having negative equity; <ii> a unit 
incurring continous cash losses; (iii) the chances of 
recouping losses are either low or negative; (iv) a 
nr> i t siiat^ ti;. uating away its capital; <v) a unit stopped 
1 l& prodULl ion at^tiviiiB&i (vi) UuK'heh^i liabilities 
M)<< .«>t^(lt^  <»ui't»fii cAuuttiui <vll) Irretjular account^i with 
l«ai>Ku)V <viii> (» iutit (. l<mu<l purmcAnun I ly I <1M) «I unit 
ulillulng lis capacity below 20 percent; (x) rate of 
return on investment is less than the cost of capital; 
(xi) increased customers complaints; (xii) ability to 
face competition and ability to exist in the market is 
low; (xiii) a unit fails to meet its social and 
economic obligations; <xiv) a unit is not in a position 
4a 
to survive; ( K V ) low employees morale due to 
mismanagement; <Kvi) decline in the quality .and 
service; <Kvii) a sick unit is one that has incurred 
cash losses in the immediately preceding two years and 
in the judgement of credit institutions is expected to 
incur these losses during the current year; <xviii) a 
sick unit is one whose net worth has been eroded to the 
extent of at least 50 percent; <xix> a sick unit is one 
whose working capital advance account with the bank was 
irregular and this persisted over a longer period of 
time 12 to 18 months and is likely to become more 
persistent; and <xx) a sick unit is one which has 
defaulted in paying four consecutive half—yearly <or 
two consecutive annual) instalments of principal and 
interest on terms loans, if any. 
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Cbapter » 
GOVERNMENT POLICIES FOR REHABILITATION OF SICKNESS 
IN INDUSTRIES - A REVIEW 
Sickness has different meanings to 
different people. To the investors it is 
foregoing payment of dividends, to the 
industrialist it is growing financial liability and 
erosion of their investments by loses, to the workers 
it is the threat of losing job, to the financial 
institution it is the question of sinking large funds, 
and to the Government it is the problem of precious 
capital going waste and valuable assets remaining 
idle. The effect of industrial sickness on . bank 
and other financial institution is to make their 
operations less productive. Profitability of banks 
is eroded by interest write-offs, loan write downs, 
revenue loses from reduced interest rates and interest 
funding at zero—rates and non—availabi1ity of funds 
for recycling. 
Keeping in view the growing incidence of 
industrial sickness and the resources blocked in sick 
units, it is realised that solutions atrs to be found to 
rehabi1ititate sick units. 
Rehablitat ion is a remedy considered for 
industrial units which have already become sick and a^rG 
on the verge of virtual collapse. Some viable policy 
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measures ar-e required to revive the sick units. Ad—hoc 
remedies and commitments to keep the unit running would 
not help to overcome the problem of industrial sickness 
in the long run-
Rehabilitation has been discussed under two headsa 
<I> What has been done at the various 
levels by the Union Government, the Reserve Bank 
of India and the Financial Institutions to 
rehabi1ititate sick units? 
(II> What should be done to revive sick units? 
Some of the measure evolved to rehabilitate 
sick units at various levels are below. 
1. Industrial Reconstruction Corporation of India. 
2. Soft Loan Scheme (1976) 
3. Merger Policy <1977) 
4. Policy Guidelines on Sick Units (1978) 
5. Government Policy for Industrial Scheme (1981) 
Industrial Reconstruct ion Corporation of India 
The Industrial Reconstruction Corporation of 
India Ltd. was cot up in 1971 an «n adjunct to th« 
devolopmontal institutions with the primary objectlvB 
to revive or revitalise industrial units which were 
closed or those which were sick and facing closure but 
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showed promise of viability. Now the IRCI maintains a 
list of professional managers, invites public sector 
units to share their expertise management practices, in 
sick units-
Soft Loan Scheme 
The soft loan scheme was introduced in 
November, 1976 for modernising the five selected 
industies, namely, cotton textiles, jute, cement, sugar 
and ' specified engineering industries. The main 
objective of the scheme is to provide financial 
assistance on concessional terms to the weaker units in 
these five groups for modernisation, replacement and 
renovation of their old plant and machinery. 
f 
The scheme is being operated by the IDBI with 
participation of IFCI and ICICI. The IFCI is the lead 
institution for jute and sugar industries, IDBI for 
cotton and cement industries and ICICI for engineering 
industries. However, the over all responsibility of 
operating the scheme is vested in IDBI. Loans, under 
the soft loan scheme, are provided on concesttlonal 
terms not only regard to the rate of interest, but also 
in regard to other provisions such as the promoter's 
contribution, debt equity ratio, initial moratorium and 
repayment period. In pursuance of the decision taken 
by the Union Government in November 1977, loan under 
this scheme are exempted from the convertibility 
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c. lause-
Under the so"ft loan scheme, the unit have 
bc?en clacci fieri into throo groupa-wejak, not B O W O A U and 
better off units. 'Weak' unit are those in respect of 
which erosion in paid-up capital and reserves is above 
50 per cent, * not so weak' units are those in respect 
o-f which such erosion is up to 50 per cent and 'better 
off' units as those without such erosion. The entire 
financial assistance to * weak units' is given at 
concessional rate of 7.5 per cent, vihile" the 
concessional part is reduced in the case of 'not so 
weak' and 'better off' units on a grading scale 
di^pending upon the financial position of the units. 
Merger Policy <1977> 
In 1977, the Union Government evolved a 
scheme of merger of sick units with healthy ones with a 
view to revive sick industrial units. In the Finance 
Act, 1977 the Bovernmenti introduced certain fiscal 
concession under section 72—A of the income—tax Act. 
Whereby a healthy unit taking over a sick unit was 
allowed to eatery forward and set off the accumulated 
losses and unabsorbed depreciation of the latter 
against its own tax incidence. However, it was 
stipulated that the merger should be in the public 
interset. In respect of the amalgamations mooted by 
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MRTP companies, the requirement was an overwhelming 
public interest. Three conditions were laid down for 
overwhelming public interest s 
(a) The amalgamated companies should have experience of 
manufacturing the same products as produced by the 
sick unit proposed to be taken over by it. 
<b> The sick unit considered for merger with a healthy 
unit should belong to a industry suffering from 
widespread and chronic sickness. 
(c> Yhere must be a demonstrable gain to public 
intereset through the proposed merger. 
It was further required that (1) the sick 
unit to be taken over should have employed staff 
numbering more than lOO and <2) it should have assest 
of more than Rs 50 lakhs. These two conditions " were 
applicable to both MRTP and non—MRTP companies. 
In September 1980, the Union Government 
decided to withdraw all the above conditions on account 
of steady progress of company takeover under the 
scheme. The liberalisation led to more expeditious 
clearance of merger proposal which is clear from tho 
data that between 1978 and Soptambor 1980, only 16 
schemes had been apoproved, while between Sepemtember 
1980 and June 1981 the number of approvals was 25. 
Until August 1979 ,the Government did not 
allow amalgamations of intei—connected companies or 
48 
subsidiaries with their principal units taking the view 
that such mergers were against the basic objectives of 
the policy relaxation under Section 72—A of the Income 
Tax Act. But in August 1979, in a bid to make the 
scheme more attractive, it was decided to throw open 
the tax concession also to companies mergering with 
their subsidiaries or inter—connected units. 
Government Policy on Sick Industry (1978) 
The Minister of Industry announced in the Lok 
Sabha on 15th May 1978, a policy on sick industries. 
The Policy <197B> on Sick IndM«trj«?R recogniswd that 
t.l»w r«iBvlvii»l <•» f A dick unit connofc hu rojaponnlb i 11 ty of 
tfjtny tainglu agency and that It can b© achieved 
urr<tfctiv&ly unly by a »h«rlng of the rveponeibl11ty by 
Central Government and state governments. Some of the 
important features of the policy a^r^e : 
In case where the units are sick due to 
faulty management practites, financial institutions 
will jointly set up a group of professional directors 
to be nominated on the board of directors of such 
compan ies.— 
- In the case of industrial units that are 
already sick the following options be explored before 
the take over of manamengent: (a) Rehabilitation 
through state goverments and financial institutions 
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which ' would provide both financial and managerial 
support. 
<b) Proposals, if any for the merger of the sick unit 
with a healthy unit, 
— In other cases a screening committee set up 
under the chairmanship of the Secretary, Industrial 
Development, with the representatives of financial 
institutions will examine the further course of action. 
— Certain guidelines have been evolved which 
the screening committee will take into account while 
considering the possibility of take—over of the 
management under the Industries Act. 
— In certain cases the screeing committee- may 
recommend initial take—over of management particularly 
where the unit employed more than 500 persons and has 
fixed assets of not less than Rs. one crore. Besides, 
management will also' be taken over of the unit is 
considered necessary in national interest. 
— After take over of the management. 
Government may sell it as a running concern or 
reconstruct the under taking, or merge the unit with a 
public sector undertaking. 
— Sick units of the small scale sector will 
be given special attention. 
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It Mould appear from the above Policy 
Statement that Government have given a major 
responsibility to banks and financial institutions to 
appoint directors on the boards of management. 
Similarly, take over of management by Government in 
many cases may not be the right solution. It may be 
mentioned that in some cases Government policy itself 
has been responsible for causing sickness in industrial 
units. For instance, the controlled cloth policy of 
the Government in the textile industry had made many 
units sick as the prices were pegged down at an 
uneconomic level. Goverment have now announced the New 
Textile Policy and the obligation of the mills in the 
private sector has been phased out from 1st October 
1978. This policy declaration itself has improved the 
working of many textiles mills. 
Government Policy for Industrial Scheme , 1981 
For dealing systematically with the problem 
of industrial sickness, in October 1981, Government of 
India announced certain policy measures for the 
guidance of Central Ministries, state governments and 
financial institutions. The salient features of these 
guidelines were as follows : 
a) Administrative Ministries' Role 
The administrative ministries in the Central 
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Government attre the authorities that have specific 
responsibility for prevention and remedial action in 
relation to sickness in industrial sector within their 
respective charge. They should play a central role in 
monitoring sickness and coordinating action for revival 
and rehabilitation of sick units. In suitable cases, 
they should also establish Standing Committees for 
major industrial sectors where sickness is widespread. 
b) Strengthening of the Monitoring Mechanism 
by Bank and Financial Institutions 
Financial institutions should strengthen the 
monitoring system so that it is possible to take timely 
corrective action to prevent incipient sickness. They 
should obtain periodical returns from the assisted 
units and from the directors nominated by them on the 
boards of such units. These should be analysed by 
Industrial Development Bank of India and results of the 
analysis should be conveyed to the financial 
incit i tu t i on<3 concerned and the government. 
c) Diagnostic Studies by Banks and Financial 
Institutions and Drawing up of Revival Plans 
The financial institutions and banks should 
inil, iaip? ri»<»ta»ary tiorrwctlvo 4»c:tinn frar micU or pronw— 
to-sickness units based on diagnostic studies. In case 
of growing sickness, the financial institutions should 
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also consider assumptions of management responsibility 
where they are confident of restoring a units to 
health. 
The most vital atspcct perhaps i« » critical 
assessment of the proposed unit's resilience in times 
of adversity. For any unit, the seeds of sickness lie 
in its vulnerability to adveresly changing parameters. 
In the present times of uncertainty , such parameters 
could be factors like inflation, imposition of import 
or export restrictions, the possibility of 
technological obsolescence, and so on. 
Financial institutions often fail to lay down 
strict criteria and also areas of priority in respect 
of capital expenditure by the borrowers. The result is 
reckless distortion of priorities by some of the 
borrowers. A large part of the expenditure incurred 
during the implementation of the project is often found 
to be avoidable at that stage. Among others, they 
resulted in keeping the capital of the company larger 
than the normally accepted level, leading to a higher 
debt serving burden. But financial institutions are 
unable to act effectively. They should not allow their 
borrowers to get their priorities wrong. 
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d) Report by Banks and Financial Institutions tO' 
Government to Determine whether Nationalisation 
of the Units or any Other Alternative is Necessary 
Whoro banks and financial institutions are 
unable to prevent sickness or ensure revival of a sick 
unit, they should deal with their outstanding dues to 
the unit in accordance with the normal banking 
procedures. However, before doing so, they should 
report the matter to the Central Government Enow -BIFR, 
constituted under the Sick Industrial Companies 
(Special Provisions) Act 1983] who would decide whether 
the unit should be nationalised or whether any other 
alternative, including workers* participation in, the 
management, can revive the undertaking. 
e) Take-over of a Sick Unit Under IDR Act 
Where it is decided to nationalise the 
undertaking, its management may be taken over under the 
1 
provisions of the Industries (Development &< Regulation) 
Act 1951, for a period of six months to enable the 
Government to take necessary steps for nationalisation. 
f) Decision after Take-Over 
In regard to the industrial undertakings already 
being managed under the provisions of the Industries 
(Development tt Regulation ) Act 1951, a decision should 
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be taken if it should be nationalised or any other 
alternajtives can provide a solution, the alternatives 
being revival under the same management, revival under 
a new management, amalgamation/merger of a sick unit 
with a healthy one, leasing, etc. If none of the 
alternatives is considered feasible, the Government may 
consider de-notification of the unit, in which event 
the banks and financial institutions will deal with 
their outstanding dues to the undertaking in accordance 
with the normal banking procedures. 
Present Industrial Infrastructure for Monitoring 
Sickness 
The following are the main monitoring 
agencies currently functioning in the country : 
(a) Monitoring Cells in Banks 
Each bank has a setup of its own to monitor 
cases of sickness among its clients. Irregular 
accounts are placed under special scrutiny. Also, when 
applications for renewal of credit facilities or fresh 
facilities come up, banks are supposed to carafully go 
jittc) thu health of their clients (basically on the 
basis of selected financial indicators). Banks in 
their turn pass on the information to the RBI. 
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<b) Sick Industrial Undertaking Cell of RBI 
Within the RBI, there is a Sick Industrial 
Undertaking Cell which acts as a clearing house for 
information relating to sick units and also monitors 
information relating to undertakings which are covered 
under rehabilitation/nursing programmes. 
(c) RBI Standing Committee 
A Standing Co—ordination Committee in the RBI 
tries to bring about better co-ordination between 
concerned agencies. Its activities ar^e different from 
those of the cell is basically an information gathering 
agency, the Standing Committee gets itself involved. in 
devising measures and in bringing about co-ordination 
between the measures to be taken by different agencies. 
(d) Special Cell in IDBI and Other All-India Financial 
Institutions ' 
The IDBI and other financial institutions 
have special cells which collect informations about 
sick units and then pass it on to the RBI. 
(e) Industrial Reconstruction Bank of India <IRBI> 
The Industrial Reconstruction Corporation of 
India <IRCI), which was established in 1971 with a view 
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to functioning as a credit and reconstruction agency 
for industrial revival and rehabilitation of sick and 
clo«3ud industrial units, has now been changed as 
Industrial Reconstruction Bank of India (IRBI). It 
had no special powers and it could at the most act as a 
catalyst to bring together the banks, the 
enterpreneurs, the institutions and the Government to 
explore the possibilities of rehabilitation. The IRBI 
was left in a very difficult situation to prepare and 
implement rehabilitation schemes in co-operation with 
multiple of agencies, but it had no legal or statutory 
power to enforce any scheme through these agencies. 
Out of the 330 units assisted by Industrial 
Reconstruction Bank of India till the end of June 1986, 
136 units are revived and 131 are under nursing 
programme. The rest of the units have either continued 
to incur losses or have been de—notified with measures 
initiated for legal proceedings and recall of advances. 
Merger and Amalgamation 
Another measure to revive the sick units 
could be to allow the merger of sick units with the 
healthy ones. To facilitate this arrangement, the 
Finance (NO. 2) Act, 1961 relaxing the provisions 
contained in that Act relating to carry forward and 
set—off accumulated business loss and unabsorbed 
depreciation allowance in certain cases of 
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amalpamation. This scheme does not seem to be very 
popular since only 19 companies have applied for 
amalgamation so far under 72A. With protracted 
delay only a few applications have been cleared. 
The main hurdle seems to be clearance from the MTTPC 
angle. The delay in taking decision by the specified 
authority in granting mergers has dampened by the 
interest of healthy units and the MRTP units to go 
forward to revive a sick unit through this process. 
Conclusion and Suggestion 
There cannot be one single solution for the 
levival ol LiicknesB. Problems have to be identified 
industrywise and unitwise. The units which have been 
mis-managed will have to change hands, and a proper 
scheme of reconstruction would have to be devised. In 
deserving cases, mergers and amalgamation should be 
allowed rather than take—over of the management by 
Bavernment. Wherever Government poicy is responsible 
lor making an industry sicU, it would be advisable to 
<nodity the policy taking into account the broader 
objectives of growth. In some cases a unit may not 
be viable inspite of any assistance that can be given 
for temporary sustenance. Such units should be allowed 
to close down. Of course, this will create the 
problem of displacement of labour, but this will have 
to be sorted out rather than creating further 
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difficulties by merely keeping the units alive. 
In the revival of sick units banks and 
financial institutions have a great role to play. 
They have to strengthen their monitoring system and 
initiate early steps before the units reach a stage 
that they cannot be revived. In fact, the banks and 
financial institutions have not been properly able to 
organise their monitoring system and they do not have 
up—to-rdate information about the assisted units. 
Since the causes for sickness could be 
different for diffrent units, there cannot be a 
specific formula to rehabilitate a sick unit. Each 
case will have to be diagnosed separately and proper 
remedies should be found for it. However, some broad 
guidelines are suggeseted to nurse and rehabilitate a 
sick industrial unit. The following may be considered 
important in this regard. 
<a) The causes for sickness must be clearly 
identified, preferably through a diagnostic study 
by a competent independent agency. Aliao the 
potential viability of the unit must be analysed 
considering the size of the unit, the stock of a 
bank and the complexities or sophistication of 
operat ion. 
(b) The assets and liabilities of unit must be 
ascertained from the borrowers and this 
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information must be put to the scrutiny o-f 
aud i tars. 
<c) The assets charged both current and fixed should 
toe evaluated, pari icularly when it is estimated 
that there is a wide gap between the outstanding 
amount and the declared book value of assets. 
(d) An assessment of fund required both long term and 
short term, should be made. Normally, a bank will 
provide additional funds for working capital, , but 
some amount on a long—term basis may also be made 
available depending upon the urgency of the 
situation. In other words the long—term capital 
base of small units must be improved. 
(e) Necessary resources must be made available to 
install additional machinery to modernise the unit 
and improve its productivity. 
(f) Managerial deficiencies must be detected and the 
units must be asked to induct professionals on the 
Board of Direcctors. Competent technical and 
managerial personnel must be appointed to the key 
positions to in—production, finance and marketing. 
<g) Sick units need time to genertae surplus and build 
themselves up when remedial measures are applied. 
They would, therefore, need concessions in 
111 tertjtit, margin money and time for the repayment 
of debts. Depending upon the merits of each case, 
a bank will have to consider : 
6U 
(i) The funding of unpaid interest/instalment/ 
uncovered part of the advance^ 
(li) easy repayment instalment of long—term 
lodoia with roAsonabie mordtoriumi) 
(iii) reducing interest and margin; 
(h) The Government may come up with proposals, if 
necessary through legislation to protect the 
interest of the small industry. 
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GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF COTTON TEXTILE MILLS 
IN INDIA - An Overview 
After Independence, there were .lust over 10 
millions spindles and nearly 200 thousand looms in the 
organised sector of the country. Most of the machines 
were obsolete and outdated. They had been working 
round the clock during the war periods in order to 
fulfil wartime requirements as well as the needs of the 
c ivi1i an. 
The Textile industry was badly effected due 
to partition- More than 30 per cent of the cotton 
growing aLt^ea was in the territorial boundry of Pakistan 
which created the problem of raw materials-
The textile sector of India can be grouped 
into three sub sectors viz. organised mill sector, 
decentralized powerloom sector, and the handloom 
sector. As on 31st March, 1989, the organised sector 
of the Indian Textile industry consists of 1056 mills 
of which 733 wore mpinning «nd 2t33 compovlto) ml 11a. 
The installed capacity is aggregated to 26.44 million 
spindles and 1.98 lakh looms. The number of installed 
open—end rotors had been placed at 40,000 in 1988-89 as 
against 19,6oO in 1987-88. Out of the total 
spindleage, about 7 millions were reported to be idle. 
Of the total 1.98 lakh looms, 58.052 or 29.4 per cent 
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of the -total, were automatic looms. The total number of 
shuttleless looms was placed at 2213. Of the total 
loomage, about 77,000 were reported to have remained 
idle during l'?8S-89.'^ As regards the decentralised 
sector, consisting of handlooms and pawerloams accurate 
data were not available as there were several 
nnr-fc-'OiSiteretl units which have mushroomed In the rur«l 
ctiul tafcioi I ~((iM»dn ar«ae of feeveral at;«t;fc»fa, Mowevor, on th« 
lirftaita uf ih«=j (Jal;a compiled by differuntj aQencloe, tho 
lit'fcjiatint sir'tjngth of handlooms ia placed at 33«04 lakh 
and tliat of puwerloomB at 9. IB lakhs. 
Capaci ty 
The capacity utilisation in case of spindles 
during 1988-89 was nearly the same as in 1987-88. The 
figure's of shift—wise utilisation were as under: 
lable 3.1 showing the shiftwise capacity utilisation 
Daily average No. 
Year Worked <in Million) Perccntag© Utllisatian 
I 
I II III I II III 
Shift Shift Shift Shift Shift Shift 
1987-ee 19.52 19.80 18.43 74.53 75.60 70.37 
1988-89 19.62 19.90 18.52 74.29 75.35 70.12 
liuijicwi- Ihu fsll India K«darAtlon of Corporation 
Spinning Mills Ltd <AIFCOSPIN ANNUAL). 1989, Bombay. 
6^ 
From the foregoing table 3.1 it can t>e 
observed that the capacity utilisation in Ilnd Shi-ft 
was (75.AC per cent) higher than the 1st Shift (74.53 
per cent) and Ilird Shift <70.37 per cent), While 
comparing to the performance of 1988—89, it can be 
said that the capacity utilisation has declined in all 
the three shifts. 
Average Spindle Utilisation 
An idea of average spindle utilisation of 
working mills in three shifts during the period 1987—88 
and 1988-89 can be had from the following table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 showing the average spindle utilisation of 
working mills < per cent ) . 
1988-89 
I Shift 84-6 85.71 
II Shift 85.8 86.94 
III Shift 79.9 81.17 
, 
Sources- AIFCOSPIN ANNUAL 1989, p.15 
The above mentioned table 3.2 reveals that 
the highest average spindle utilisation was in the Ilnd 
shift followed by 1st shift in 1987-88 and similarly in 
1988-89. 










H»w production of yai«n during 19B0'-B9 and 
1*789—*?0 hais been depicted in the fallowing table. 
Table 3.3 shows the yarn production 
Cotton Yarn 








Source:- AIFCOSPIN ANNUAL 1989, p.15 
It can be seen from the above mentioned 
table 3.3 that the production of cotton yarn has 
slightly declined in 1988—89, but there is an increase 
in the production of blended and non—cotton yarn on 
account of which the total yarn production in 1988—89 
has increased than that of 1987-88. 
Cloth Production 
The total production of cloth by all the 
three sectors viz. mills, powerlooms and handlooms was 
13,282 million metres in 1988-89 as against 12,992 
million metres in 1987—88. The sectoi—wise production 
B6 
of cotton cloth and blended/non—cotton cloth during the 
two years can be seen in the following table 3.4. 
Table 3.4 shows the Cloth Production 
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V4<.xj 3592 12992 9i:a2 42(>:) 13282 
l>a(u-ce :-- AlFUfcF-lN P^ MJCU_ 1989. p. 15 
From tho above mentioned table 3.4 it can 
bu obuurved that the the share of Mills in total cloth 
production is only 21 per cent. While the share of 
powerlooms is 52.8 per cent. During 1987—88, the 
percentage shares of mills, powerlooms and handloomo in 
total cloth production wene 23 per cent, 50 per cent 
and 27 per cent respectively. The total production of 
cotton cloth has decreased from 9400 million metres in 
1987-88 to 9082 mi lion metres in 1988-89. Likewise, 
the share of cotton cloth to the total production had 
also come down from 72 per cent in 1987-88 to 68 per 
cent in 1988-89. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
overall Capacity of cloth production had declined year 
67 
after year which is a sign of industrial sickness. 
Powerlooms 
There were 9.18 lakh powerlooms installed in the 
decentralised textile sector at the end of the year 
1988-89- Out of this, 5-27 lakhs were working on 
cotton. The state-wise break-up powerlooms can be seen 
from Table 3.5 
C^ 
The Table 3.5 shows the number of powerlooms state—wise 
(Figs.in lakhs) 





















































TOTAL 9. 18 5.27 
BoMrce:- AIFCQSPIN ANNUAL 1989, p.6b 
From the above said table it can be seen that 
among the 16 states and union territories, Maharashtra 
has the highest number of powerlooms (3.26 lakhs) 
&a 
fallowed by Gujrat (2.0A lakhs) and Tamil Nadu (1.75 
lakhs). Of the total 9.18 lakhs pawerlooms, 5.27 lalihs 
were cotton powerlooms. Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu had 
the highest number of cotton powerlooms. This leads to 
a conclusion that the cotton industry is highly 
concentrated in Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu. 
Out of the total 5.27 lalih cotton poMsrlooms, 
over 90 per cent were small scale units with 4 looms. 
These small scale units suffered from numerous socio-
economic constraints such as the erratic supply of 
yarn, variations in its quality and prices, higher 
overheads on account of under utilisation, lack of 
institutionalised infrastructural facilities and 
marketing organisations etc. 
Production of Powerloom 
The Powerloom industry is producing over 3680 
million meters of cotton cloth per annum which 
constitutes 41 per cent of |the total quantum of cotton 
cloth produced in the country. Majority of the looms 
do not function stricty on standard shift basis. These 
looms generally work for one and half shift or 12 hours 
a day and produce roughly about 40 to 45 metres of 
cloth. Therefore, the production of cloth of 5.27 
lakh authorised powerlooms would be nearly 7115 million 
metres per annum as against the actual production of 
3680 million metres- The capacity was, thus under 
utilised. A Detailed br6ak up of production of poweloom 
cloth during the last five years can be had from the 
following table 3.6-
Table 3.(b shows the Production of Powerloom Cloth-
ij.No. Year Production of powerloom cloth 
(cotton) in million meters 
1. 1984-85 3348 
2. 19aS-86 3435 
3. 1986-87 3676 
4. 1987-88 3734 
5. 1988-89 3680 
Source:- AIFCQSPIN ANNUAL, 1989, P. 
The table 3.6 depicts that the production of 
power cloth has increased from 3348 million metres in 
1984-85 to 3680 million metres in 1988-09, recording an 
increase of 109-9 per cent- This sector shows that 
there is an improvement in the powerloom sector of the 
country. 
Decentralised Textile Sector 
The decentralised textile sector consists of 
about :5S.iJ^ lakhs handlooms (cotton ) and nearly 9.18 
lakhs powerlooms (cotton 5.27 lakh). Carpet, duree. 
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tape, hosiery and newar looms have been excluded from 
this industry. Braiding, Jari and wick making etc. 
also form the part of it. In addition, a large number 
of dyers and printers also run their small scale units. 
They are as an integeral part of this sector. There ar^e 
f 
about 5 lakh small dyers and printers. Co—operative 
spinning mills which supply yarn to this sector afe 
also its integral part. At precent 195 cooperative 
spinning mills with nearly 5.46 million spindles have 
boen proposed to be installed. df these 107 mills Are 
in production accounting for 2.82 million spindles.'^ 
Employment 
In developing countries like India, there is 
tremendous unemployment which is posing a serious 
obstacle in the socio-economic development of the 
• -(xintry ; ifi.it la why mor'o «nd moru tJinphaola h«a bsotn 
laid in each and every successive years for the 
establishment of • labour intensive industries. 
Therefore, Textile industry is one of the labour 
intensive industries. It is desirable to note that the 
handloom sector provides jobs to nearly lO million 
people, and an equal number of people are employed in 
its ancillary activities. About a million people work 
on powerlooms. Another one million jobs are provided by 
the dye-houses and other ancillary units providing and 
72 
pr»'-it-wcavmcj faciliticaa. In the cooperatlva aplnnlnQ 
mills about a lakh of people are employed. Thus, this 
provides direct employment to this sector provides 22 
million people.^ 
Capital Investment 
The capital investment in the decenrtralised 
textile industry is estimated to be of the order of 
Ks. 1500 crores. Of this, handlooms account for about 
150 crores. An amount of Rs. 300 crores has been 
invested in the powerlooms. The balance amount of Rs-
1050 crores is invested in the spinning cooperatives, 
including those which aire in advance stages of 
installation. Another 55 mills aire in the preliminary 
stage of installation. When all these new mills are 
installed the total investment in the spinning sector 
may rise to Rs. 1750 crores, making a total investment 
of Rs. 2200 croi ^ 
Yarn Requirement 
The estimated annual requirement of yarn is 
for 33 lakh handlooms is 413 million kgs. < 125 wroklng 
tidiyu. at the r'ate of half a kg. of yarn for ovoraQ* 
daily production of 5 to 6 metres). Similarly, the yarn 
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requirement for 5.27 lakh cotton powerlooms is 
estimated at 6»32 million kgs. per annum <300 days 
working and 4 kgs. of yarn per day for average 
production of 40 metres). Thus, the total yarn 
requirement of the decentralised sector Mould be to 
1045 million kgs. (average 34s count) per annum. 
Share In Cloth Production 
The share of the decentralised textile sector 
in the total production of cloth has been steadily 
growing. This can be seen from the following table. 
Table 3.7 showing share in cloth production. 
t 
(In Million Metres) 
Year Total cloth Production Percentage 
production in decentralised of column 
sector 3 to 2 
1984-85 12014 8582 71 
1985-86 12498 , 9 1 2 2 73 
1986-87 12988 9671 74 
1987-88 12992 9965 77 
ivae-e9 l ^ 2 H 2 10/|73 79 
tiourcei- AIFCOSPIN ANNUAL, 1989. p. 61 
Ihe? above mentioned table indlcatea, that the 
clotln production of the decentralised sector was 8,582 
74 
million mettles in 1984-85 which has gone up to 10,473 
million metres in 1988—89, accounting, an increase o-f 
122.03 per cent. 
Hand looms 
In India handloom weaving is a traditional 
craft. Handlooms are spread through out the country 
in almost every village. They rank next to agriculture 
in terms of size, income and employment potential. 
There ait^e over three million handlooms (cotton). They 
provide employment to about 10 million people on 
weaving alone. In associate activities such as pre— 
weaving, post—weaving, etc- a lage number of people are 
employed. At present about 3381 million metres of 
cotton cloth is produced on handlooms. It accounts for 
3/ per cent of the total cotton cloth produced in the 
c_oun try. 
State—wise break up of Hand|.oom in India 
The state-wise break-up of the handlooms in 
ii»e cQuntry, as estimated hy th« flfficer at the 
i)»iv»d inpinwut. i;nmmi fc»b,»nnfc»i' tnv HaiuthMMiita, llnvanimwnlj nf 
indiM, uii the battlM of centiUfi taken by the state 
governments, is reported as follows. 
7o 
I al l J e vS.U sahowta t h e a t a t o - w l a w b rw«k up o f Hand loom 
i n I n d i a <1V09 y o a r > . 
























Jammu 8< Kashmir 
Karnataka 1-03 
Kerala 0.95 
Madhya Pradesh O. 43 
Maharashtra O.aO 




Tamil Nadu 5.56 
Tripura 1-OO 
Uttar Pradesh 5-09 
West Bengal 2-56 
Other States/Union Territories 0-37 
TOTAL 32.96 
<* This number excludes domestic looms) 
Source:- AIFCQSPIN ANNUAL, 1989. p,63 
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The foreqoinQ table reveals that Tamil Nadu 
has the highest number of Handlooms <5.56 lakh^> 
followed by Andhra Pradesh (5.29 lakhs) and Uttar 
Pradesh <5.09 lakhs). This shows that Handloom 
industry is mainly concentrated in the aforesaid three 
states. 
Cloth Production 
The production of cloth durinq J981-0S and 
190a-B9 can be studied in the table 3.9. 
Table 3.9 shows the cloth production in Handloom 
uucz tor. 
Year Estimated production Percentage of total 
of handloom cloth production of cloth 
(million meters) 
1984-8t3 3.073 _--=:_-~^  34.0 
l9Ut>-tl6 3.177 //^r^ '^ -^ V^v 35.0 
19B6-87 3.466 ( '^^ ^^ 'o. \ 35.8 
1987-88 3.432 '^ '^ v. ' "^(31 .; 36.5 
1988-89 3.381 "^ '- !''?^'^^- 37.2 
Source:- AIFCOSPIN ANNUAL, 1989. p. 64 
From the foregoing table it can be observed 
(.hat, t.iiw prodiictian of li«ndloom cloUh lias increased 
from 3,073 million metres in 1984-85 to 3.381 million 
7? 
metres in 1988—89, representing an increase of 110.02 
per cent- In terms of percentage the production 
jMcrtja&yttJ from 31.0 per cent in 1901"Q5 to 37.2 per 
cent in 1988—89. This shows a significant increase in 
the production of handloom cloth. 
Area of Production and Yield of Cotton. 
The area of production and yield of cotton in 
India during the last ten years are given in the 
following table 3.lO. 
"Table 3.lO shows that the area production and yield of 
cotton in India. 

















































Source:- AIFCOSPIN ANNUAL, 1989. p. 36 
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It can be observed from the above table that 
the cotton at^eai has declined in recent years. This is 
partly duo to the competition from other oilseed and 
pulse crops like sunflower, soyabean, red qram etc. and 
partly due to the inadequacy of rains at the optimum 
period of sowing cotton. Hence, cotton aresi is not 
expected to show any increase in the coming years and 
it may however be around 7.5 million hectare. Although 
the area has declined but the cotton production has 
gone up due to the increase in productivity. However, 
during 1987-08, there was a significant fall in 
production which was mainly due to the prevalence of 
severe drought in several cotton growing States. 
Despite the substantial increase in the yield 
per hectare, even the highest yield level attained in 
India so far is less than half of the world average. 
This is attributed to a number of factors. For 
instance, only 30 per cent of the total cotton area 
receives irrigation facilities while the rest of the 
area is rainfed. Since the rainfall is often 
inadequate or i11—distributed, the yields are adversely 
affected. Further, the coverage by improved production 
techniques is limited due to several techno—economic 
constraints and weaknesses of extension. Even the 
production and distribution of good quality certified 
seed is far below the requirements and hardly 15 per 
cent of the cotton area is now covered by such seed 
7a 
causing heavy crop loss-
It, however, needs to be stressed that 
technology already exists for raising the cotton yield 
to much higher levels. This has been proved time and 
again by the results of demonstration trials conducted 
on farmers' fields in such trials, it has been found 
that if all the improved practices are adapted as a 
package, yields can be further raised by 60 to SO per 
cent. It may also be mentioned that although the 
national average yield is low, in several irrigated 
tracts, especially those growing hybrid cottons,, the 
average yield obtained is as high as 1200 to 1500 kg-
lint per ha., which is comparable to the highest yield 
obtained in any other country. It is essential to be 
pursued more vigorously so that the production can be 
further stepped up by tapping the available potential 
and the country's growing needs of cotton in the coming 
years can be fully met. 
8U 
Spinning Mills in India 
The number of spinning mills in India during 
the period 1961 to 1988 is shown in the following tatple 
3. 11-

















Handbook of Statistics on Cotton Textile 
Industry, Twenty First Edition, p.21 
The above mentioned table reveals that the 
number of spinning mills has increased from 192 in 1961 
to 752 in 1988 accounting for an increase of 391.66 
per cent In terms of percentage, the number of mills 
increased from 4.86 per cent in 1961 to 19 per cent in 
1988. It is imperative to note that there has been a 
continues increase in the number of mills over the 
years. 
SI 
Composite Mills in India 
The table mentioned below 3.12 shows the 
composite mills (spinning. Weaving and -furnishing under 
one roof) of India during the period of 1961 to 1988. 
Table 3.12 showing the number of composite mills. 
Year Number of mills 7. 
1961 287 14.42 
1971 291 14.62 
IVUl 2131 14.12 
1985 282 14.17 
I'/IU. -^UZ 14.22 
IVU/ 2U3 14.22 
1988 283 14.22 
Licjurcfcis-- HanUtjook of Statistics on Cotton Textile 
Industry, Twenty First Edition, p.21 
The above said table reveals that the number 
nt cnnifM)ttit»s mills haa ducreaead frnni 287 In ]I961 to 
2U.i in 1988. In terms of percentarjra the number of 
«• < Kupcju 1 t(j mill'-i dujcruaed from 14.42 ptn' cent in 1961 to 
1'I - 22 pur cent in 1988. Ihis analysis shows that there 
lias been a very marginal decline in the number of 
composite mills in India. 
8^ 
Spindles Installed in Cotton Textile Mills of India 
The following table 3.13 shows the number of 
spindles installed in India during the year 1961 to 
1988. 















Source:— Handbook of Statistics on Cotton Textile 
Industry, Twenty First Edition, p.21 
From the above mentioned table it can be seen 
that there has been a continues increase in the the 
installation of spindles ' which reflects two fold 
increase from 8.58 per cent in 1961 to 17.64 per 
cent.- Thus, it can be said that the Government has 
created an infrastructure for the growth and 
development of textile sector in the country. 
S'S 
Daily Average Spindles Worked 
The table mentioned below indicates the 
working of spindles in different shifts in cotton 
textile mills of India. 
Table 3.14 shows the working of spindles in India. 
Year 1st Shift 2nd Shift 3rd Shift 
1961 12.09 11.89 7.32 
1971 13.39 13.44 11.50 
1981 16.65 16.95 16.61 
1985 18.00 18.30 17.05 
1986 18.68 18.94 17.75 
1987 19.83 20.11 18.72 
1988 19.31 19.59 18^23 
117.93 119.22 107.18 
Source:— Handbook of Statistics on Cotton Textile 
Industry, Twenty First Edition, p.21 
The above mentioned table reveals that in 
1961 the spindles of 1st shift worked more than the 
Ilnd shifts and Ilird Shift. But from 1971 to 1988 the 
tipindles of Ilnd shift worked more than the 1st shifts 
and Ilird Shifts. From this analysis it can be 
concluded that the efficiency of spindles in the Ilnd 
shift was more than the other two shifts after 1971. 
S4 
Looms Installed in Cotton Textile Mills of India 
The looms installed in India during the period 
1961 to 1988 can be seen from the folowing table 3.15. 
Table 3.15 showing the number of looms. 








Handbook of Statistics on Cotton Textile 
Industry, Twenty First Edition, p.21 
The foregoing table shows that the number of 
looms increased from 199 in 1961 to 208 in 1987 and 
declined to 199 in 1908. There was a slight 
fluctuation in the number of looms during the period 











Daily Average Looms Worked (OOO nos.) 
The below table 3.16 shows the working of 
looms per day. 
Table 3-16 showing working of looms per day. 















1 7 6 . 4 
1 6 2 . 9 
1 7 2 . O 
1 4 5 . O 
1 4 1 . O 
1 3 2 . 0 








Total 1079.4 1051.3 650.9 
Source:— Handbook of Statistics on Cotton Textile 
Industry, Twenty First Edition, p.21 
The above said table reveals that the daily 
average of looms worked in the first shift came down 
from 188 thousand, in 1961 'to 124 thousand in 1988. In 
second shift the average of working looms came down 
from 176 thousands in 1961 to 122 thousands in 1988 but 
in the third shift the trend was different, average 
working looms increased from 51 thousands in 1961 to 87 
thousands in 1988. Hence, it can be said that third 
shift was more productive. 
S5 
Cotton Consumed <000 Tonnes) 
Vhe table 3-17 shows the cotton consumed in 
co'tuori "CSX tile mills of India during 1961 to 1*?88. 
Table 3.17 showing the cotton consumption in cotton 
textile mills. 








































ook of Statistics on Cotton Textile 
Industry, Twenty First Edition, p.21 
Ihe above mentioned table reveals that the 
consumption of cotton has increased from 1001.30 
thousand tons in 1961 to 1344.02 thousand tons in 1988, 
1 luJ 1 c;» •, i nn '"I Incroaow of 134.22 ptsr cent. Llkewisa, 
the consumption of total fibres went up from 1001.30 
thousand tons in 1961 to 1545.42 thousand tons in 1988 
representing an increase of 154.34 per cent. 
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Thus, it can be said that due to growth in 
textile sector the consumption of fibres went up during 
the period of two decades. 
Production of Yarn 
The following table shows the production of 
y a m m cotton textile mills of India during the years 
1961 to 1988. 
Table 3.18 showing the production of yarn in cotton 
t u:( t; I 1 e lu i 1 11^ . 












































Source:— Handbook of Statistics on Cotton Textile 
Industry, Twenty First Edition, p.21 
The above mentioned table shows the 
production of cotton yarn has increased from 862.OO 
million K Q S in 1961 to 1073.41 million Kgs. in 1988, 
indicating an over all increase of 124.52 percent. The 
8^ 
total production o-f yarn has gone up -from 907.46 
million K Q 3 m 1961 to 1461.89 million K Q S in 19Q8 
accounting an increase of 161.09 per cent. 
Production of Mill Made Cloth 
The following table shows the production of 
mill made cloth during the year 1961 to 1988. 
Table 3.19 showing the production of mill made cloth 
and decentralised mills. 
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Source:— Handbook of Sta^cTstics on Cotton Textile 
Industry, Twenty First Edition, p.21 
From the table 3.19, it is evident that the 
null maUu cloth haei gone down from 4/01 million metres 
in 1961 to 2396 million metres in 1988, representing an 
over all decrease of 50 per cent. In decentralised 
mills production of cloth increased from 2372 million 
83 
meters in 1961 to 10003 million meters in 1987 showing 
an overall rise of 421-27 per cent. The total 
production of cloth has gone tip from 7073 million 
metres in 1961 to 13117 million metres in 1987, 
accounting an increase of 185.45 per cent. 
From the above analysis it can be concluded 
that the production of cloth in decentralised sector 
has increased significantly compared to mill made 
sector. 
Exports Of Cotton Cloth 
The table 3.20 shows the exports of cotton 
cloth of India to different countries during the period 
1961 to 1988. 
lable 3.20 shows exports of cotton cloth. 
(in R s . Crores) 
Year Cotton Cloth '/. 
1961 60.lO 63.36 
19 7 1 126.34 1.33 
1981 958.49 7.99 
1985 1522.OO 16.04 
1986 1654.00 17.43 
1987 2694.OO 28.39 
1988 2472.00 26.05 
l i o t i r c e : — » ( a n d b a o k o f S t a t i s t i c s o n C o t t o n T e x t i l e 
l i u l u i i t » * y , t w e n t y » - i r a t E c J i l - i o n , p . 2 1 
'^\^ 
The above said table indicates that export of 
cotton from India has mounted up from Rs. dbO. lO crores 
in 1961 to Rs.2472.00 crores in 1988, recording an 
xncreatit.' of 412 per cent. This leads to a conclusion 
that export of cloth has shown a tremendous increase. 
Number of Mills and Spindles Installed in Different 
States. 
The following table 3.21 shows the number 
of mills and installed spindles in different states of 
the country. 
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Source:- AIFCQSPIN ANNUAL, 1989. p.296 
The afore said table reveals that out of 1054 
spinning mills in all the states of the Country, 451 
mills were in Tamil Nadu followed by Maharashtra with 
123 mills. L-ike wise, installed spindles were also 
highest in Tamil Nadu (7604) followed by Maharashtra 
92 
(51<b4> thousands. 
From this facts it can be concluded that 
cotton textile industry is mainly concentrated in Tamil 
Nadu and Maharashtra i.e. 7604 installed spindles and 
5164 thousand installed spindles respectively. 
Average Spindle Activity On Cotton and Man—made Fibres 
Including Blends 
Ihe beloM table 3.22 shoMs the average 
spindles activiy on Cotton, Man—made fibres and Blends 
in cotton textile mills of India. 
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T a b l e 3 . 2 2 s h o w i n g s p i n d l e a c t i v i t i e s o n c o t t o n , 
m a n - m a d e f i b r e s a n d b l e n d s 
Avraoe installed Daily average spindles Percentage of total 
so indies worlfed on cotton nan- spindles worked to 
Year Un silhons) Bade 'fibres tt blends installed somdles 
5oinn- Cosip- Total 1st llnd l l l rd 1st llnd l l l rd 
inq osite shift shift shift shift shift shift 
mills mils 
[ i I ^ 5 6 7 " 9 9 10 
19/6 7.25 12.45 19.70 15.10 15.28 14.01 76.6 77.6 71.1 
1977 7.32 12.3t 19.63 15.22 15.38 13.95 77.3 78.2 70.9 
1978 7.57 12.35 19.92 15.47 16.27 15,20 77.7 81.7 76.3 
1979 7.99 12.47 20.46 16.11 16.51 15.96 78.7 80.7 78.0 
1V80 8.34 12.56 20.90 16,01 16.04 15.96 76.6 76.7 76.4 
1981 9.13 12.38 21.51 16.65 16.95 16.61 77.4 78.8 77.2 
1982 9.95 n.V) c2.35 14,44 14,55 14,35 64,6 6S.1 64.2 
1983 10.93 12.43 23.36 15.76 15.96 15.22 67.5 68.3 65.2 
1984 11,86 12,43 24.29 16.93 17.16 15.98 69.6 70.6 65.8 
1985 12.07 12.43 24.5<) 18.00 18.30 17.05 73.5 74.7 70.0 
1986* N.A. N.A. 25.33 18.68 18.94 17.75 73.7 74,8 70.1 
1987» ti,A, tl.A. 26.07 19.83 20.11 18.72 70.1 77.1 71.8 
19e8» 16.17 11.90 28,07 19,31 19,59 18,23 68.8 69.8 64.9 
Souir~ceT~ "VUIFCOSP IN ANNUAL 1989. p^ 
* Figures are estimai ^ d 
NA: Not Available 
The above table reveals that the total average 
spindles has increased from 19.70 millions in 1976 to 
28.07 millions in 1988. But the percentage of total 
94 
spindles worked to installed has come down from 71.1 per ce 
in 1976 to <b4.9 per cent in 1988. 
Production, Consumption and Deliveries of Cotton Yarn 
The below mentioned table 3.23 showing 
poduction, consumption and deliveries of cotton yarn in 
India during the year 1975 to 1988. 
95 
T a b l e 3 - 2 3 S h o w i n g P r o d u c t i o n , C o n s u m p t i o n and 
D e l i v e r i e s o f C o t t o n Y a r n . 
Soindle Point Consumed in M i l l s Free Del iver ies for 
Production Yam 
aval lab i -
SoQ. Compc- Total For For Total l i t y Civi l Exports 
Year Mills site Heaving other (4 -7) consumo-
Mills nanuf- tion 
tures* 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
19/5 333 656 989 
IV/t i'lt) tbl K'1'6 
1977 310 53fa ti\ti 
1978 332 580 912 
1979 .354 598 952 
1980 411 647 1058 
1981 437 578 lu l5 
1932 511 447 958 
1983 567 525 1092 
1984 610 541 1151 
1985 663 593 1261 
1986 - - 1257 
1987 - - 1348 
1988fi - - 1073 
@ F i g u r e s a^re e s t i m a t e d 
* Such a s h o s i e r y , s e w i n g t h r e a d and t y r e c o r d . 
F rom t h e a b o v e t a b l e c o n s u m p t i o n and 
tJu 1 i vuM l u i j o f c o t t o n y a r n c a n be s t u d i e d . I t I s 
e v i d e n t f r o m t h e t a b l e t h a t t n a l tap intUw ,1o ln t 






















































































1988, recording an increase of *?2. 1 per cent. On the 
other hand, the consumption of cotton yarn has declined 
from 529 million Kgs in 1975 to 252 million kgs in 19BB 
reperesenting a decline of 209-9 per cent. the 
availability of free yarn went up from 460 million Kgs 
in 1975 to 821 million Kgs in 1988 as an increase of 
56.0 per cent. Likewise, the delivering of civil 
export consumption jumped up from 430 million Kgs in 
1975 to 770 million Kgs in 1988 i.e. a record increase 
of 55.2 per cent. 
Conelusion 
From the foregoing discussion it can be 
concluded that after Independancc, especially after 
Partition, the textile industry wau badly affected due 
to cjicutt;; -shortage of raif* material because 30 per cent 
at cattc.M\ yrowing arua went to Pakistan. Inspite of 
this fact, the organised had 1056 textile mills out of 
which 733 were spinning mills and 283 composite mills 
which consist of handloom and powerloom. 
I 
At the end of the year 1988—89 there were 
9. ID lakhij powerlooms and 33.04 lakhs handlooms. Out 
of 9.18 lakhs powerlooms, 5.27 lakhs were working on 
cotton of this 3.26 lakhs looms were in Maharashtra and 
2.06 lakhs were in Bujrat- These powerlooms produced 
over 3680 million metres of cotton cloth per annum at 
the end of year 1988-89, which constituted 41 per cent 
97 
of total quantity of cotton cloth produced in the 
country. Majority of looms do not function strictly on 
standard shift basis. Thus, the capacity of production 
was under utilisation of the total investment in 
textile industry (Rs.1500 crore), the share of 
powerloom was Rs. 300 crores. 
In decentraslised sector, there were 33.04 
lakhs handlooms and nearly 9.18 lakhs were cotton 
handlooms. The handloom industry provide employment to 
nearly lO million people and an equal number of people 
are employed in its auxiliary activities. The capital 
investment in this sector was estimated to be of the 
order of Ka. 150 crores. TThe total production of 
handloom cloth has increased from 8582 million metres 
in 1984-85 to 10473 million metres in 1988-89, 
accounting an increase of 122-03 per cent. The highest 
number of handloom i.e. 5.56 lakhs were in Tamil Nadu 
followed by Andhra Pradesh (5.29 lakhs) and Uttar 
Pradesh (5.09 lakhs). From this fact it can be said 
that handloom industry is mainly concentrated in Tamil 
Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh with the 
increase in the capital investment a number of mills, 
the consumption of cotton has also gone up from 1001.30 
thousands tons in 1961 to 1344.02 thousands tons in 
1988-89, recording an increase of 134.72 per cent. The 
consiumption of fibre has also increased during the last 
two decade due to diverse growth and development of 
9^ 
tsjctile sector. 
The production of y a m has gone " up from S'Oy 
million I^ QS in 1966 to 1461.89 million K Q S in 1988, 
with an increase of 161.08 per cent. As far as the 
|)r'n<tnr i: J nn nf mil) maiiw cotton lu concJOfUfe}*.!, it haa 
inci-eavJuni from 7073 million metres in 1961 to 10940 
million mtitres in 1988, an increase of 154-67 per cent-
I 1 l-.t.rw 1'...e t-hcf auport wu'n t up from K-j. d>0 crorea in 1961 
tt) I'T/J ururuto in IVWH, recorclmij an increase of 4 12 
• r cunt.. Ihu ttturly ha« rejve*al»d th«kt T«mi 1 Madu anrl 
xhtfurfluht»•« having hlrjhoot ntimher of milJa in th© 
Duntry. ThcsQ statoa have 451 and 123 mills 
t 'spectivoly. Likewise, installed spindles are also 
h)qhest in Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra i.e., 7604 and 
5164 thousands installed spindles respectively. 
Thus, to sum up, it can be highlighted that 
during the last decade the textile sector has got a 
favDurablia environment for its growth and developmBnt. 
The Government, financial institutions and other 
coordinating agencies are paying their due attention 
for its growth because, the textile industry has become 
a vital sector of the economy. 
9d 
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Ctjapter 31V 
PERFORMANCE OF SICK COTTON TEXTILE MILLS IN 
UTTAR PRADESH - An Analvais 
The critical situation faced by the cotton 
textile industry during the recent past is well known, 
the crises before the industry has been the worst ever 
in its lonQ and glorious history. Although this has 
been the mother industry of the country which ushered 
in the ot^a of industrial growth, it is now itself 
experiencing a precarious existence. It has been 
suffereino from the chronic industrial sickness and is 
indeed fighting a grim battle for its future survival. 
The industry in the state of Uttar Pradesh 
and more particularly at Kanpur has been in a specialy 
disadvantageous position as compared to its counterpart 
in other states. 
The performancp of the sick cotton mills of 




Vhe f-^thertnn Mills was established in the 
year IS'Jfj and was taken over by National Te;<tile 
Cor^porat 1 on on l9th July, 1976. The concern is a 
composite mill and works in two shifts. The total 
number oT workers on the roll in January, 1985 was 2530 
out or iJhich 1/// were parmanent , 5<S2 substitute and 
ivi temporary employees. 
I tie number of spindlc-. installed in the 
con(.:t.'rn lu -59600 out of which 3'1 1 68 sre worl-':ing. The 
number of looms installed ai.ir& 898 plain and only 697 
looms arc workino. 
(he average production of yarn is 4116 Kq. 
and the production of cloth 36063 meters per day- The 
total out-put of cloth in 1985 was 1013809 yards valued 
at Rs. 5b28218/-. 
Raw material consumed ,income from sale proceeds and 
__ I 
p o ' j i t i o n i ) t p r o f i t a n d l o s s 
IhQ d o t a l !•_, o f t h e v a l u e a n d r a w m a t e r i a l 
t.(ir\':iuiiiuHl a n d i n c o m e r r a m s a l e p r o f o e d t a f o r l a s t s e v e n 
y t - ' a r i j a l o i u j w i t h p r o f i t a n d l o s s <accoun t f o r a f o r e s a i d 
IDZ 
Table 4.1 showing the consumption of Raw Material, 
Income and Profit and Loss of the Atherton Mills 
N eat^ i 
J 979-BJ 
l'?t>v-tU 
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l(lt;>t 
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o f T h e E m p l o ' 
1 F>X)f jt/Lo<3C. 
(-> 74.54 
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/ e r s A s s o c i a 
Nothern India, Kanpur. p. 235 
of 
From the above mentioned table it can be 
observed that consumption of raw material, has gone up 
from Rs.90.85 lakhs in 1979-80 to 264.57 lakhs in 
1985—86 showing an overall increase of 34.3 per cent. 
The increase from sale rose from Rs. 354.13 lakhs in 
1979-80 to Rs.621.86 lakhs in 1985-86 accounting an 
increase of 56.9 per cent. Inspite of the increase in 
income the mill is incurring losses. There has been 
continuos increase in loss. In 1979—80 the loss was 
Rs.74.54 lakhs which rose to Rs. 535.53 lakhs in 
1985-86. This shows that tho mill is facing finoncl«I 
constraints due to loss. This needs an immediate 
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r r x t i t 1 t. l o i i o f (n i 1 1 w h o i t l d i o k c i 1 nuiitsiti i <u ker et ' tdfja t;a t i n c i 
o u t t h e r e a s o n s o f l o s s e s . 
Expenditure of Atherton Mills 
The details of expenditure in terms of 
percentage and value under various heads of cost for 
the years 1975-76, 1980-81 and 1985-86 can be studied 
from the following table. 
Table 4.2 showing the expenditure of Atherton cotton 
Mills Ltd. during 1975-85. 
Jtam:b : 1975 : 19eX>81 : 1984-85 
Kaw (laUnual l b , / 4 27.15 115.26 •'S.Kth 2M.57 23.26 
b^-iJar^es b 27.71 47.BI) 191.10 ZA.(f^ 378-17 33.2A 
)^toi--e>3 •>.' 3.78 6.52 57.81 10. !.2 6<:).3.> 5 .2^ 
Spai-es 
H i e i t 2.34 4.(.)4 37.48 6.69 81.33 7.15 
E lec : t i - i c i t y 
rtlmjnntrativc 4.23 7.30 78.94 14. ot;) 67.57 5.94 
Exp 
Jnter'<?st 4.07 7.02 77.14 13 . /o 276-26 24 .2^ 
MiBC bicp. O.K.) 0 .1 2.80 0.50 9.25 0.81 
lata! 57.97 lOI) 560.53 KX) 11"37.55 100 
Source : Subsidiary of The Employers Association of 
Nothern India, Kanpur. p. 236 
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Ihe above table explains the expenditure 
and xts percentage under various heads in which the 
maximum expenditure is on raw material (cotton) 
followed by salary and wages for the year, 1975—76, 
1980-81 and 1985-86 respectively. 
New Victoria Mills 
New Victoria Mills was established in 1924 by 
the private management and was taken over by National 
Textile Corporation from 1st April, 1974- It is a 
composite mill having 4255 workers on roll on January 
1, 1985. The comparative figure for December 1975 
was 4424. The total number of spindles installed is 
52820, out of which 49440 are working. (29448 on warp 
count and 19992 on weft count). The count range is 
18'5 to 36 9 in the mill and average count for the mill 
is 26'"5 warp and 32'^5 weft. The total number of looms 
installed in the mill were 1197. Out of which llOl are 
plain and 96 are Auto looms. The average production of 
yarn in the mill is 8115 K^. per day and the production 
of cloth is 62400 meters per day. 
The employment of labour in the mill is 11.8 
per thousand spindles and 57.9 per hundred looms. There 
Are 105 ring frames installed in the mill. Out of 
which lO ring frames atre working in single side and 
rest 95 ring frames are working in double sides 
(inclusive warp and weft). The total out put of cloth 
far the month of June 1986 was 13.41 Lakhs meter valued 
at Rs. 6^2..2.1 Lakhs. 
Value of Raw Material Consumed, Income from Sale 
Proceeds and Position of Profit of New Victoria Mill 
The value of raw material consumed (cotton) 
income from sale proceeds and position of profit and 
loss during the last seven years has been depicted in 
ihu folloi-jJnQ tabic 
Jrtublu ^. S uhowing tliw raw material consumed. Income 
from sale proceed and profit of ^4ew Victoria mills-
Voar 
Vi/W-tHJ 
1 9 8 0 & 1 
ISe j -E fJ 




Kaw m a t e r i a l 
('.(DTisiiJiied 






' r j 4 . 9 5 
.•K:-i l .23 
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S a l o ptxx: 
7 9 9 . 2 2 
7 9 6 . 5 1 
i i>:)2.3<;i 
9(: '7.32 





PfX3 f l t / LO<5S 
( - ) 125. a 2 
( - ) 153 .91 
( - ) 2 8 6 - 4 6 
(_) 23'^. 79 
( - ) 415.2*0 
<-) 5 6 0 . 4 1 
(~) KXD.SI 
(")2.-;;r:,. 15 
liixirctf a Liubtj Id 1 ary of I hfe? Employers Association of 
Nothern India, Kanpur. p. 230 
Mi<3 Ah«>v» uiatil t.««hl^ > inilH «tt,t:;>n <.hf«(j tli» 
consumption of raw material has gone up from Rs. 286.07 
lliO 
lakhs in 1979-80 to Rs. 507.35 lakhs in 1984-85, 
accounting an increase of 56-38 per cent. But in 1985— 
86 the consumption of raw material declined to 
Rs.425.95 lakhs from Rs.507.35 lakhs in 1984-85. 
As far as the profit is concerned there has 
been a continuos loss. In 1979—80 the loss was of 
Rs. 125.82 lakhs which rose to Rs 500.S1 lakhs in 1985-
86. From the above analysis, it can therefore, be 
concluded that due to incurring continuous losses, the 
Victoria Mill has become sick and needs moderate 
rehab i1i tat ion. 
E:<penditure of New Victoria Mills 
The details of expenditure in terms of 
percentage and value under various heads of cost for 
the years 1975-76, 1980-81 and 1985-86 aire given in the 
following table. 
I:i7 
T a b l e 4 . 4 s h o w i n g t h e e x p e n d i t u r e o f N e w V i c t o r i a 
M i l l i j l - i d d u r i n g 1 9 7 3 - 8 3 
1 tans 
itimsiivBRmxRSsnnis Bt;,^iu 
: 1975 : 19a«:)-81 : 1984-85 
: Value : V. : Value : 7. : Value : 7. 
Raw ma,ter ia l 




Fuel ?< , 
E l e c t r i c i t y 



















386.81 36.02 523.62 34.06 
305,21 .35.87 551.27 35.86 
82.rj4 7.64 93.53 6.08 
86.56 8.06 150.42 9.79 
21.88 2.M 34.85 2.27 
63.17 5.88 94.70 6.16 
24.26 2.26 r^ **?/. "T'7 » 6 ^ .i^ . X-~ 
Misc E>;p'. 9.-77 1.64 
lotal 594.92 lOD 1073.77 U'XJ 1557.18 IW 
Source : Subsidiary of The Employers Association of 
Nothern India, Kanpur. pp : 231 
SWADESHI COTTON MILLS 
Swadeshi Cotton Mills Kanpur, was 
established in the year 1911 and was taken over by the 
National Textile Corporation on April 16, 1978. It was 
nationalised with effect from 1.4.84. It is a composite 
11}^ 
mill and the total number of workers on roll on January 
1, 1985 was 6288 (including operating clerks • and 
supervisors). Comparative figure for May, 1987 was 
6961. 
The Labour working in the mill at present, 
12.20 workers per thousand spindles and 92.46 per 
looms. The range of counts is lA-'-S to 36'^5- The total 
number of looms (ordinary plain) st^e 1950 the mill but 
only 648 are working. The average production of yarn 
in the mill is 7500 Kg. per day and that of cloth is 
50,000 meters per day. The total output of cloth during 
1985-86 was 143.58 (lakhs metres). 
An idea regarding the raw material consumed 
and income from sales of cotton yarn and waste and 
profit loss figures during the last seven years have 
been given in the following table. 
Value of Raw Material, Income from sale proceeds and 
profit and loss. 
The following table gives an account of 
consumption of raw material, income from sale proceeds 
and profit and loss of Swadeshi Cotton mills . 
l i J i ) 
Table 4.5 showing the value of i~aw material consumed, 
income from sale proceeds and profit and loss of the 
mills. 
Vear Raw ma te r i a l 
ccxTsumed 





5 M . 7 6 
618.66 















^20 .19 ( - ) 
14<:>6.93<-) 
1667.63(-) 
iD ta l 32^15.72 7883.11 578(:). 68 
S o u r c e : S u b s i d i a r y o f T h e E m p l o y e r s A s s o c i a t i o n o f 
N o t h e r n I n d i a , K a n p u r . p . 2 3 7 
F r o m t h e f o r e g o i n g t a b l e i t c a n b e o b s e r v e d 
t h a t c o n s u m p t i o n o f rai^ m a t e r i a l h a s g b n e u p t o 
R s . 3 8 8 . 8 1 l a k h s i n 1 9 7 9 - 8 0 t o 4 0 2 . 5 0 l a k h s i n 1 9 8 5 - 8 6 
I 'a t j i t:i I. O f I iMj an « t v o r « * l l I n t . r u i ^ u u «.» r V( ' j . r» p t a r i..«=>nt.. O u t 
t h e tadJe | » r » M : e e t l t j l>dsa t l t i q l j n ^ d r r u t n I i 17 • 8'*^ l M k h § i n 
1 9 7 9 - 0 0 t o R s . 8 I 3 . 9 5 l a k h s i n 1 9 n 5 - n < ' > , « h n w i n o « 
d e c r e a s e o f 1 6 1 . 8 per c e n t . L i k e w i s e , t h e m i l l h a s 
i n c u t ^ r e d a l o s s w h i c h h a s i n c r e a s e d f r o m 2 6 9 . 3 4 l a k h s 
i n 1 9 7 9 - 8 0 t o R s . 1 6 6 7 . 6 3 l a k h s i n 1 9 8 5 - 8 6 . T h u s , d u e 
l l u 
to incurt-inQ loss the mill is sick and the heed of the 
hour is to rehabilitate the sick mill. 
Expenditure of Swadeshi Cotton Mills 
The details of expenditure in terms of 
percentage and value under various heads of cost for 
the years 1975-76, 1980-81 and 1985-86 have been 
depicted in the following table. 
Ihe following table shows the total expenses 
of EJwadesh 1 cotton mills in which during the year 1975 
and 1980—ai the maximum expenditure was on -^-aw material 
followed by salary and wages but during 1984—85 the 
ui<|»«nwwu4 on nnloiry «IHI w*k«3«B L»wc«ii(uu l^lgh tul lowed by 
raw materia 1. 
Ill 
Table 4.6 showing the expendxture of Swadeshi cotton 
Mills Ltd during 1975-85-
itaTTS 1975 : 1980B1 : 1984-85 
^^ah\e : 7. : VaJcie : 7. : VaJue : '/. 
i./.3iarit5t3 ."./ 372 
wacjes 
f ^ \a [ b B8 
^-]^>ctr^f:^ty 
f wddunslu'ativo l i . 
Jntet-est 131 
b f - ro i r jh t 















31.9 760 3^.7 
11.7 9^ ^ 4 .5 












l o t a l 16<J8 l t> j 1559 i(>:) 2071 lo.) 
Source : Subsidiary of The Employers Association of 
Nothern India, Kanpur. pp : 237 
The above table shows the expenditure of 
Swadeshi Cotton Mills under various item in which 
maximum expenditure is on raw material (cotton) 
followed by salary and wages. 
m 
Elgin Mills Co. 
Elgin Mills consists of two milli&. Mill No. 1 
at Civil Line, S< Mill No.2 at Cooper Ganj* Mill No. 1 
was established in 1964 and Mill No.2 4 which was 
formerly known ds Kanpur Cotton Mill was established in 
1984. Mill No.1 was earlier under private fiection with 
BeQQ Sutherland and Co. as managing agent and there 
after it remained with British India Corporation with 
effect from 16.8.I960, with effect from 11.6.1981, it 
became a Government Company. It is a composite unit 
with processing department. Elgin Mill No*2 which was 
formaly known as Kanpur Cotton Mill was closed in the 
year 1<95B and later on, the Elgin Mills Co. Ltd. 
purchased this unit in I960 and renamed it as Elgin 
Mills Co.Ltd. (Mill No.2). Earlier this Mill was 
also under private sector, but it became A Government 
Co. w.e.f. 11.6.1981. The details of Mill No.1 and 
Mill No.2 are given separtely as under. 
blyirt Mill Na.l 
The total number of workers in Mill 
No. 1 was 5581 as on Jan. 1985 incl\,*dinQ permanent, 
temparory and substitute. The corresponding figure 
for Dec. 1975 was 5716. 
The Mill has 48,484 spindles out of 
llJ 
which 47,092 spindles are working. The number of 
looms installed is 1.194 (plain) and all are 
working- The Mill works in 3 shifts. The labour 
emplyoment per thousand spindles is 12.79 and per 
hundred looms is 52-64. The average total of wages 
bill per month including fringe benefit comes to 
Rs.<b4.43 lacs. The average daily production of yarn is 
1&,709 kg. and the average dally production of cloth 
is 80,000 metres. 
Elgin Mill No.2 
The total number of workers employed in' the 
mill as on Jan. 1985 was 4,907 which includes 3,677 
permanent hands, 1,089 substitutes and 142 as 
temporary. The corresponding figures of total 
employment in Dec- 1975 was 4,844-
The mill is a composite textile processing 
and works in 3 shifts. The labour employment per lOOO 
spindles is 9.27 and per hundred looms is 46.65 and 
the total wage per bill month including fringe benefit 
comes to Rs. 61.11 lacs. The average daily production 
of yarn is 17.844 kg- and average daily production of 
cloth is 83,700 metres. 
Elgin Mills 
The a c c o u n t s of b o t h t h e s e co/T<panies are 
11 
maintanied together. The details of value of raw 
material(cotton) consumed during last 7 years, the 
income from sale proceeds as well as the profit and 
loss during the same period is as under ; 
Elgin Mills (No. 1 ic 2> 
The below table representing the value of 
raw material consumed, income from sale proceed and 
profit and loss Elgin Mill* during the period 1979-80 
to 1985-Q6. 
Table 4.7 showing the value of material 
income from sale proceed and profit and lose. 
Yeai-
consumed, 
1 Value at rinw i IncaHe f ron i P t ' o f l t 
: m a t e r i a l (cottcan : s a l e pfXDceeds. : Z>. 
i cansuinsd ) : : l oss 
J.979 936 
I'Aii.i t,fl 
( J t l (IKiOtllG) 
1981-82 
i.'-hi..: tti 
I M i i - t i ' l 
l^A-tlrj 
rAJ.i \.ii.> 



















To ta l 8192 18310 (-) 3941 
bik Area : SIAIDSIdiary o f Ihe Enploysf-^ Assoc ia t i on o f 
hb thern lndi ,- i , K.,.vipur. p. 222 
I I J 
Mifcf ciiiu\/*:t nientiontid table shows that there 
has been no material change in the consumption of 
cotton accept in the year 1983—84 and the income from 
sale proceeds does not shoM any increasing trend. These 
mills are continuously registering losses since 1980—81 
and further it is sad to note that these losses aire 
increasing each year. 
Elgin Mill No. 2 
T h e n u m b e r o f c o t t o n b a l e s consumed a n d 
p r o d u c t i o n o f c l o t h d u r i n g t h o l a s t s i x y e a r s h a s 
b e e n g i v e n i n t h e f o l l o w i n g t a b l e . 
Tab 1« 1 - 0 u h o w i n g t h e t r e n d o f c o t t o n conaumod and 
p r o d u c t i o n o f c l o t h d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d 1980—81 t o 
1 9 8 5 - 8 6 i n E l g i n M i l l N o . 2 . 
Year : ^>in^1ber o f Cot ton ba les : Pt^oduction o f c l o t h 
: consumod. : m metres. 
19b(.v-t!i 76*.M6 4 .97,21,561 
(15 tTVTiths; ' 
I \'\.', I \;^ ' tizA-i^t. 3 ,68, 18,571 
iva. . -b : . t/\^jt;u 3 ,75,52,163 
I'/t-i.. LH 41it^5 2,96,23,049 
I9&^i-if:i '«.)«/1 3,2<5,(.)9,2<:>7 
i Vtjirr tta bV/64 4 ,18,97,154 
i/ix-ircp : Sf i tasjdiarv OT Ihc tmo ioyer^ f->s50ciatian o f 
lib 
The above mentioned table shoiMS that there 
has been a continuous decrease in the consumption of 
cotton bales since 1980—81 similarly the production of 
cloth declined from 4,97,21,561 metres in 1980-81 to 
3,20,09,207 metres in 1984-85. But in 1985-86 the 
production of cloth was very high compared to previous 
years. 
This leads to conclusion that the Elgin mills 
have no future prospects. Therefore the declining 
trend should be properly Matched by the management and 
the correct step should be adopted to overcome these 
prob 1ems. 
Expenditure of Elgin Mills Co. Ltd. 
The details of expenditure in terms of 
percentage and value under various heads of cost for 
the years 1975-76, 1980-81 and 1985-86 are given in the 
following table . 
The below table showing the expenditure of 
Elgin Mills No- 1 and No. 2 on various items in which 
the maximum expenditure is on raw material followed by 
salaries and wages and the minimum on agent commission 
for the year 1975-76, 1980-81 and 1984-85. 
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Table 4.9 showing the expenditure of Elgin mills on 
various heads. 
(Rs. in lakhs) 
Items : 1975 : 19B:>-ai : 1984-83 
: Valus : '/. : Value : "/. : Value : '/. 
Raw material 750.03 42.46 1314.B',) 4<:). 13 1155.64 33.52 
apiaries ?y 569.83 32.26 H-J3<5. 18 31.^ 14 1127.27 32.70 
waooo 
Stares .«y. 182.76 10..35 4<:)2.45 12.28 288.17 8.36 
Scathes 
Fuel,?< 91.23 5.17 269.14 8.21 287.81 63.35 
Electricity 
(Vdminstrative 31.69 1.79 47.24 1.44 50.34 1 . ^ 
E;;D 
Inter-^est 68.51 3 .88 94 .92 2 .90 418.80 12.15 
f-V:.ant Canmision 23.-34 1.32 42.50 l.:50 37.84 1.10 
Misc E;'>D. 48.87 2.77 75.52 2.3<:> 81.63 2.36 
Total 1766.27 HX) 3276.75 KX) . 3-^47.5('J KXJ 
Source : Subsidiary of The Employers Association of 
Nothern India, Kanpur. p. 234 
lU 
P r o d u c t i o n P e r f o r m a n c e o f ( C o t t o n Y a r n ) . 
Thc8 p r o d u c t i o n o f s i c k c o t t o n t v x t i l a M i l l s 
o f U t t a r P r a d e s h d u r i n g d i f f e r e n t y e a r s c a n b e s t u d i e d 
f r o m t h e f o l l o w i n g t a b l e . 
T a b l e 4 . l O shows t h e p r o d u c t i o n p e r f o r m a n c e o f s i x 
C o t t o n Y a r n I n c o t t o n t e x t i l e m i l l s o f U . P . 
Mame of M i l l s Quantity of Production 
198&-S6 1986-87 1987-Kt 1988-89 1989-9<"J 
..Atherton M i l l s 115.07 102.93 78.69 7^,02 m 
I i»nnur 
2. B i .U i Cotton 25.51 23.13 12.<"J8 16.61 17.19 
M i l l s . Hathras. 
3. ^ 4el^ ) V i c t o r i a , 2018.18 179.15 93.68' 1(XJ.72 86.10 
Mills.KanDur. 
4.a'«.dG?5ha Cotton 99.64 194.15 107.65 148.43 128.83 
M i l l s . Kanour. 
5.Swadeshi Cotton 53.07 49.47 45.64 16.^K) 41.95 
M i l l s . Kruni . 
6. The Elg in M i l l s 87.26 1(X).63 88.36 81.02 89.81 
No. 1. t'l.anDur. 
S o u r c e : - Q u e s t i o n n a i r e 
T h e a b o v e m e n t i o n e d t a b l e shows t h e 
p r o d u c t i o n o f y a r n i n s i x s e l e c t e d s i c k m i l l s o f c o t t o n 
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textile mills of U-P. during the year 1985-8<lb to 1989-
90. The two mills viz. Bijli Cotton Mills (Hathras) 
and Swadeshi Cotton Mills (Nalni) produce yarn only 
and, one composite mill produces yarn as well as cloth. 
The table reveals that the production of Atherton Mill, 
Kanpur has decreased from 115.07 lakh metres in 1985 to 
74.02 lakh metres in 1988, recording a decline of 155.4 
per cent- Similarly, the production of B.C.M. 
(Hathras) came down from 25.51 lakh metres in 1985 to 
16.61 lakh metres in 1988 i.e., a fall of 153.5 per 
cent. Likewise, the production of New Victoria Mill 
and Swadeshi Cotton Mills of Naini has declined from 
53.07 in 1985 to 86.lO, 41.95 lakh metres in 1988, 
registering a decline of 126.5 per cent respectively. 
Hence, it can be said that due to continuous decline of 
prodution, these mills fall under the purview of sick 
mills of the state. 
The production of viable mills i.e., Swadeshi 
Mill, Kanpur and the Elgin Mill, Kanpur, has gone up 
from 99.64, and 87.26 l^kh metres in 1985 to 128.83, 
and 89.81 in 1989, accounted for an increase of 
77.33 per cent and 97.16 per cent respactiv»ly. 
Therefore, it can be concluded from the 
f»nnlywiw of th«a ln»llvlUu«»l mlllfci that aufe of th« 
a«it=n ttj.i t^atDpiti uiu its, twQ dir« w»-nnpfnVq^Hy viF4il3l@ and 
rest at the three are sick mills of NTC. 
) d 
Production Performance 
The following table showing the production of 
cloth of four composite mills of U-P. 
Table 4.11 shows Production of cloth in Composite Mills 
of U.P. 
M=»me o f M i l l s O i ian t i t y o f PrxxJuction 
( I n lali;h tnetttjs) 
lV«y-L(6 l'?86~8/, 1%-)7-l.;6 1<WiHi)9 1WV<'?<| 
...,.^~,.,.*»,«.« ..,."••—n>t«»T<t>t|r'»"Hmi ..HFiiFin 1 U'"mMrninfl>;<r<tluiHiiii*tKi-i'<'t>i«| i « ' iai«t 
1*11 U B K^ATiaur. 
: : ) .Ather ton M i l l s 110.4C) 97.71 73.77 69.63 m 
l:'..anDUt" 
:;).a>>i^destn M i l l s 261.58 122.74 896.19 983.19 873.43 
4 ) . m e E l o i n M i l l s 418.97 445.97 A<:>9.17 381.01 416.35 
l-:anpnr-
S o u r c e : — Q u e s t i o n n a i r e 
\ 
The above mentioned table 4.11 reveals the 
production performance of composite mills of Uttar 
Pradesh during 1985-86 to 1989-90. It indicates the 
production of cloths only. 
The table shows that the total production of 
clot;l\ of t|->e New Victoria Mills, Kanpur has come down 
from 281.18 lakh metres in 1985-86 to 86.lO lakh metres 
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in 1990 indicating a decrease of 326.S per cent. 
Likewise, the production of the Elgin Mills Kanpur 
declined from 418.97 lakh metres in 1985 to 416.35 lakh 
metres in 1989-90 respresenting a decrease of 100.<b per 
cent. But the production of Swadshi Cotton Mills went 
up from 261.58 lakh metres to 873.43 lakh metres in 
1989—90 a record increase of 29-9 per cent. From the 
above analysis of the four mills of NTC functioning in 
U.P., the three are sick due to continuous decline in 
production and only one mill i.e., Swadeshi Mills is 
viable because its production has increased. 
Nature of Ownership 
The following table indicating "the nature of 
ownership of different six sick cotton textile mills of 
Uttar Pradesh. 
Table 4.12 showing the forms of ownership of sick 
cotton Textiles Mills of Uttar Pradesh. 
For-^i o f Owner^stiiD No. of m i l l s '/. 
i.. CcxDoerativG Scxiiety Nil -
2. Partnet-ship Nil -
:!•. . ) i - )»nt ; M . I K I . ' C ' . ixuisUiy 3 'M 
'I. Pub l i c Sec to r 2 ' 33 
'r.i. JbldinQ U3<iipc»ny 1 16.6 
lot.al 
S o u r c e i - Q u e a t i o n n a i r e 
12^ 
The above table shows the -form of Ownership 
of six different sick mills of U.P. from the above 
table it can be observed that not even a single unit 
enjoys the Cooperative and partnership forms of 
ownership. The three cotton mills are in Joint stock 
Companies and two are in Public sector and one is as 
Holding Company. Thus, it can be said that majority of 
mills under survey are in Public sector* 
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Value of Production 
The following table shows the value of 
production in six sick mills of U.P. 
Table 4.13 showing the value of production in sick 
cotton Textiles Mills of U.P. 
htenits o f M i l l s Value (Rs. i n lakhs) 
1985-^6 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 198<?-90 
l .A the r t cx i M i l l s 613.78 483.10 363.26 568.30 MA 
Kanour 
.^ 4fiA<J V i c t o r i a 870. SD 894.94 593.59 5^18.13 663.71 
Mi i Ir., P;:u\i)ur 
. B i . l l i totton 519.44 4<;)4.86 334.93 563.49 613.46 
M i l l s 
H.Swadeshi Cot ton 954.71 861.54 725.98 1021.96 993.Z5 
M i l l s , Kanpur. 
5.Swadeshi Cot ton lSja.7B 1258.43 618.34 1718.97 22«:)8.13 
M i l l s . N a i n i . 
(!.,.7"he t : iQ in M i l l s 3447.<>J 3451.(X) 3940.(X) 4<!506.tX! m 
hto. 1 . I'annnr". 
UinuH;wi- cjMWfait; ionnair© 
The above mentioned table depicts the value 
of production in six different mills of U.P. As table 
4.13 shows the value of production of cotton six 
different cotton textile mills of U.P. From the 
foregoing table it can be concluded that the value of 
production is fluctuating during the year 1985—86 to 
1989-90. 
Utilisation of Installed Capacity 
The table mentioned below shoMS the 
utilisation of installed Capacity in six different 
mills of U.P. 
Table 4.14 showing Utilization of Installed Capacity 
Utilisation of Installed No.of Mills 
Capacity 
O - 20 7. 
21 - 50 7. 1 
51 - 75 7. 4 
76 - 100 7. 1 
Source s— Questionnaire 
The above table shows that out of six 
selected mills, 4 mills have 51—75 per cent 
utilisation of installed capacity. UJhile other two 
units have the installed capacity of 21—50 per cent 
and 76—100 per cent respectively. On the basis of 
this analysis, one can conclude that majority of mills 
have more Utilisation Capacity. 
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Number of Employees working 
The below table showing the number of 
employees (Officar, Supervisor, Labour, Clerk, and 
Office staff> working in six cotton textile mills of 
U.P. 
Table 4.15 showing the Number of Employees and its 
break up. 
|Nl>-ame o f M i l l s No. of EmployGes 
Officer Suoervisor Labour Clerk Office Total 
staffs 
l .A the r ton M i l l s 16 
(•-..anpur 
2.Bi,-)li C o t t m M i l l s 7 
Ha thras . 
J-rk/AJ V i c t o r i a M i l l s 41 
Hanour. 
'i.Swadeshi Cotton 64 
M i l l s , ^anour. 
S.a^iadeshi Cotton 5 
M i l l s . Na in i . 














2974 22V) HX 346<;) 
48 268(5 
766<j 3y} 455 8724 
Source :— Questionnaire 
The above mentioned table shows that the 
number of employees worked in six different cotton 
textile mills that includes officers, supervisors, 
labourers, clerk and office staffs. Further the table 
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reveals that the Elgin Mills has the highest number of 
employees i.e. 8724 followed by Swadeshi Cotton Mills, 
Kanpqr. i.e. 3460. The lowest number of employees are 
in Bijli Cotton Mills, Hathras i.e. 917 only because it 
is a spinning mills, which produces yarn only. 
Amount of Wages and Salaries paid to Employees 
The following table shows the Salary and Ulages 
paid to employees during current year in six different 
mills of U.P. 
Table 4.16 showing the Wages and Salaries paid to 
Employees. 
Name of the Mills Amount of Salary & Wages 
(Rs.in lakhs) 
Salary Wages 
Atherton Mills lO.18 54.33 
Kanpur 
Bijli Cotton Mills 24.67 13.9 
Hathras 
N«w Viciortft Mills < 82.62 IS'J.l? 
Kanpur 
Swadeshi Cotton Mills 21.50 25.67 
Nain i. 
Swadeshi Mills 140.86 551.48 
Kiinpur 
Elgins Mills No.1 1927.OO (sal + wag) 
Kanpur 
Source i- Questionnaire 
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The above table reveals that the Ath'erton 
Mills pay amount of salary and wages of about R«.lO.IQ 
lakhs to their officers and Rs.54.33 lakhs to their 
labour employees. Likewise, New Victoria Ml 1 1 B pays 
Rs.02.62 lakhs to officers and 434.17 to labourers, 
Swadeshi Cotton Mills pay salaries of around Rs.21.5 
lakhs and wages of Rs.25.<b7 lakhs, Elgin Mills pays 
salraries and wages of Rs.1927 lakhs. Bijli Cotton 
Mills and Swadshi Mills, Naini pays very less amount of 
salaries and wages due to spinning mill and the' workers 
are also less. 
Working Capital of Cotton Textile Mills. 
The below table shows the Working Capital of 
different mills of U.P. 
12^ 
i c*L) i« '» . 1 / t i l i o w s W o r k i n Q C a p i t a l o f t h e M i l i « 
M:,Mi».» of M i l l s WorkinQ Capital 
<Rs. in lakhs) 
1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-9<"J 
l .Atherton M i l l s 1768.41 2<»3.(>:J 2467.60 3146.16 3574.49 
Kanour 
2 .B i . n i Cotton M i l l s 728.15 841.69 973.14 1070.(» 1085.08 
H3.thraB. 
3.IMevrVictoria M i l l s 66CJ.52 429.59 340.23 365.57 313.69 
V .^ar\pur. 
4.a-jad(3shi Cotton 1019.22 1383.28 1985.61 2789.55 3556.45 
M i l l s , Kanpur. 
S.tA^^dest-u Cottars 633.18 633.18 623.18 633.19 6!39.% 
• M i l l s Nairn 
fa.ElDin Mill to-1. 321.10 ^02.72 368.:S4 4<X).97 :53<5.(» 
l-'.anpur 
Source :- Questionnaire 
A close persual of the table shoMs working 
capital of the Mills. From the foregoing table one can 
easily say that in all the above cotton textile mills, 
the working capital is increasing year by year except 
in New Victoria Mills, Kanpur. In Elgin Mill there was 
an increase from 321.Ol in 1985-86 to 400.97 in 1988-89 
but now it comes down to 350.O in 1989-90. 
Thus, it can be said that most of the cotton 
12d 
mills under study are Bhowlng ascending trtend In 
working capital and other mills Sit^e showing a 
descending trend in working capital. 
Borrowed Capital of Cotton TaHtils Mills 
The below mentioned table illustrates the 
borrowed capital from the banks and different financial 
institutions during 1985—86 to 1989—90 of six different 
sick cotton textile mills. 
Table 4. IB showing the Borrowed Capital of sij< cotton 
textile mills of U.P. 
hiame of h i l l ^ Borrowed Capital 
1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-9<:) 
l .Atherton M i l l s 
H.anDur 
127.63 120.58 127.76 96.82 78.71 
2 .B i . n i Cotton M i l l s . 58.Ce 43.61 55.71 67.71 47.46 
Hathras. 
.[V-w V i c to r i a 
Ml 11'a I .aitpur. 
.5017.60 '3393.61 3967.90 4681.08 5272,65 
.Siv»ad(33hi totton 
M i l l s , Konpur. 
b.B^^;adeshi tot ton 
M i l l s l-Jaini. 
S o u r c e :— Q u e s t i o n n a i r e 
107.<^?8 174.38 152. .35 
27.25 175.4^. 42.^8 
T h e a b o v e m e n t i o n e d t a b l e e x p l a i n t h e amount 
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of borrowed capital from bank and financial 
institutions in six different mills of Uttar Pradesh 
during the year 1985-06* to 1989-90 from the table 4.18 
it can be observed that in all the mills the borrowing 
capital is decreasing- Thus it can be concluded that 
year after year, the U.P. Mills were improving their 
financial conditions with a view to be economical1ly 
viable in future. 
Sale Performance 
The below mentioned table showing the 
quantity of the sales in six sick cotton textile mills 
during the year 1985-86 to 1989-90. .cwlO 
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I,:t)ie 4.19 sficx'js a t i a n t i t y o f s a l e s . 
t-Lm-j o f the M i l l s Quan t i t y o f Sc:aec 
1985-86 i98<^r^7 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 
l . A t h e r t o n M i l l s 564.05 ^37.15 304.59 485.79 IMA 
Kanour 
. B u l l Cot ton M i l l s 23.96 25.<:>6 10.75 17.56 18.11 
Hathras. 
:..r4c?w V i c t o r i a 183.23 192.12 112.71 HX>. 14 89.11 
H i l l s V'anour. 
'<.Swadeshi Cot ton 5<-J4.<"J5 447.15 3fJ4.59 405.79 MA 
M i l l s . >'anDur. 
b.&l^ JadGShl Ccjtton 149.76 165.69 157.49 143.19 154.0 
M i l l s Nain i . 
6.ElQin M i l l s f t a . l . 117.82 126.13 956.02 939.3A 951.95 
\ annur 
S o u r c e s - Q u e s t i o n n a i r e 
T h e a b o v e m e n t i o n e d t a b l e 4 . 1 9 shows t h a t 
q u a n t i t y af s a l e s o f s i x d i f f e r e n t c o t t o n t e x t i l e 
m i l l s o f U t t a r P r a d e s h . F rom t h e f o r e g o i n g t a b l e i t 
c a n b e e a s i l y c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e q u a n t i t y o f s a l e o f 
p r o d u c t i o n i s f u n c t i o n i n g a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r p r o d u c t i o n 
o f c l o t h and y a r n . 
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Value of Sale Production 
The below mentioned table represents the 
value of sales production of six different cotton 
textile mills of U.P. during the year 1985-86 to 
1989-90. 
Table 4.20 shows the value of sales production, 
\-\Mm) o f thn f l i l J s Vriluo (Rn. In Lvlhsi) 
19tto-B6 19136-B7 I'^aZ-BB l.«i>(iie-t39 19^^-90 
I .Ather ' taT h i l l s 613.7B ^183.10 :i56.3.26 ^W.JX) m 
K.anDur 
2.Bi.111 Cot ton M i l l s 479.68 43A.70 271.^4 562.42 637.56, 
l-lathras. 
3.t-tew V i c t o r i a M i l l s 87U.20 894.94 593.39 5^8.13 66 "^^ .^71 
'I.Swadeshi Cot ton 786.69 755.66 649,76 777.24 834.57 
M i l l s , Kenour. 
5.a>jacjesf-ii Cot ton 1697.38 1493.66 1339.9<:) 531.00 1689.92 
Ml l i s l i . a i i i i , 
6.ElQin Mills rto. 1. 613.78 ^83.10 3^3.26 568,3<-J W 
-^..anout" 
Source :— Questionnaire 
The above montionsd tabl« 4.20 shows the 
value of sales production of six different cotton 
textile mills of Uttar Pradesh during the year 1985-06 
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t o 198*?—<?0. F r o m t h e f o r e g o i n g t a b l e i t c a n c o n c l u d e d 
t h a t t h e v a l u e o f s a l e s i s f l u c t u a t i n g a s r e g a r d t o 
q u a n t i t y o f s a l e s . 
C o n t i n u o u s L o s s e s i n C o t t o n T e x t i l e M i l l s 
h e b e l o N m e n t i o n e d t a b l e s h o w i n g t h e y e a r o f 
l o s s e s i n s i x d i f f e r e n t c o t t o n t e x t i l e m i l l s o f U . P 
T a b l e 4 . 2 1 s h o w i n g C o n t i n u o u s l o s s e s . 
! Name of t h e M i l l s 1 One yea r 1 Two yea r I Three y e a r l y I 
A t h e r t o n M i l l s 
Kanpur 
Bi.11 i C o t t o n Mil I s 
H a t h r a s 
New V i c t o r i a M i l l s 
Kanpur 
Swadeshi C o t t o n M i l l s 
Nain i 
Swadeshi C o t t o n M i l l s 
Kanpur 
I T 
S i n c e 1979 
I 
S i n c e 79 -80 
1 
170.67 
S i n c e 78-79 
- 3 1 4 . 5 3 - 4 5 8 . 3 9 
The E l g i n M i l l s 
Kanpur 
S o u r c e : Q u e s t i o n n a i r e 
T h e a b o v e m e n t i o n e d t a b l e i n d i c a t e s t h a t a l l 
t h e s i x m i l l s sk^re r u n n i n g i n t o l o s s e s s i n c e u n d e r t a k e n 
b y t h e G o v e r n m e n t i n t h e y e a r 1 9 8 1 . T h e A t h e r t o n 
M i l l s , S w a d e a h i C o t t o n M i l l s ainA New V i c t o r i a M i l l s 
l i r t v u t iuuM u r > d « t ' t « k « n i n t h « y e a r 1 V 7 Q - 7 9 it B l j l l C o t t o n 
M i l l s a n d New V i c t o r i a C o t t o n M i l l s i n t h e y e a r 1 9 7 9 - B O 
b y t h e N a t i o n a l T e x t i l e s C o r p o r a t i o n ( N T C ) . T h e E l g i n 
13i 
M i l l s h a v e b e e n u n d e r t a k e n b y BTC i n t h e y e a r 1 9 8 1 . 
S a l a r i e s a n d Maqes p a i d t o w o r k e r s 
T h e b v l o w tAbI«9 i n i H c A t c t s thw t ' ima f o r 
s a l a r i e s and w a g e s t o w o r k e r s o f S I K s i c k c o t t o n 
t e x t i l e m i l l s o f U - P . 
T a b l e 4 . 2 2 s h o w i n g S a l a r i e s a n d wages p a i d t o t h e w o k e r s . 
Name of the M i l l s i In time S L l t t l e l a t e ! As when req I 
; A t h e r t o n Ml M s 
1 Kanpur 
I 
I B i j l I C o t t o n M i l l s 
H a t h r a s 
New V i c t o r i a Mil I s 
Kanpur 
S w a d e s h i C o t t o n M i l l s 
N a l n l 
S w a d e s h i C o t t o n M i l l s 
Kanpu r 
1 The E l g i n Ml I I s 





The above mentioned table 4.22 reveals that 
all the employees of six cotton Textiles Mills of U.P. 
Are getting their Salaries and UJages in time eventhough 
they are running in losses. 
1 3 J 
R e q u i r e m e n t o f E x t e r n a l f u n d s 
T h e b e l a w t a b l e d i s c u s s a b o u t t h e e x t e r n a l 
ru iul t j i-ttqii 1 rt*tl r u r t a luk c u i i o t i t u x L i l o ml 1 lt$ f rom b a n k t i 
«*n(i i ' i n e t i H . i a l liitot-1 t u t 1 on 
I Mb I u ^.'JIS uhowB t h « n « a d o f E x t a r n a l F u n d s . 
Name of t h e M i l l s Some t i m e s ! F r e q u e n t l y ! Not a t a l l 
A t h e r t o n M i l l s 
Kanpur 
Bi.1l I C o t t o n M i l l s 
H a t h r a s 
New V i c t o r i a Mi I I s 
Kanpur 
S w a d e s h i C o t t o n M i l l s 
N a i n i 
S w a d e s h i C o t t o n M i l l s 
Kanpu r 




Source : Questionnaire 
The above' mentioned table 4.23 shows the number of 
unit which needs external funds from different banks 
and institutions. From the foregoing table one can 
come to this conclusion that Atherton Mills &c Swadeshi 
Cotton Mills, Kanpur need external funds only some time 
but Bijli Cotton Mills, Naini Zi the Elgin Mills No.l. 
Kanpur need funds frequently. Only New Victoria Mills, 
Kanpur did not need any external funds. Thus it can 
be said that majority of mills need external funds 
frequent l y . 
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Conclusion 
It has been observed that the textile 
industry in U.P. and particularly in Kanpur has been 
witnessed severe industrial sickness as compared to its 
counterpart in other states of the country. The study 
has revealed that the consumption of raw material and 
sale has increased in Atherton mills but the company is 
incurring lasses. The continuous loss is the main 
reason of the financial constraints of the company- As 
regards the performance of Victoria mills is concerned, 
the consumption of raw materials has increased by 
56.38 per cent during 1984—85. This company is also 
earning a continuous losses and this loss has increased 
to the tune of Rs. 500.51 lakhs in 1985-86. Hence this 
mill is also subject to rehabilitate. 
The consumption of raw materials of Swadeshi 
mill has increased by 96.5 per cent in 1985—86. But 
this company also incurred a loss of Rs. 1667.63 lakhs 
in 1985—86. Therefore, due to huge losses the company 
has become sick and needs to be rahabilated. The Elgin 
mills has 48,484 spindles out of which 47,092 spindles 
iii't* w(irlln<j. 1 , 1V4 {lidln 1 aomta liavw betan Ifteitdkllad lr» 
tht:* (.i)in|,)aiiy. lltti ctvttrctyu tutctl uf Wctguu bill 
including fringe benefit come to Rs. 64.43 lakhs. The 
average daily production of yarn is 16,709 kg and the 
13i 
average daily production of cloth is 80,000 metres. 
The Elgin mill No.2 Is a composite tentile 
processing and works in three shifts. The labour 
employment per thousand spindles is 9.27 per looms is 
•I6.<'>t3 «ntl iha total wdQe per bill including ftwinge 
benefits comes to Rs. 61.11 lakhs. The average daily 
production of yarns is 17.844 kg and average daily 
production of cloth is 83,700 metres. The survey of 
the mill have revealed that there is no material change 
in the consumption of raw material except in 1983—84 
and the income from the sale do not show any increasing 
trend. These mills have been continuously running in 
losses since 1980—81 and the loss is increasing • year 
after year. Therefore, it is desirable to note that 
Elgin mill is a sick unit which needs to 
rehabilitated. 
To conduct the survey of such textile mills 
six units were selected at non—random basis. The 
survey revealed that out of these mills, the production 
of two mills i.e. Swadeshi mills and Elgin mills 
showing an increasing trend. The total production of 
cloth of the New Victoria mills has come down from 
281.18 lakhs metres in 1985-86 to 86.lO lakh meters in 
1990 indicating a decline of 69.37 per cent. 
Similarly, the production of Elgin mills has decreased 
from 418.97 lakhs metres in 1985 to 416.33 lakhs metres 
in 1989—90 representing a decrease of 0.63 per cent. 
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It is interesting tta ire-fer' that the production of 
Swadeshi cotton mills went up from 261.58 lakhs metres 
to 873.43 lakhs metres in 1989-90 showing an increase 
of 70.05 per cent. Thus it can be said that out of 
these N.T.C. mills three spinning mills are sick due to 
continuous fall in the level of product and the other 
composite mills can be said viable. 
13a 
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FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF COTTON TEXTILE MILLS OF U.P. 
Finance is the life blood of business. 
Finance is that administrative area or set of 
administrative functions in an organisation which 
relates with the managemeint of qaeh and credit B O that 
the organisation may have means to carry out its 
objectives as satisfactorily as possible . All inputs 
in an enterprise ie., men,material, machines and 
methods involve an investment of both fixed and working 
capital which in turn generate a flow of funds. 
In the present chapter, an attempt has been 
made to assess the investment position, the 
profitability, solvency, liquidity and turnover of sick 
cotton textile mills of Uttar Pradesh undertaken by 
National Textile Corporation- The interpretation of the 
data is based on the ratio analysis. 
Financial Ratios As Indicators of Industrial Sickness 
I 
Kinancial statements are multifunctional to 
meet the needs of several users, both from within and 
outside the company viz., shareholders, managers, 
creditors, investors. Government and customers etc. On 
the basis of the information gained from these 
financial statements, various decisions in different 
areas are taken. The varied users are interested in 
assessing the financial viability of companies which 
14U 
have been in existence which is usually Judged from the 
profitability, liquidity and solvency position • of 
companies. These aspects aire represented by profit or 
loss,net working capital and net worth respectively. It 
can be stated that solvency and liquidity aire the two 
vital organs of financial viability of a unit and 
profitability is its life blood. 
The three elements of financial viability ait^e 
estimated normally from the financial ratios which are 
mostly computed from the company's balance sheet. A 
financial ratio is a quotient of two numbers, where 
both numbers consist of financial statement items. 
Financial ratios have been used extensively in the 
past. The usage of financial ratios is justified by the 
fact that the selection of pertinent material from a 
plethora of published information is more useful than 
wide and indiscriminate reading. Financial ratios serve 
this purpose by reducing tho oize of data dinclosed in 
financial statements to a relatively small set of 
readily comprehended and economically meaningful 
indicators. Laurent has stated that "In principle, the 
justification for employing financial ratio analysis to 
investigate a company's financial state is highly 
defensible. There are certain normative relationships 
existing between different financial components of a 
company as displayed in the balance sheet and revenue 
txnd appropriation account. Tho extent to which a 
1-U 
company does or does not confirm to these norms for the 
activities (industry) that it is engaged in, is 
indicative of something favourable or unfavourable, 
depending upon relationship being examined". 
If the actual relationship exhibits a 
significant departure from the normative relationship 
it acts as a precursor of some event in future. The 
prediction of future event is of great interest to the 
varied users of financial statements since prediction 
is necessary and prior condition for decisionmaking. 
The predictive capability of financial ratios has 
assumed great importance in the past few years that it 
is now used as a criterion for judging the usefulness 
of ratios. The predictive capability as a criterion for 
judging the usefulness of financial ratios is generally 
justified by the fact that it circumvents the enormity 
of task required for a complete specification of 
decision settings. 
Financial ratios can be classified into four 
major groups : 
1. Solvency ratios 
2. Liquidity ratios 
3. Turnover ratios 
4. Profitability ratios 
This classification depicts different 
economic aspects of the company's operations. This is 
14^ 
oriented to the needs of users. Investors are mainly 
concerned with profitability ratios, lenders with 
solvency ratios and shareholders and the management 
with all of these type of ratios. 
In order to assess the financial performance 
of sick cotton textile mills of U.P,, the help of the 
above ratio has been taken. The ratios (except 
profitability ratio)have been calculated with the help 
of relevant data gathered from the Annual Reports of 
National Textile Corporation <NTC> Kanpur. These data 
aif^e presented in the following table. 
Table 5.1 showing the summary of Balance Sheet of N.T.C 
Data 1988-89 1887-88 1986-87 
Total Tangible assets 
















































1. Solvency Ratios 
The fnain objective of long-term solvency 
ratios is to indicate the company's ability to meet its 
long—term obligations with regard to (a) periodic 
payment of interest during the period of the loan and 
<b) repayment of principal on maturity or in 
predetermined instalments when due. These measures 
stress the long run financial and operating structure 
of a company-
Some of these ratios are : 
<1) Total tangible assets to long—term debts 
<2) Total tangible assets to total debts 
(3> Net worth to total debts 
(4) Net worth to long-term debts 
To .itirlqiQ the; o o l v t a n c y o f c l c k c o t t o n t e x t i l e 
m i l l s o f N . T . C . , s o l v e n c y r a t l o o , h o v o bocsn c a l c u l a t o d 
i n t h e f o l l o w i n g t a b l e s . 
T o t a l T p n g l b l w A « « « t « t o Long T « r m D « b t i 
\ 
Table 5.2 indicates that the total tangible 
assets to long term debts has been decreasing from 
0.49:1 in 1V86-S7 to 0.42:1 in l«787-88 and 0.39:1 in 
1988-89. This leads to a conclusion that total tangible 
assets are less than the long term debts and are not 
equal to the standard norm of 1:1. Thus it can be said 
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that the cotton tejjtile mills of N. T.C are in it 
position. 
Table 5.2 Shows the total tangible assets to long term 
debts. 
Year Total tangible assets Long term debts Ratio 
1986-87 7747;. 03 15649.70 0.49:1 
1987-88 7732.48 18169.45 O T2 
1988-89 8475.05 21852.92 0.39:i 
Total Tangible Assets 
Long—term Debt 
Total Tangible assets to Total debts 
Table 5.3 shows that the total tar* jible 
assets to total debts has increased from 0.'*V:1 1 
1986-87 to 0.71:1 in 1987-88 but it came down to 0.38:1 
in 1988—89. The reason for the increases in 1907—B8 x a 
that the debts were less than the other years.From thxs 
analyses it can be concluded that the position of mill 
is not sound except in 1987—88. 
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Table 5.3 shows the total tangible assets to total 
debts. 











O . 7 1 : 1 
O.38:1 
Total Tangible Asset; 
Total debts 
Net Worth to total debts. 
In table 5.4, net worth to debts has been 
calculated which shows that net worth to total debts 
has gone down in 1986-87 from 0.23:1 to 0-21:l in 1987-
88 and 0.19:1 in 1988-89.This is an indication of 
sickness. 
Table 5-4 shows the Net Worth to Total Debt 
















Net Worth to Lang Term Debt 
In table 5.5, Nn t woi'th to lunq •.(•nn 
debts of sick cotton mills has been calculated. The 
table shows that net worth to long term debts has 
increased from 0.17: 1 in 1986-87 to 0.22:1 in 1987-80 
and 0.24:1 in 1988-89. This shows that these ratio are 
not equal to the standard ratio. 
Table 5.5 shows the Net Worth to Long Term debts 
Year Net Worth Long Term debts Ratio 
1986-87 3662.59 15649.70 O.19:1 
1987-88 3887.59 18169.45 0.22:1 
1988-89 4074.21 21852.92 0.24:1 
Net Worth 
Long Term debts 
2- Liquidity Ratios 
The degree to which a company meets its 
current obligations is a measure of its short term 
liquidity. The general objective of Iquidity ratio- is 
to indicate the companies ability to meet its short 
term financial obligations. Liquidity measures a^t^e 
believed to be of prime interest to short term lenders 
such as banks and merchantile suppliers . Some of the 
ratio included in thxs category s-re ; 
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1) Current assets to current liabilities 
2) Quick assets to total tangibles Assets 
> Current Assets to Total tangible assets 
4) Cdsh to current liabilities 
5) Quick assets to current liabilities 
Current assets To Current Liabilities 
The current ratio is an important test by 
which the financial health of a unit with reasonable 
reliability can be judged. The current ratio is also 
called as working capital ratio as it measures the 
working capital available at a time. The term current 
assets generally refers to those assets which change in 
their form and substance in the normal course of 
business operations and are ultimately realised in cash 
during the course of a year. As such the relationship 
of current assets and current liabilities is very 
sign if icant. 
The current liabilities include the sundry 
creditors, bills payable, bank overdrafts and other 
outstanding expenses. The current assets comprise 
cash , bills recievable, sundry debtsers, investments 
and stocks of finished goods. It can be calculated by 





The failure of a unit to meet its abligations 
due to lack of sufficient liquidity, will result in bad 
credit, loss of creditors confidence and even leqal 
suit resulting in closure of the Units. Hie standard 
current ratio is 2:1 which refers to Rs. 2 worth of 
current assets should be available to meet Rs. 1 worth 
of current Liabilities. The logic behind this norm is 
that in a worst situation even if the value of current 
assets becomes half, the firm will be able to meet its 
obligation. (The following table exhibits the ratio of 
current assets to current current liabilities). 
Table 5.6 showing current assets to current liabilities 
Year Current assets Current liabilities Ratio 
1986-87 5697.26 3591.93 l-e7--i 
1987-88 5878.86 3485.Ol 1.68:1 
1988-89 6716.19 3591.93 1.87:1 
Table 5.6 shows that current assets to 
current liabilities during the period 1986—87, 87—83 
and 88-89 were 1.87:1, 1.68:1 and 1.87:1 respectively. 
The preceding three^ years ratios are less than the 
suggested standard of 2:1. I ri i s shows that liquidxt/ 
position of cotton te5<tile mills is not good which is 
an indicator of sickness. 
14i) 
Current Assets to Total tangible Assets. 
The table 5.7 depicts the current Assets to 
total tangible assets during the year 1986—87, 87—88 
and 88-89, when are 0.74:i, 0.77:1 and 0.79:i 
respectively. The preceding three years ratios were 
less than the suggested standard of Isl . This shows 
that the liquidity position of cotton textile mills of 
N.T.C. is not sound. 
Table 5.7 depicts the current assets to total tangible 
assets. 
Year Cui^rent Asset Total tangible assets Ratio 
1986-87 5697.26 7 747.03 0.74:1 
1987-88 5878.86 7732.48 0.77:1 
1988-89 6716.19 8475.05 0.79:1 
L^ _ — , 
Current assets 
Total tangible assets 
Quick Assets to Total Tangible Assets 
The talilM h.ll «»l<plrtlnn t.h.nt t,h«.' quit k a o u; ri (.-i. 
to total tangible assets of the cotton teKtiie mills of 
N.T.C has increased from 0.74:1 in 1986—87 to 0.79:1 in 
1988-89 but it is not equal to the standard norms. Thus 
it can be said that the quick assets .pire less than the 
total tangible assets. 
IJU 
Table 5.S highlights the Quick assets to lotal tangil.)lf.> 
assets. 
Year Uuick assets lotal tangible assets Ratio 
l«?8<b-a7 3142.58 7747.03 0.74:1 
1987-88 3124.63 7732.48 0.77:1 
1988-89 3821.63 8475.05 O.79:I 
Quick asset* 
Total Tangible assets 
Cash to Current liabilities 
The table 5.9 reveals that the cash to 
current liabilities during the year 1986—87, 87-88 and 
88-89, were 0.91:1, 0.07:1 and O.19:1 respectively. 
This shows that the ratio were less than the standai^d 
ratios which indicates that N.T.C's liquidity position 
is not good which results sickness. 
Table 5.9 explains the cash to current liabilities-
Year Cash Current liabilities Ratio 
1986-87 195.44 3591.93 0.19:1 
1987-88 234.15 3485.01 0.07:1 




Acid Test Ratio or Quick Ratio 
Acid test or quick ratio is a more severe 
and stringent test of the unit, ability to meet current 
obligations. The ratio establishes a relationship 
between quick or liquid assets and current liabilities. 
An asset is considered liquid if it can be converted 
into cash immediatetly without a loss of value .Liquid 
assets include *cash, book debtss including bills 
recieveable and marketable securities. Inventories are 
not considered to be liquid assets because normally 
they take sometime for converting into cash. The quick 
ratio is found out by dividing the total of the quid:, 
assets by total of current liabilities- It is shown as 
Quick assets 
current liabilities 
Generally a quick ratio of 1:1 is considered 
to be satisfactory. This means that for every rupee of 
current liabilities, there must be a rupee of Quick 
Assets. The same has been calculated in the following 
table. 
Table 5.lO shows the Quick assets to Current Libilities 
Year Quick assets Current liabilities Ratio 
1986-87 3142.58 3591.93 1.03:1 
1987-88 3124.63 3485.Ol 0.89:1 
198a-8S> 3821.63 3591,93 1 . 0 7 : 1 
^'^ 
It is evident from the table ti. lO that the 
acid test ratio is satisfactory . The units are keeping 
high quick assets against the required current 
Abilities except in the year 1987—88-
.. Turn—over Ratios 
Turn over ratio usually consists of the sales 
figure in the r\umerator and the balance of an asset 
<e.Q inventory, debtors etc.) in the denominator. Fhe 
objective of these measures is to indicate the voi'ious 
aspects of operational efficiency. Thus, somtimes these 
»--»tios are also called efficiency ratios. The 
efficiency with which the assets are used would be 
reflected in the speed and rapidity with which these 
are converted into sales. Attention is focussed here 
on specific assets rather than on the overall 
efficiency of assets utilisation measured by the 
profitability ratio . Following are some widely used 
turnover ratios. 
1) Net sales to working capital 
2) Net sales to quick assets 
3) Net Sales to current assets 
4) Net sales to Net worth 
5) Net sales to fixed assets 
6) Net sales to Total Tangible Assets 
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Sales to Working Capital 
Ihis ratio is a measure of the efficiency or 
the employment of warkinq capital . If e;upp lemen ted 
ch tMifs rntjn nf np»t «»«li??5 tu n«l worth it indic^-^tG<r; 
r.nn p r m n n c o of ^^^\(^nr cop 1 tfl I 1'^..t t i < ir» or (iv«.>r (.rndinu 
ponllirm of il"ir> CDhCorn. Normally lor handling any 
desireable amount of sales certain pror)nrtion of 
working capital is required. 11 too much investment is 
made in a fixed assets than the working capital will be 
inadequate to handle that volume of sales. In order to 
affect the desired amount of sales in such a situation 
current liabilities will have to be incurred- The aim 
should be to set up an ideal ratio showing an 
appropriate relationship between the amounts of working 
capital and net sales. 
This ratio is calculated by dividing the 
figure of net sales by current assets minus current 
liabilities .In the absence of any authoritative 
standard ratio it is not possible to suggest any ratio 
for serving as reference level. 
Table 5.11 showing the Net Sales to Working Capital 
















Table 5.11 reveals that Net Sales to working 
f 
f Jital in 1986-87 was 2-34:1 which came down to 2.03:1 
1987-88. But in 1988-89 it increased to 2.36:1. Thus 
it can be said that the Net Sales is higher than the 
working capital which is about two fold. 
I 
Net Sales to Quick Assets 
The Net Sales to quick assets can be seen 
from the table 5.12. It reveals that the sales to 
quick assets decreased from 1.98:1 in 1986-87 to 
1.56:1 in 1987-88 but it rose to 1.92:1 in 1988-89. In 
terms of figure quick assets are half of the Net sales-
This shows that Net sales has increased at a higher 
rate than quick assets except in the year 1987—88. 
Table 5.12 showing Net Sales to Quick Assets 
Year Net Sales Quick assets Ratio 
1986-87 6242.08 3142.58 1.98:1, 
1987-88 4877.27 3124.63 1.56:1 
1988-89 7320.12 3821.63 1.92:1 
Net Sales 
Quick assets 
1 5 J 
Net Sales to Current Assets 
It is desired to r»scf=»»'t;a in thr? run 1;i'j tin t: i nn 
of curr-ent assets to the sales then we may calculate 
this ratio. For this purpose the figure of net sales is 
tu be divided by the current assets. The calculated 
ratios can be seen from the following tables, will be 
the ratio. 
Table 5.13 showing Net Sales to Current assets. 
Year Net Sales Current assets Ratio 
1986-87 6242.08 5697.26 1.09:1 
1987-88 4877.27 5878.86 0.83:1 
1988-89 7320.12 6716.19 1.08:1 
Net Sales 
Current assets 
The net sales to current assets can be 
studied from the table 5.13. It reveals that in 1986-
8 7 . Net sales to current assets was 1.09:1 which came 
down to 0.83:1 in 1987-88 but it increased to 1.08:1. 
This leads to a conclusion that the net sales" to 
current assets was not very satisfactory. 
Net Sales to Total Tangible Assets 
This ratio is calculated by dividing net 




Total Tangible assets 
The total assets turnover ratio is a 
significant ratio since it shows the company's ability 
o-f generating sales from all the financial resources 
committed to the firm. As this ratio increases, there 
is more revenue generated per rupee of total investment 
in assets. A higher ratio of net sales/ total tangible 
assets gives an indication of a higher degree of 
efficiency in the utilisation of assets. Higher the 
ratio, more efficient the utilisation of resources and, 
therefore, lesser the probability of financial 
problems. The higher turnover brings fair return and 
even il the profit margin in <n(»a I I, I hn total mfcurn on 
investmofit shall be large enouqfi to ovfr'r^came twiy 
financial difficulties. Therefore, a lower turnover of 
total assets is generally treated as precursot^ ot 
financial crisis and thus an indicator of corporate 
sickness. 
Table 5.14 showing Net Sales to Total Tangible assets 
Year Net Sales Total tangible assets Ratio 
1986-87 6242.08 7747.03 0.80:1 
1987-88 4877.27 7732.48 0.63:1 
1988-89 7320.12 8475.05 O.S6:l 
10/ 
Table 5.14 shows that Net Sales to total 
tangible assets is very low which can be t-ead as 0.80: 1 
in 1986-87, 0.63:1 in 1987-88 and 0.88:1 in 1988-89. in 
terms of figure total tangible assets are more than the 
net sales of different years. This leads to a 
conclusion that in terms ratio Net sales to total 
tangible assets is not higher therefore, the degree of 
efficiency in the utilisation of resources is not 
h igher. 
Fixed Assets Turnover Ratio 
This ratio measures the efficiency in the 
utilisation of fixed assets. Is there any excess 
installed capacity ? Have the fixed assets been fully 
utilised ? To what extent sire fixed converted into 
sales ? The answer to these question will be traced by 
the analysis of this ratio. The capacity concerns whicfi 
require huge investments in fixed assets usually attach 
greater significance to it. 
For calculating this ratio we divide the 
total value of sales by the amount of fixed assets 
invested. A high ratio is an index of over capacity 
while the low ratio suggest idle capacity and excessive 
investment in fixed trading assets. 
l06 
relation to its net worth is excessively large m 
comparison to the similarly situated concerns e\ 
business is saxd to be over trading i.e handling a 
large turnover than warranted by its net worth. The 
overall result is that huge financial obligations are 
incurred which leads to under capitalisation . It is 
usually maintained that a higher turn over of capital 
is a sign of prosperity. 
\ 
Table 5.16 showing the Net Sales to Net Worth 
Year Net Sales Net Worth Ratio 
1986-87 6242.08 3662.59 1.70il 
1987-88 4877.27 3887.59 1.25r1 
1988-89 7320. 12 409-1.21 l./Bil 
Net Sales 
Net Worth 
The table 5.16 shows that in 1986-87 the Net 
sales to Net worth was 1.70:1 but it c^me down to 
1.25:1 in 1987-88 and in 1988-89 it rose to 1.78:1. 
From this analysis it can be concluded that in 1986-87 
and 1988—89 the value of sales in relation to net worth 
was more which is said to be over trading i.e handling 
a large turnover than warranted by its net wor' 
IJ, 
4. Profitability ratios 
Profitability ratios are designed for the 
evaluation of the company's operational performance. 
The numerator of the ratios consists of periodic 
profits according to a specific definition, while the 
denominator represents the relevent investment base. 
The ratios thus are an indicator of the company's 
efficiency in lAsing the capital committed by 
shareholders and lenders. Some of profitabilty ratios 
in common use are t 
<1> Net income to net sales 
(2) Net income to net worth 
(3) Net income to total debts 
(4) Net income to net working capital 
(i) Net Income to net sales 
Net Income 
Net Sales 
(ii) Net lr>come to net worth 
Net Income 
Net Worth 




<iv) Net Income to net working capitaii 
Net Income 
Net Working Capital 
The profitability ratios could not be 
calculated because the annual reports of N.T.C. have 
shown continuous losses for the last three years. 
Conclusion 
In order to assess the financial performance 
of sick cotton textile mills of N.T.C, solvency ratios, 
liquidity ratios and turn over ratios were calculated 
and the results of this ratios 3.t^ts as follows. 
The main objectives of solvency ratio is to 
indicate the company's ability to meet its long term 
obligation. To judge the solvency of the mills four 
ratios were calculated which shows that total tar^gible 
assets to long term debts, total tangible assets to 
total debts, net worth to total debts and net worth to 
long term debts a^r-e continuously decreasing during the 
year 1986-87, i<?87-aa and 1988-89 and are also less 
than the standard norm 1:1. It leads to a conclusion 
that these mills aire not in solvent position. 
The general objective of liquidity ratio is 
to indicate the company's ability to meet its short 
term financial obligation. To assess the liquidity of 
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sick cotton te5<tile mills of N.T.C, five ratios were 
calculated which indicates that current assets to 
current liabilities, current assets to total tangible 
assets, quick assets to total tangible assets, cash to 
.trrent liabilities and quick assets to current 
liabilities are continuously decreasing durin the 
period 1V86-87, 1987-88, 1988-RV arr- 1F"=;'^ . than t.t«o 
standard norm 2.^1. I his leads to a conclusion thai-
liquidity of cotton textile mills of N.T.C is very poor 
which displays sickness of the mills. 
Turn over ratio usually consists of aalF?-". 
figures in numerator and the balance of assets airo used 
to indicate various aspects of operational efficiency. 
Six turn over ratios were calculated for N.T.C- mills, 
sales to working capital shows sales is higher than the 
working capital. In case of net sales to quick assets, 
the net sales has higher rates than the quick asset-:; 
except in the year 1987—88- Net sales to curt-ent 
assets is very satisfactory. In regards to net sales 
to total tangible assets, the degree of efficiency m 
the utilisation of resources is not higher. Net sales 
to fixed assets, ratio shows that in 1986—87 and 1787— 
88 the N.T.C's mills had more idle capacity and excess 
investment in fixed trading assets. 
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remedial measures a.fe applied. They would, therefore, 
need concessions in interest, mat-gin money and time tor 
the repayment of debts. Uepondinq upon thn uwrn {-.•-. ni 
< i ) \\\n f I inri 1 nt) n f nrip^i « (J i iH i^ rp't-, i / i 11--. I..» 1 1 tiwi i I. •. 
/uncovered part ol advance; 
(11) easy repayment installment of long-term loans 
with reasonable moratorium; 
(ill) reducing interest and margin; 
The Government may come up with the 
proposals, if necessary through legislation to protect 
the interest of small industry. 
losi 
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CAUSES OF INDUSTRIAL SICKNESS IN COTTON TEXTILE MILLS 
OF U.P. — A Survey Analysis 
An industrial unit does not become sici: 
overnight, rather it passes through diferont staqec. 
At the early stage the sickness is seen in the form of 
disorders in any of the functional areas such as 
production, marketing, finance and personnel etc. which 
in turn, may results decline in production and sales, 
returning of bills, accumulation of stocks etc-
Besides, there are different causes of sickness which 
vary from industry to industry , unit to unit and 
product to product etc. For example in a small scale 
industry inadequacy of raw material coupled with 
problems of production which affects the level of 
output. The increase in the cost of raw material 
overheads and taxes push up the final cost of 
production. Added to decline in sales, poor cash 
management results in the frittering away of the 
resources and symptoms of sickness may appear. 
Research studies have revealed that sickness 
in small scale industries is broadly caused by two sets 
of factors: 
I— Internal factors 
II— External factors. 
Among the various internal and external 
166 
factors the important ones are 
Internal Factors 
There B.re certain internal factors which lead 
to widespread individual sickness. These factors can 
be controlled if the unit is in a position to handle 
certain things in an effective manner. They may be 
termed as controllable factors. A particular unit can 
control these factors if it is in a position to set the 
things in right direction. The remedies of these 
factors wholly depends upon the ability of the 
management to take quick and timely decisions. If the 
management recognise the symptoms of industrial 
sickness and take remedial measures before the 
industrial unit goes to sickness and set its activities 
according to the requirements of the economic 
conditions prevailing in the country it can save unit 
from sickness. Internal sickness can be divided in the 
following headings. 
a) Mismanagement or Inefficient Management 
Among the the internal factors responsible 
or the sickness of an industrial unit is mismanagement 
or defective management or bad management. "Bad 
managemnt may be explained as the management which is 
not in a position to handle the affairs of a business 
concern effectively". 
lb, 
Lack of management competence has been one of 
the main causes for increasing sickness in small scale 
sector. Many new entrants do not possess the requisite 
qualification, training and experience in the fields of 
manufacturing, organisation and running of units. The 
problem has become more acute with the implementation 
of the self—employment schemes for Educated Unemployed 
Youth. It is knovjin from many surveys that the youth a^rG 
entering the small industry because finance is provided 
by banks and many incentives and subsidies are offered 
by the Governments. Studies carried out by BBI recently 
revealed that the youth have neither motivation, nor 
training nor risk—taking capacity. Besides,the 
educational qualifications also do not suit them for 
the activity started by them. Further, it is learnt 
that many self—employed people enter the field as a 
stop—gap arrangement and as and when they get some 
employment they leave the unit without any hesitation 
as they do not have much stake in the unit. Moreover, 
many entrepreneurs venture the field without any future 
p Ian. 
"Bad management is also associated with one 
man rule in the organisation without managerial 
abl i t ies" . ""^  Our Industrial units to a large extent is 
run and managed by persons who possess either poor 
managerial abilities or no managerial knowledge. In 
these units there is a common dearth of efficient; 
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manaoiers. Many of these units have been promoted by the 
technical personnel without having sufficient knowledge 
on how to run the business. Thus, these units 3^re 
managed and looked after by inefficient managerial 
persons and face very many problems to obtain the 
desired goals. Due to lack of adequate managerial 
knowledge most of the business units face sickness and 
are forced to close their shutters for ever-
Marketing Problems 
The other important factor causing sickness 
in small scale industry has been the inability to 
market the products. For many obvious reasons such as 
lack of market information, poor advertising, poor 
quality of products, etc.. Professional marketing is 
conspicuous by its absence. 
Lack of Research and development 
Due to weak financial position the research 
and development activities in this industry are not 
conducted properly. Research plays an important role in 
developing production and distribution techniques. lb 
makes an industrial units to adjust its actxvitiG?5 
according to time and conditions. Due to lack of 
research and development the quality and standard of 
goods are poor and fail to meet the consumers needs in 
this fast changing. 
loH 
Lack of Forecasting 
Another important internal factor which 
is responsible for industrial sickness is the lack of 
forcasting the change. Some of these changes take place 
slowly and are found to be predictable while other 
occurs suddenly and can be predictecl unless firm and 
its management is competent enough to force such 
events in time and estimate their impact. These 
changes may be competition political, social, economic 
scientific and technological. In these changing 
circumstances a firm must be competent to see and 
adjust its activities according to the time and 
condition- If it fails to adjust its activities it 
will have to face sickness. 
Faulty Project Planning 
Due to lack of managerial ability the project 
planning is not done properly. Many a time, units face 
difficulties in the field of manufacturing and selling. 
These are the much important and basic field of 
activities of an industrial units. The location of the 
plant, selection of goods to be produced and the needed 
resources are not make surveys of demand and supply 
before setting up a unit. The viability of the project 
i^ nut determined before the unit goes into action. In 
most of the cases it is found that although the 
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ev-isiting sources sr-e not fully capable to create the 
demand. "The units were set up with a hope to get 
other'share. This result in unhealthy competition and 
decrease in the profitability. In such circumstances 
units with sound financial and managerial background 
can face the consequences while other fall sick". The 
need of the hour is that different financial 
institutions specially banks, should help the 
entrepreneurs in conductinq viability studies, both 
technical and ecconmic, before the unit is actually 
sponsored. But this is not being done adequatly and 
objectively. Due to miscalculations, the industrial 
units face the industrial sickness and are ultimately 
forced to close thier shutters permanently creating 
several severe problems like unemployment and wastage 
of resources. 
Technological Problems, 
It is learnt from many studies that 
technological problems, have turned many units sick. 
Because of shortage of finances, many units resort to 
outmoded equipment and methods. In the result, small 
units start facing problems of quality as also high 
cost of production and consequently they find it 
difficult to compete with the large industries 
producing the same products or other units from the 
small scale sector with the fast changing technology. 
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inventories should be fixed in such a way that neither 
funds are blocked nor shortage of material is created. 
Both shortage and excess of raw materials leads to 
unhealthy conditions. lack of proper studies and 
demand estimation cause many difficulties in the 
fixation of inventories. This lands a unit in the net 
of industrial sickness. 
Poor Exploitation and Utilisation of Resources 
One of the major factors responsible for 
induEitrial sickness is the poor utilisation and 
exploitation of its available factors of production. 
For the success of an industrial unit it is needed that 
it should utilise its resources to the maximum possible 
extent. The capacity utilisation or resource 
utilisation should get proper attention of the 
management. 
Lack of Ploughing Back of Profits 
In the Industrial Units there is a lack of 
Ploughing back of Profits. Many healthy units build up 
their savings out of profits by ploughing back of 
profits. These savings or reserves are nothing but 
retained earnings. It is a very economical source of 
finance as the unit is not required to pay any interest 
on this amount. It helps an industrial unit to face the 
challenges of depression and seasonal fluctuations. 
1 7 1 
Entrepreneurs do not pay proper attention on unforeseen 
er.penditure and hence, neglect ploughing back of 
profits- This leads to financial crisis in the wake of 
economic depression or demand recession. 
Lack of Accounting and Management Information System or 
Inefficient System of Record Keeping. 
As has been pointed out earlier that 
Industrial Units ar'e managed by unqualified and even 
illiterate persons who do not have sufficient knowledge 
of accounting and book—keeping. Thus the lack of 
accounting information system is another cause of 
industrial sickness. 
Shortage of finances has been identified as 
one of the most important causes of sickness among 
small scale units. Many enter the field with 
inappropriate financial structures, meagre resources 
and with their poor equity base they are not able to 
attract the attention of creditors and investors. Very 
often poor equity base of small sector has been 
identified as the cause of sickness in small scale 
sector as the same affects the operations in small 
units. Though the Government has extended a number of 
incentives for the growth of this sector and 
financial institutions like SFCs and banks have been 
provided increasing quantum of finances still finance 
seems to be the scarce factor for many units which 
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become sick. 
Due to lack of proper accounting system there 
always remain the absence o-f proper records o-f past 
activities. The lack of accounting information system 
leads to wrong information and decision making. Most of 
these units do not have systematic budgetary control 
device. Due to lack of proper information of past 
activities they prepare neither cash flow statements of 
past nor they forecast the cash flow future. Many of 
"^these units do not have proper and scientific costing 
system to calculate the effective cost of each product-
On account of lack of proper accounting and record 
keeping the units fail to forecast the trend of their 
activities which in turn results to the erosion of cash 
and leads to sickness. 
High Rate of Capital Gearing 
The other important internal factor of 
industrial sickness in the industrial units is high 
rate of capital gearing. It has been pointed out by 
several entrepreneurs that they are to depend upon a 
higher proportions of long term fixed interest bearing 
loans. These loans are provided by banks and other 
financial institutions and in most cases by indigenous 
money lenders. The rate of interest of these loans is 
found to be very high if compared with he total capital 
employed. Some studies show that bank credit and loans 
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from term lending instiutions constitute about 75 to 90 
percent of the total capital employed in the majority 
of the Industrial Unit Sector. These loans carry a 
fixed interest comparatively at higher rate. These 
loans providing agencies do not see whether the firm is 
working effectively or not. They only concern about 
realisation of loan and its interest. The high rate of 
capital gearing and economic depression are sufficient 
enough to push a marginal firm into sickness. Further 
units generally raise their initial capital in the form 
of debt capital from indigeneous money market. They 
don't have free access to long term organised debt 
market or the equity market. For each of their 
additional capital requiremens they have to depend upon 
local money lenders or at the most on commercial banks 
who charge usually high rate of interest depending upon 
the time of repayment- When the commercial banks fail 
to meet the financial requirement specially at the time 
of economic recession these units become sick. Again, 
it has been own experience that duing economic 
recession some industrial units become sick because of 
the problem faced by similar firms. It may be due 
infection effect. 
Other Problems 
There are many units which are born sick and 
the number of such units is increasing from time to 
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time. Many small scale units atre ancillary industries 
and their fate is greatly linked up with large scale 
units. Any adverse effect on large industries, 
therefore, is invariably felt by the small scale units 
also. Another constraint of small scale industries is 
their size. they cannot reap the benefits of scale, 
reduce the cost of production, innovative and adopt 
fast changing technology and improve the quality of 
their products. Due to their inherent weakness they 
have to depend on the support of the Government, large 
industries and society in general. 
From the above it can be said that sickness 
in the small scale industries has been due to various 
reasons and a unit becomes sick due to one or a 
combination of the various factors as explained above. 
But it will not be wrong to sat that the internal 
factors aire controllable if the management is effecient 
and effective. These factors may be grouped as 
mismanagnagement, lack of accounting and management 
inf ormat ion, h igh rate of cafiital gearing, lack 
offorecasting, research and develoment, faulty project 
planning, poor maintenence of plant and machinery, 
improper fixation of inventory, poor collection of bad 
and doubtful debts and infighting, etc. 
Among these causess the management weakness 
is the most prominent factor of industrial sickness in 
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industrial units. In fact, management around which all 
the factors rotate. In fact, management weakness 
encompasses almost all the othe causes since it covers 
every aspect of the working of an unit. Thus, the main 
cause of industrial sickness among internal .causes is 
the poor or weak managemnt and other causes are 
subsidiary and are the creation of mismanagement or 
inefficient management. 
The internal factors caused sickness in seven 
cotton textile mills namely Atherton Cotton Textile 
Mills, Kanpur, Bijli Cotton Mills, Hathras, Nevj 
Victoria Cotton Textile Mills, Kanpur, Swadeshi Cotton 
Textile Mills, Kanpur, Swadeshi Cotton Mills, Naini, 
Sri Vikram Cotton Mills, Lucknow and The Elgin Mills, 
Kanpur of U.P. have been identified and discussed in 
the following pages. 
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Managerial Fac-fcors causing Sickness in Cot-bon Tex-fcile 
Mills of U.P. 
In order to analyse the managerial factors 
influencing sickness, a ranking table has been prepared 
by taking upto eight rank of different managerial 
factors. Weighted score of each factor has been shown 
in table 6.1. 
It is revealed from the data that among the 
ranking factors no proper manpower development 
programme has been considered as the first cause of 
sickness by 19.84 per cent of the mills, lack of 
management expertise and supervision has been ranked 
second by 15.87 per cent of the mills. Timely and 
adequate modernisation has got the third rank with a 
rating 12.3 per cent as a factor influencing sickness 
in cotton textile mills of Uttar Pradesh. It has also 
been revealed that no proper manpower development 
programme has emerged as the single most influencing 
factor for sickness by scoring 50 points. Second 
highest paints were scored by lack of management 
expertise and supervision (40 points). Third and fourth 
position according to score went to lack of timely and 
adequate modernisation (31 points) and lack of 
professionalisation <23 points). 
From the foregoing discussion it can be 
177 
laDle &.1 sfiDwiriQ the Heiohtea score of Manaoenal factors Causma Sickness in Cotton Textile Mill of U.f. 
MAtWGEftlAL FACTORS ! 
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concluded that no proper manpower development programme, 
lack of management expertise and supervision and lack 
of timely and adequate modernisation have been the main 
causes of sickness in cotton textile mills of Uttar 
Pradesh. 
Therefore, management of mills should make an 
arrangement to send their employees for training and 
should induct experienced professionals on the board of 
directors, competent technincal and management personnel 
must be appointed to the key positions. Besides they 
should have a research and development cell for finding 
out the possibilities of modernisation of the mills. 
7i 
Finaincial Factors causing Sickness in Cotton Textile 
Mills of U.P. 
In order to analyse the financial factors 
causing sickness, we have prepared ranking table by 
talking upto iO ranks of different financial factors. 
Weighted score of each factor has been calculated as 
shown in the table 6.2. 
It is revealed from the data presented in the 
table that lack of finance and working capital has been 
considered as the first cause of sickness by 5 units 
out of 7 units and secured 50 points. The second most 
important factor ( second Rank) was continuous loss and 
poor cash management which has been the cause of the 
sickness in cotton tej'itile mills of Uttar Pradesh. Too 
much dependence on borrowed money has been the third 
cause of sickness and^ secured 35 points according to 
the weighted score. Inappropriate financial structure 
and too much' bad debts have got fourth and fifth rank 
among the causes of sickness. Thus it can be said that 
lack of finance and working capital, continuous losses/ 
poor cash management and too much dependence on 
borrowed money have been the main causes of sickness. 
Therefore, the management of mills should 
find some solution to the problem. Sick units need 
time to generate surplus and build up themselves when 
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fade 6.4 st\avnm the weichted score of financial factors causmo sickness in cotton textile raiUs of U.P 
ftanhng oreference of cotton textile mills 
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mills of Uttar Pradesh. Therefore, the management of 
these mills should give due importance to sale 
promotion programmes and product mix. They must also 
make necessary arangement to forecast the demand and 
other market information. 
isz 
Marketing Factors causing Sickness in Cotton Te5<tile 
Mills of U.P. 
Sickness in industries is not thf? inf luenro 
of any single factor but it owes due to number ot 
factors. Marketing factors aire one of the main factors 
causing sickness in industries. We have therefore 
attempted to assess the influence of marketing factors 
on cotton textile mills of U-P. A limited sample of 
sick cotton textile mills has been drawn from Uttar 
Pradesh. According to the calculated weighted score 
lack of sales promotion has been the first cause of 
sickness (1st rank) followed by selection of 
inadequate product mix (Ilnd rank) inaccurate domanrJ 
forcasting (Ilird rank) and lacl-i of marlcet feed back 
(IVth rank). 
Further, it can be observed that out of 246 
points of weighted score, lack of sales promotion has 
got 3-3 points, selection of inadequate product mix 
secured 32 paints. Inadequate demand forcasting 
recieved 31 points and lack of market feed back got 28 
points. It is therefore, revealed that the above four 
factors together secured 124 points which arG more 
than 50 percent. Thus, it can be said that lack of 
sales promotion, selection of irundequate product mix, 
inaccurate demand forcasting and lack of market feed 
back ars the main causes of sickness in cotton textile 
is:i 
Taole 6.3 showino the wsiohted score of raarketino ractors causino sickness in cotton te;;tile mills of U.P. 
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1 0 1 U 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 4 1 1.^2 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 0 113 1 5.28 
) , , , 1 , , 1 . 1 1 1 1 1 , 1 , > 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 












1 10 1 
1 7 1 
1 12 1 
1 11 1 
1 9 1 
i _ . 
1 
SOURCE: Questionnaire 
fiOTE ! R: Rank. 
WS : Weighted Score 
PWS : Percent of Weighted Score. 
RPWS ; Rankino Percentaoe of WeiQhted Score. 
Productivity Factors causing Sickness in Cotton Textile 
Mills of Uttar Pradesh. 
Productivity factors causing sickness in 
textile mills has been shown in Table 6.4 to assess 
this fact, we have analysed the priority ranking of 
sample units. Priority ranking with weighted score 
shows, that three most important factors such as poor 
maintenance and replacement of machinery, poor quality 
of products and power shortage have scored 47 points, 
33 points and 23 points respectively. However, 18,65 
percent of the unit considered poor maintenance and 
replacement of machinery as first ranking factor, poor 
quality of pr'odyct is considered as a second factor of 
sickness by 13.09 per cent of the mills and power 
shortage has been concluded as the third cause of 
sickness. We can conclude from the above that poor 
maintenance of machinery, poor quality of product and 
power shortage have been the main causes of sickness in 
cotton textile mills of Uttar Pradesh. 
Keeping in view the above noted findings 
into consideration it can be suggested that management 
of these seven cotton textile mills should give due 
attention to maintenance of machinery and quality of 
product. Similarly the Government should caro for^warcl 
to solve th© pr-otalwm o-f powwt' «H«3r *•««•» 
I S J 
Table 6.4 showino the weiohted score of oroductivity factors causino sickness in cotton textile mills of U.F, 
RankinQ oreference of cotton textile raills 
1 PRODUCTIVITY FACTORS 1 
1 1 WronQ selection of sioht for industrial unit.! 
1 2 Poor quality of raw materials. 1 
1 3 Poor maintenance and reolacemsnt of machineryl 
1 4 Power Shortage. i 1 
1 5 Delayed supplies from Sub Contractors. ' 
1 fa Lack of oroduct diversification. 
1 7 Poor qualitiy of oroduct. 
1 B Improper planning for the l ife of the oroduct 
I 9 Lack of quality control. 
110 Poor industrial relation. 
Ill Lack of order due to coitoetition. 
112 Irregular deleveries. 
113 Lack of raw material due to high cost. 
114 Sudden increase in cost of oroduction 
115 Heavy borrowing higher interest charges 
116 Unplanned capital exoenditure 
117 Unolanned payment creditors 
118 Absence of manpower olanning and overstaffing 
11*? Increased cost not recovered m selling orice 
1 due to faulty costing 
1 Total number of mills 
— 1 _ 1 
1 1 
Rl 1R2 1 
1 1 0 1 
1 1 0 1 
_ ' _ ' 
4 1 0 1 
0 1 3 1 
t t 
0 1 0 1 
1 1 
0 1 0 
1 
0 1 0 
0 1 0 
0 1 1 
t 
1 1 1 0 
; 0 1 0 
1 
1 0 10 
1 1 
1 ~ ( ~ 
1 0 12 
1 1 
1 0 1 0 
( t 
1 0 1 0 
1 - — — , - — 
1 0 1 0 
1 0 1 0 
1 0 10 
\ 1 
1 t 
1 0 1 0 
( 1 
t ( 
1 . _ 1 
• 1 

























R4 1R5 1R6 1R7 1 
0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
0 10 10 1 0 1 
0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
0 1 0 10 1 0 1 
0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
0 1 0 11 1 0 ' 
3 1 0 10 1 0 
1 1 0 10 1 0 
I 1 0 1 0 1 0 
0 1 1 1 1 1 0 
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 U 
10 10 1 1 1 1 
10 12 10 10 
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 
1 0 1 1 1 2 10 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
1 0 1 0 10 11 
10 1 0 1 1 1 2 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 3 






















~ t ~ 1 ~ 1 
W3 IPWS IRPWSl 
t I . t 
1 1 1 
12 1 4.76 1 7 1 
8 1 3.17 1 10 1 
( 1 1 
47 118.65 1 1 1 
_ 1 _ „ _ 1 _ _ _ 1 
t I t 
"57 t 0 t ~ I 7 1 
t 1 1 
4 1 1.58 1 13 1 
1 ( 1 
13 1 5.15 1 6 1 
_ t 1 1 
t I I 
33 113.09 1 2 1 
1 1 ( 
11 1 4.36 1 8 1 
1 t 1 
12 1 4.76 1 7 I 
1 1 I 
15 1 5.95 1 5 1 
t „ 1 1 
. 15 1 5.95 1 5 1 
1 t t 
1 5 1 1.98 1 12 1 
1 [ I I 
1 n 1 P 7 7 1 A i 
1 1 _ » i 
( 1 I t 
1 3 1 1.19 1 14 1 
I t I I 
I t t t 
1 11 1 4.36 1 8 1 
1 " " ( "" " • * ( "" "" 1 
1 0 1 0 1 16 1 
1 1 " " " • " 1 •*• i 
1 2 1 0.79 1 15 1 
C I I I 
1 9 1 3.57 1 9 1 
1 7 1 2.77 1 11 1 
I t I I 
t . „ _ „ 1 . 1 - . - . - . - . I 
I I I I 
1252 1 1 1 
1 t 1 
SOURCE : Chjestionnaire 
NOTE : R:R3nk 
WS : Wsighted Score. 
PWS ; Perecentage of Weighted Score 
RPWS : Rankino Percentaqe of Weionted Score 
ISo 
Personnel Factors causing Sickness in Cotton Textile 
Mills of U.P. 
Sickness in cotton textile mills is not 
influenced by any single factor, it may be due to 
number of factors. To know the real causes n f r.icknnr.'-
a survey was conducted in seven cotton tG:',ti 1 o mi 11^ o( 
Uttar Pradesh. ^ Eleven personnel factors causing 
sickness were taken for study as shown in table 6.5, 
The mills were asked to give their openion about the 
causes of sickness in order of priority. A weighted 
score has been calculated for these openion. The idea 
of weighted score has been burrowed from G.N.Sasamal, 
who made an attempt to evaluate the efficiency of 
Industrial development loan. The weighted score har. 
been termed as content score by G.N.Sazamal in his 
studies. This is secured by each factor. In order to 
get weighted score or 'content score' for each factor 
we have assigned weight to each rank and got the 
weighted score for factors. Since we have taken upto 6th 
rank and assigned 6 points to first rank, 5 points to 
second rank, 4 points to third rank, 3 point to fourth 
rank, 2 paints to fifth rank and 1 point to sixth rank. 
From the calculated weighted sum of the 
ranking. It can be concluded that absence of manpower 
planning has been the first cause of sickness, b^ xd 
labour relation as second cause and weak 
ir/ 
Table 6.5 showina the weiohted score of oersonnel factors causmo sickness in cotton tev;tile mills ct '!. 
Pankmo preference of cotton teutile mills 
P£RSONf£L FACTORS 1 
11. Bad labour relation. 1 
12. Inaopropriate wage and salary administration,! 
13. Absence of manoower plannmo. 1 
14, Continous labour strike or lack out resultino 
15, StoDpaoe of work and low oroductivity. 
16. Internal auareil. 
!7, Weak Oroanisational set uo, 
19. Labour Absenteeism / Labour orobleiLS, 
19. Insfficiant handhno of labour problens. 
no Low labour oroductivity. 
111. Lack of trained / skilled labour. 
1 No.of mills. 
1 1 1 * 1 1 ~ 1 I 1 
Rl 1R2 1R3 1R4 1R5 1R6 IWS IFWS 1 
3 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 I 124 116,32 1 
1 1 I 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 111 1 7,48 1 
1 1 I 1 1 1 " 1 ' 
3 1 3 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 133 122.44 1 
0 1 1 1 0 10 1 0 10 1 5 1 3.4 
0 1 0 1 3 1 0 1 0 1 0 112 1 8.16 
0 1 0 1 2 1 3 1 1 1 0 119 1 4,76 
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 2 10 17 110.88 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 116 1 2.72 
0 1 0 10 1 0 1 0 14 14 1 4.t;8 
l „ „ _ l 1 ' . _ . _ ! _ - . 1 _ 1 ^ . I 
t I 1 I » I 1 1 
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 iJ 1 1 1 0 1 6 1 6.8 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 2 1 2 1 0 110 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 
17 17 17 17 17 17 11471 
1 I ^ 1 _ _ „ I \ 1 1 1 _ 










. 8 1 
1 6 1 
1 1 
SOURCE: Questionnaire 
m i E : R-.Rank. 
WS I WeiQhled Score. 
F'WS : Percentage of Heiohted Score, 
RPWS : Rankino Percentaoe of Heiohted Score. 
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External Factors 
The external factors aire related to the 
environment in which the industry works and over which 
the industry or management has no direct control. 
These may be grouped as advancement in science and 
technology, government policy regarding production, 
prices and distribution, inadequate supply inputs like 
raw material, power shortage, inadequate transport 
facilities, non—availabi1ity of adequate and timelv 
finance for working capital requirement, labour 
problem, delayed payment, competition, procedural 
delays in sanctioning loans by commercial bank.s >^nd 
other financial institut ions.The External factors have 
discussed the following headings-
Advancement in Technology 
The present age is the age of science and 
technology. In this age a large number of 
organisations are engaged in the research and 
development activities. These institutions are leaving 
no stone unturned to develop sophisticated techniques 
of production in order to meet the challenges of 
production and distribution. The process of developing 
high technology and its absorption is at the peak in 
advance where resources are in abundance. With the 
passage of time developed industrial economies of the 
19U 
world ars workina hard to develop newer techniques of 
production. In our economy there is a general 
deficiency of sophisticated techniques or high level 
technology where cntreprenurs are found to be reluctant 
to conduct development activities of their own. They 
ai.re not even in a position to absorb the new technology 
in their production process. If they develop and 
absorb new technology the changing phase of science and 
technology creates numerous other problems. Thus,in 
this age,the science and technology is an 
uncontrollable problem created by new inventions in the 
field of production and distribution.This state of 
affairs of change in technology from time to time leads 
to industrial sickness. 
Labour Unrest 
The present age can also be termed as the aqe 
of strikes and lock—outs or the age of unrest. The 
management and the labour is struggling between 
minimum and ma>jimum. Due to increase in awareness the 
labour force seldom goes on strikes which results in 
low productivity or lesser utilisation of available 
resources. Due to strikes and lock—outs the several 
man hours are lost and the organisation finds it 
difficult to recoup its losses, in such circumstances 
the unit has no option but to close down its shutters 
which is the symptom of industrial sickness. The 
1 9 1 • 
strikes in a particular organisation may be motivated 
by neighbouring units. Labour is not an ever satisfied 
element. Therefore, the strikes remain a challenge for 
all times to come and its incidence can not be 
eliminated for ever. 
Power Failure 
One of' the main factors responsible for 
industrial sickness in modern days is power failure. 
Now a days most of the entrepreneurs complain about 
sudden electric power break down. These break down 
cause labour, material and machine wastage. On sudden 
electric failures the whole process comes at stand 
still which results in permanent cash losses resulting 
industrial sickness. 
Market Recession 
Sometimes country as a whole comes under the 
grip of general recession or inflation resulting the 
decline in the market demand. The sudden fluctuations 
become unbearable for entrepreneurs with meagre 
resources. This recessionary situation forced these 
entrepreneurs for under utilisation of installed 
capacity. Uncertain and excessive shortfall in demand 
again leads to unit to work below its break—even point. 
All these conditions force to entrepreneur to declare 
his unit as sick. 
13J 
Shortage of Essential Inputs 
Most of the units are facing acute shortage of 
essential ' inputs. As a result the units become sick. 
In this regard the example may be cited of mini steel 
plaln1;§ where most of these plants are facing actual 
shortage of steel scrap, electric power and graphite 
electrodes, etc. On account of the paucity of these 
inputs they have no option but to under utilise their 
production! capacity. In the long run these plants 
began to face cash losses and forced to close their 
doors and declare themselves sick. 
Restrictions on Imports 
In the country the government has imposed 
heavy restrictions on the import of sophisticated 
1 
material, machinery and even on technology. Due to 
these restrictions most of the units specially 
engineering and electric goods producing units often 
face an acute shortage of materials and equipment 
available in foreign market or previous stocit: exhausted 
their production and supply is suspended which 
resulted industrial sickness. 
Unfavourable attitude of Banks and Other 
•u-u-v.-v-x.-\,-v.'\, ^/Vi ^  .V-v.'u-u-v. A, A,-v.-v.-w ^ 'w ~ ~ ^ -x.'w'\.'\,'W->.-vv,-vx. •>,-v,-w/w-w ~-vy 
Institutions 
In spite of the liberal policies of the 
19 
government for meeting financial requi r^emen ts of 
industrial units on priority basis, the banks and 
financial institutions are not paying proper attention-
Due to procedural delays and unfavourable attitude of 
administrative and other staff, entrepreneurs do nnt 
approach the commercial banks and other institutions 
for loans. This state of affair resulted heavy 
industrial sickness. 
Delayed Payment of Qovernment Purchases 
Another challenge which is faced by the 
industrialists is the delay in payment of government 
purchases. Due to these delays Wnt repreneurs 3.t^G 
landed in financial crisis. Ultimately they are forced 
to declare their units as sick units. 
Lack of Availability of Skilled Labour 
In recent years due to diversification of 
industries from urban to rural areas the industries arei 
established in rural and backward areas. An industry 
located in a backward area may get unskilled labour in 
abundance. But there is a shortage of skilled manpower 
in the countryside. This promotes industrial sickness. 
Wage Disparity in Identical Units 
It is a fact that a large number of units a.r(B 
not organised properly. Due to this fact the 
profitability of units goes down. Experience shows that 
l^t 
an efficiently manaqed and orqanised unit can offot^ 
better T>alaries and other facilitir?r; aiul t»«>n(« f i tr. tfi.ui 
mismanacied units. An skilled and efficient worker 
would prefer to shift to an employer who can offer 
better remuneration and facilities. In such 
circumstances an inefficient unit finds it difficult to 
retain skilled and efficient workers. A high rate of 
loss of skilled and experienced employees may furthnr 
land ttiG unit into difficulty r'RSultinq i r> tlie nr'nvsihh 
uf numiMM" of Glck units. 
International Competition and Protectionist Policies 
of Advanced Countries 
The degree of competition in . the international 
market is rising in recent years. Besides, advanced 
countries have been imposing protectionist measures on 
their imports which are creating problems for exporting 
units. In such circumstances entrepreneurs are facing 
difficulties to attract customers in foreign markets 
which results in the loss of incomes. 
Heavy Taxes• 
Heavy taxes, excise duty and other penalities 
contribute in increasing prices of goods and services 
producd in industrial units. The high in prices 
adversely affect the demand and revenues of industries 
which are already financially weak. This may further 
IB. 
aggravate the situation resulting in sickness. 
Delays in Rehabilitation of Sick Units 
Delays in rehabilitation of those units which have 
already gone to sickness is another cause of industrial 
sickness. Government aid for rehabilitation of these 
units usually comes very late due to procedural delays. 
On account of delays in recognising the symptoms and 
taking remedial measures take an ugly turn. This aid 
fuel to fire and promotes further sickness in 
industrial units due to infection effect. 
Increased Government Interference 
In recent times the government interference is on 
rise in day today affairs of business and industry. 
There is a large team of inspectors who casually visit 
units to check their product and working. This stands 
as an hinderance in the way of smooth functioning of 
units and affect their profitability and revenues 
adversely. In the long run this becomes the cause of 
industrial sickness in this sector. 
Broadly external causes for sickness can be 
listed as, 
1. Government policy regarding prices and 
distribut ion. 
2. Restraint on diversification/expansion imposed by 
the government. 
J l 
3. Liberalised licensing poicy for- ai sinale product 
resulting in excessive supply and unhealthy 
campet i t ion. 
4. TaMation policy of the Government. 
5. Import restraints on essential inputs. 
6. Change in International marketing Scene. 
7. Change in Government's purchasing policy. 
8. Change in economic and Social policies of the 
Government. 
9. Change in fiscal imposition. 
10. Devaluation. 
11. Failure of state institution vis—a—vis export 
orders on deffered payment Basis. 
12. Various unwelcome compulsions, including pricing 
policy etc. 
13. Credit Squeeze, high Interest rates. 
14. Sharp fluctuation in exchange rates. 
15. Credit restraints. 
16. Delay in disbursement of loans. 
17. Unfavourable investment climate. 
18. Shortage of inputs. 
19. Delay in release of promised funds by the 
Financial Institution. 
20. Adverse and uncertain market conditions due to 
change in Government policies, emergence in 
subsidies, changing consumer's preference. 
21. Lack of availability of credit at an appropriate 
t ime. 
19? 
22. Market recession 
23. Non—aval labi1ity of skilled manpower. 
24. Inter union rivalry. 
25. Decline in the market demands for the goods. 
26. Storage of/or interruptions in power supply. 
27. Inability to reduce unit cost in a competitive 
market. 
28. Receiving tiransport bottleneck. 
29. Unrealistic price control. 
30. Dependence on few buyers. 
31. Changes in International market conditions. 
32- Non—availabi1ity of skilled labour. 
33. Higher turnover of labour and staff. 
34. Low productivity of labour. 
35. General labour unrest. 
36. Wage desparities in similar industry. 
37. Sudden strikes/lock outs. 
38. Litigations. 
39. Natural calamities. 
40. Inaccurate demand forcasting. 
41. Selection of inadquate product mix. 
42. Lack of sales promotion. 
43. Lack of sufficient advertisement. 
44. Lack of market feed back. 
45. Poor marketing efforts. 
46. Absence of product planning. 
47. Dependence of few buyers. 
13 6 
48. Lack of market research. 
49. F'ricinQ or product. 
50- Lack of knowledge of marketina technique. 
External Factors causing Sickness in Cotton Te:<til< 
M i H » of U.P. 
It is revealed from the table 6>.6> that 
restraint on diversification/expansion imposed by the 
Government has emerged as the first cause of sickness 
by scoring 69 points. The second highest point was 
secured by market recession (50 points). The third and 
fourth position according to weighted score went to 
non availability of skilled manpower (49 points) aiul 
change in economic and social policies of thR 
Government (46 points). It is therefoi^e, revealed that 
restraint on diversification/expansion imposed by the 
government, market recession, non availability of 
skilled manpower and change in economic and social 
policies of the Government secured 214 points having 
emerged as the most important factors causing sickness 
in the cotton textile mills of Uttar Pradesh. 
Conclusion 
The managerial factors such as lack of 
manpower development programme, lack of management; 
13J 
Table b.b showino the weiqhted score of external factors causma sickness in cotton textile raill in U.P. 
Ranking oreference of cotton te;;tile mills 
EXTERNAL CAUSES 1 
1. Govt policy regarding orices i. distribution. 1 
2. Restraint on diversification/expansion imoosed by the 1 
Government. 1 
3. liberalised licensing policy for a singal product 1 
resulting in excessive supply and unhealthy competition! 
4. Taxation policy of the Govt. 1 
5. IfflDort restrains on essential incuts. 1 
6. Change m International markstlng Scene. 1 
7. Change in Governsient's purchasing policy. ' 
8. Change in econosiic and social policies of the govt. 
9. Change in fiscal imposition. 
10. Devalution. 
11. Failure of state institution vis-a-vis export order on 
deffered payment Basis. 
12. Various unwelcome coitipulsions,including pricing policy 
etc. 
13. credit Squee:e,high Interest rates. 
14, Sharp fluctution in exchange rates. 
15. Credit restraints. 
it. Delay in disbursment of Loans. 
17. Unfavourable investment climate. 
18, Shortage of inouts. 
19. Delay in release of promised funds by the financial 
Institution. 
20. Adverse and uncertain market conditions due to change 
in Govt, policies, emergence in subsidies, changing 
consumer's prefence. 
Rl ;R2 !R3 IR4 :R5 IR6 !R7 IRS 1R9 lR10IRlllR12IR13iR14IWS 1!HS IRraSl 
2 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 i 0 1 0 1 U 1 U 1 1 1 0 1 4! 15.65 1 5 1 
3 i 2 ! 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 I 0 1 U 1 0 1 1 1 69 19.38 1 1 1 
1 1 f 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 > 1 1 1 1 1 1 
t ( 1 t t t 1 t 1 t 1 I t I I \ t 
. . . . - > . . . . . > . . - . . * - ._ ' . ._ ' ,, _ - ' . . . _ ' . . _ - . > . , . . . _ * . ' ' ' - ' . . _ . ' _ . , . ' . . 1 .. _,. I 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 
0 ; 0 1 2 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 I 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 ! 0 1 0 1 24 13.26 1 13 1 
1 t 1 f f 1 < 1 1 1 1 ( 1 1 1 i ( 
1 I 1 i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ) 1 1 
I 1 _ 1 I 1 1 i I I 1 1 I 1 1 . 1 _ _ _ I 1 
< 1 1 t < 1 1 1 1 1 < 1 1 1 t 1 [ 
O i l ! 0 1 2 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 35 14.7fc 1 7 1 
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 10 1 0 1 0 1 25 1 
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 i 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 ! <•) 1 0 1 25 1 
0 1 0 1 2 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 24 13.26 1 13 1 
_ „ l ^ ^ l ^ 1 . 1 { „ i _l _ i _ _ t _ _ l _ _ l _ l _ ( I 1 i _ 1 
( 1 1 I 1 I 1 1 1 I 1 1 t ( I < ( 
1 I 0 1 0 ! 1 1 2 1 0 I 0 ! 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 I 1 4t lfa.25 1 4 1 
- _ ' _ _ ' - » < - 1 - _ * _ _'-_ _ < ' _ _ ' ' I ' I — ' ' ' ' 
1 t 1 1 C 1 1 1 t ( ( 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( 
U t V 1 '.J 1 i f •-.' 1 i 1 '.' 1 '.' 1 V 1 '.' 1 '.' 1 V I V 1 V I i. ( I J • , -T I / I 
. , 1 • . ' . . ! 1 , 1 1 . ' I „ 1 1 1 t 1 . . 1 . I . 1 
t t t t t t 1 t ( 1 1 1 I ( t t \ 
0 ! 0 1 0 1 0 : 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 O l O l O l O t 0 1 y 1 25 1 
1 1 ( 1 1 1 1 1 ( 1 ( ( ( ( I 1 ( 
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 u 1 10 11.3t 1 20 1 
1 1 1 t 1 1 1 t f ( 1 1 1 t 1 1 r 
1 ( 1 t 1 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 1 1 ( '. I 
1 1 r t I 1 1 1 1 1 t 1 t 1 1 t ! t 
0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 ! 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 22 12.99 1 14 1 
t i 1 1 1 1 ( 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 
( r 1 t 1 1 1 1 1 1 t 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 I ) i 1 t 1 1 I I 1 1 1 1 t ^ 1 ( 1 
1 0 1 I 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 ; 13 11.76 1 17 1 
t 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 < 1 t t 1 1 1 ( < 1 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1. 0 1 25 1 
t 1 t 1 1 1 1 1 1 < 1 f 1 ( ( 1 I 1 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 u 1 0 1 U 1 0 1 0 1 U 1 '.) 1 25 1 
1 1 t 1 1 1 t 1 V 1 1 1 k I 1 I \ t 
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 ! 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 y 1 0 ! 0 1 0. 1 12 11.63 1 19 1 
! 0 ! 0 ! 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 U 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 25 1 
1 t < ( ~ 1 1 1 C t I 1 1 1 t ( 1 t 1 
1 0 1 0 1 0 ! 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 ! 0 1 0 1 0 ! 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 8 11.08 '• 21 1 
1 I 1 1 1 1 1 < 1 < 1 1 1 t r 1 t t 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 25 13.4'; 1 12 1 
) > 1 1 1 1 1 1 t 1 ) 1 1 ) 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 • r 1 1 1 t ( < ( 1 ( 1 1 1 t ) 
1 _ _ ^ 1 ^ „ ^ J . 1 1 „ I _ I _ _ 1 1 ,_ 1 _ « . 1 ^ » , 1 „ ' ' 1 ' ' 
1 1 1 1 ** 1 1 1 I 1 1 I t 1 1 1 t 1 
1 0 1 0 1 I 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 11 1 0 1 I 1 0 ! y 1 1 1 0 1 2b 13.53 1 11 1 
> 1 1 1 1 t 1 ) 1 ) 1 1 t 1 1 1 > 
1 1 1 r 1 1 1 1 ( 1 1 1 I 1 ) ' 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 t ( 1 < t 1 t ( 1 ( 1 < { 1 < 1 
'^i)U 
21. Lad; of availabihtv oi credit at an apDrooriate tiiss. 1 
22. Market recession. ! 
23. ftan avaiUbihtv of stciUed (nanaower. ! 
24. Inter union rivalry, ! 
25, Decline m the marl',et demands for the ooods. 1 
26, Storage of/or interructions in power supply. '. 
27. Inability to reduce unit cost m a comoatitive market, ! 
28. RecevinQ transoort bottleneck. 
29. Unrealistic once control. 
3u. Dependence of few buvers. 
31, Changs in international market conditions. 
32, Mon-avaibility of si i l l labour, 
33. Higher turnover of labour and staff. 
34, Low productivity of skill labour. 
35. General labour unrest. 
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1\)1 
expertise sind supervision and timely and adequate? 
modernisation have been the most striking factors for 
sickness and were ranked as first, second and thii-d 
respectively which is evident from table 6.1. 
Table 6.2 indicates that among the financial 
factor, lack of finance and working capital, 
coontinuous losses and poor cash management and too 
much dependence on borrowed capital have got the first, 
second and third rank and they were emerged as the most 
imprtant causes of sickness. 
Among the marketing factors, sales promotion, 
inadequate product mix, inaccurate demand forcasting 
have got first, second and third rank, in order of 
ranking priority. It is clear from the table 6.3. 
Among the productivity factors, poor" 
maintenance and replacement of machinery was ranked 
first and secured 47 points, poor quality of production 
got second rank with 33 points and power shortage was 
ranked as the third cause of sickness with 23 points as 
it is evident from the table 6.4. 
From the foregoing discussion, it can be 
concluded that a number of factors s^re responsible for 
sickness in cotton textile mills of Uttar Pradesh. The 
present study has revealed that among the personnel 
factors three most important factor vis; Absence of 
manpower planning, poor labour relation and weak 
202 
organisational set up are responsible for industrial 
sickness in cotton textile mills as dr-pictcd in 
table 6.5. 
I able 6.6 reveals that the e:<tot^nal factors 
such as restraint on diversification/expansion imposed 
by the government, market recession and non 
availability of ,manpower got the highest points 69, 50 
and 49 respectively. This shows that they have been the 
most influencing factors-
Thus it can be said that there is no single 
factor which caused sickness but there a^re many 
factors which have been the causes of sickness in 
cotton textile mills of Uttar Pradesh. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
A persistent decline in profits or productiati 
or both or the incurring of cash losses, thus leading 
to closure of a large number of units is usually termed 
as 'Industrial Sickness'. Sickness in industry has not 
developed all of a sudden. This is a slow process 
which has set'in about two decade ago. While the 
country made significant progress over the years and 
diversified its industrial activities, certain 
structural weaknesses set in particularly xn the case 
of cotton textiles did not CB.rvy out replacement and 
modernisation in time. As a result, they were saddled 
with obsolete plant and machinery. 
Such structural weaknesses became more 
pronounced in inflationary conditions, when cost of 
replacement of machinery or expansion far exceeded the 
original estimates and many industries found it 
difficult to carry out renovation and replacement. 
To diagnose the Industrial Sickness in cotton 
textile mills of U.P. by identifying the main causes, 
the entire study has been divided into six differmit; 
chapters. 
In the first chapter, the concept of 
industrial sickness has been reviewed. It revealed 
that sick unit is one which bears one or more of the 
followina symptoms. 
(1) a unit havinc) nfiM-ia t i vcf tH<ull.y; (il) M 
unit incurring continous cash losses; <iii) the chances 
of recouping losses are either low or negative; (iv) a 
unit starts eating away its capital; (v) a unit stopped 
its production activities; (vi) Current liabilities 
exceeds current assets; (vii) irregular accounts with 
Banks; <viii> a unit closed permanently; ( i ;<) a unit 
utilising its capacity below 20 percent; (x) rate of 
return on investment is less than the cost of capital; 
(xi) increased customers complaints; (xii) ability to 
face competition and ability to exist in the market is 
low; (xiii) a unit fails to meet its social and 
economic obligations; <xiv) a unit is not in a position 
to survive; (xv) low employees morale due to 
mismanagement; (xvi> decline in the quality and 
service; (xvii) a sick unit is one that has incurred 
cash lasses in the immediately preceding two years and 
in the judgement of credit institutions is expected to 
incur these lasses during the current year; (xviii) a 
sick unit is one whose net worth has been eroded to the 
extent of at least 50 percent; <xix) a sick unit is one 
whose working capital advance account with the bank was 
irregular and this persisted over a longer period of 
time 12 to IS months and is likely to become more 
persistent; and (;<K) a sick unit is one which has 
defaulted in paying four consecutive half—yearly <or 
two consecutive annual) instalments of principal and 
interest on terms loans, if any. 
The second chapter has been devoted to review 
the Government Policies towat^ds rehabilitation of 
sickness in industries. This chapter shovMS that there 
cannot be one single solution for the revival of 
sickness. Problems have to be identified industrywise 
and unitwise. The units which have been mis—managed 
will have to change hands, and a proper scheme of 
reconstruction would have to be devised. In deserving 
cases, mergers and amalgamation should be allowed 
rather than take—over of the management by Bovernment. 
Wherever Government poicy is responsible for making an 
industry sick, it would be advisable to modify the 
policy taking into account the broader objectives of 
growth. In some cases a unity may not be viable 
inspite of any assistance. Such units should be 
allowed to close down. Of course, this will create 
the problem of displacement of labour, but this will 
have to be sorted out rather than creating further 
difficulties by merely keeping the units alive. 
In the revival of sick units banks and 
financial institutions have a great role to play. 
They have to strengthen their monitoring system and 
initiate early steps before the uinits reach a staQo 
that they cannot be revived. In fact, the banks and 
financial institutions have not been properly able to 
organise their monitoring system and they do not have 
up—to—date information about the assisted units. 
Since the causes for sickness could be 
different for diffrent units, there cannot be a 
specific formula to rehabilitate a sick unit. Each 
case will have to be diagnosed separately and proper 
remedies should' be found for it. However, some broad 
guidelines are suggeseted to nurse and rehabilitate a 
sick industrial unit. The following may be considered 
important in this regard. 
(a) The causes for sickness must be clearly 
identified, preferably through a diagnostic study by a 
competent independent agency. Also the potential 
viability of the unit must be analysed considering the 
size of the unit, the stock of a bank and the 
complexities or sophistication of operation. 
(b) The assets and liabilities of unit must be 
ascertained from the borrowers and this information 
must be put to the scrutiny of auditors. 
(c) The assets charged—both current and fixed should 
be evaluated, parlicularly when it is estimated •that 
there is a wide gap between the outstanding amount and 
the declared book value of assets. 
<d) An assessment of fund required .both long term and 
short term, should be made. Normally, a bank will 
provide additional funds for working capital, but some 
amount on a long-term basis may also be made available 
depending upon the urgency of the situation. In other 
words the long-term capital base of small units must be 
improved. 
(e) Necessary resources must be made available to 
install additional machinery to modernise the unit and 
improve its productivity. 
(f) Managerial deficiencies must be detected and the 
units must be asked to induct professionals on the 
Board of Directors. Competent technical and managerial 
personnel must be appointed to the key positions in 
production, finance and marketing. 
(Q) Sick units need time to generate surplus and 
build themselves up V4hen remedial measures are applied. 
They would, therefore, need concessions in interest, 
margin money and time for the repayment of debts. 
Depending upon the merits of each case, a bank will 
have to consider : 
(i) The funding of unpaid interest/instalment/ 
uncovered part of the advance; 
(ii) easy repayment instalment of long—term 
loans with reasonable moratorium; 
(iii) reducing interest and margin; 
<h) The Government may come up with proposals, if 
necessary through legislation to protect the interest 
of the small industry. 
Third chapter analysed the growth and 
developmentt of cotton textile mills of India, in which 
it discussed that, after Independence, especially after 
Partition, the textile industry was badly affected due 
to acute shortage of r3i.\^ material because 30 per cent 
of cotton growing area went to Pakistan- Inspite of 
this fact, the organised sector had 1056 textile mills 
out of which 733 were spinning mills and 2S3 composite 
mills which consist of handloom and powerloom. 
At the end of the year 1988—89 there were 
9.18 lakhs powerlooms and 33.04 lakhs handloams. Out 
of 9.18 lakhs powerlooms, 5.27 lakhs were working on 
cotton nf thi« 3.26 lakhs* looms? W R T R in M.nharaihl:r.i r\t\(i 
2.0<b lakhs were in Gujrat. These powerlooms produced 
over 3(b80 million metres of cotton cloth per annum at 
the end of year 1988—89, which constituted 41 per cent 
of total quantity of cotton cloth produced in the 
country. Majority of looms do not function strictly On 
standard shift basis. Thus, the capacity of production 
was under utilisation of the total investment in 
textile industry (Rs.1500 crore), the share of 
powerloom was Rs. 300 crores. 
In decentraslised sector, there were 33.04 
lakhs handlooms and nearly 9.18 lakhs were cotton 
handlooms. The handloom industry provide employment to 
nearly lO million people and an equal number of people 
a.re employed in its auxiliary activities. The capital 
investment in this sector was estimated to be of the 
order of Rs. 150 crores. The total production of 
handloom cloth has increased from 8582 million metres 
in 1984-85 to 10473 million metres in 1988-89, 
accounting an increase of 122.03 per cent. The highest 
number of handloom i.e. 5.56 lakhs were in Tamil Nadu 
followed by Aqdhra Pradesh (5.29 lakhs) and Uttar 
Pradesh <5.09 lakhs). From this fact it can be said 
that handloom industry is mainly concentrated in Tamil 
Nadu,, Andhra Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh with the 
increase in the capital investment a number of mills, 
the consumption of cotton has also gone up from 1001.30 
thousands tons in 1961 to 1344.02 thousands tons in 
1988—89, recording an increase of 134.72 per cent. The 
consumption of fibre has also increased during the last 
two decade due to diverse growth and development of 
textile sector. 
The production of yarn has gone up from 907 
million kgs in 1966 to 1461.89 million Kqs in 1988, 
with an increase of 161.08 per cent. As far^  as the 
production of mill made cotton is concerned, it has 
increased from 7073 million metres in 1961 to 10940 
million metres in 1988, an increase of 154.67 per cent. 
Likewise the export went up from Rs. 60 crores in 1961 
to 2472 crores in 1988, recording an increase of 412 
per cent. The study has revealed that Tamil Nadu and 
Maharashtra having highest number of mills in the 
country. These states have 451 and 123 mills 
respectively- Likewise, installed spindles are also 
highest in Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra i.e., 7604 and 
5164 thousands installed spindles respectively. 
Thus, to sum up, it can be highlighted that 
during the last decade the textile sector has got a 
favourable environment for its growth and development. 
The Government, financial institutions and other 
coordinating agencies are paying their due attention 
for its growth because, the textile industry has become 
a vital sector of the economy. 
It has been observed that the textile 
industry in U.P. and particularly in Kanpur has been 
witnessed severe industrial sickness as compared to its 
counterpart in other states of the country. The study 
has revealed that the consumption of raw material and 
sale has increased in Atherton mills but the company is 
incurring losses. The continuous ,loss is the main 
reason of the financial constraints of the company. As 
regards the performance of Victoria mills is concerned, 
the consumption of raw materials has increased by 
56.38 per cent during 1984—85. This company is also 
earning a continuous losses and this loss has increased 
to the tune of Rs. 500.51 lakhs in 1985-86. Hence this 
mill is also subject to rehabilitate. 
The consumption of raw materials of Swadeshi 
mill has increased by 96.5 per cent in 1985—86. But 
this company also incurred a loss of Rs. 1667.63 lakhs 
in 1985-86. Therefore, due to huge losses the company 
has became sick and needs to be rahabilated. The Elgin 
mills has 48,484 spindles out of which 47,092 spindles 
are working. 1,194 plain looms have been installed in 
the company. iThe Averaiqe total of wages bill 
including fringe benefit come to Rs. 64.43 lakhs. The 
average daily production of yarn is 16,709 kg and the 
average daily production of cloth is 80,000 metres. 
The Elgin mill No.2 is a composite textile 
processing and works in three shifts. The labour 
employment per thousand spindles is 9.27 per looms is 
46.65 and the total wage per bill including fringe 
benefits comes to Rs. 61.11 lakhs. The average daxly 
production of yarns is 17.844 kg and average daily 
production of cloth is 83,700 metres. The survey of 
the mill have revealed that there is no material change 
in the consumption of raw material e5<cept in 1983—S4 
and the income from the sale do not show any increasing 
trend. These mills have been continuously running in 
losses since 1980-81 and tJie loss irr. increasing yocM-
after year. Therefore, it is desirable to note that 
Elgin mill is a sick unit which needs to 
rehab i1i tated. 
To conduct the survey of such textile mills 
six units were selected at nan—random basis. The 
survey revealed that out of these mills, the production 
of two mills i.e. Swadeshi mills and Elgin mills 
showing an increasing trend. The total production of 
cloth of the New Victoria mills has come down from 
281-18 lakhs metres in i9B5-B6 to 8<b.lO lakh meters in 
1990 indicatir;>g a decline of 69.37 per cent. 
Similarly, the production of Elgin mills has decreased 
from 418.97 lakhs metres in 1985 to 416.33 lakhs metres 
in 1989—90.representing a decrease of 0.63 per cent. 
It is interesting to refer that the production of 
Swadeshi cotton mills went up from 261.58 lakhs metres 
to 873.43 lakhs metres in 1989—90 showing an increase 
of 70.05 per cent. Thus it can be said that out of 
these N.T.C. mills three spinning mills ait^e sick due to 
continuous fall in the level of product and the other 
composite mills can be said viable. 
In order to assess the financial performance 
of sick cotton textile mills of N.T.C. solvency ratios, 
liquidity ratios and turn over ratios were calculated 
and the results of this ratios aire as follows. 
The main objectives of solvency ratio is to 
indicate the company's ability to meet its long term 
obligation. To judge the solvency of the mills four 
ratios were calculated which shows that total tangible 
assets to long term debts, total tangible assets to 
total debts, net worth to total debts and net worth to 
long term debts are continuously decreasing during the 
year l<?86-87, 1907-60. and 1960-09 and are also less 
than the standard norm 1:1. It leads to a conclusion 
that these mills are not in solvent position. 
The general objective of liquidity ratio is 
to indicate the company's ability to meet its short 
term financial obligation. To assess the liquidity of 
sick. cotton textile mills of N-T.C, five ratios were 
calculated which indicates that current assets to 
current liabilities, current assets to total tangible 
assets, quick assets to total tangible assets, cash to 
current liabilities and quick assets to current 
liabilities a^re continuously decreasing durin the 
period 1986-87, 1987-88, 1988-89 Are less than the 
standard norm 2:1- This leads to a conclusion that 
liquidity of cotton textile mills of N.T.C is very poor 
which displays sickness of the mills. 
Turn over ratio usually consists of sales 
figures in numerator and the balance of assets are used 
to indicate various aspects of operational efficiency. 
Six turn over ratios were calculated f,or N.T.C. mills, 
sales to working capital shows sales is higher than the 
working capital. In case of net sales to quick assets, 
the net sales has higher rates than the quick assets 
except in the year 1987—OO. Net sales to current 
assets is very satisfactory. In regards to net sales 
to total tangible assets, the degree of efficiency m 
the utilisation of resources is not higher. Net sales 
to fixed assets, ratio shows that in IS'Q^b—87 and IS^B/ — 
88 the N.r.C's mills had more idle capacity and excess 
investment in fixed trading assets. 
The sixth chapter identify the main causes of 
industrial sickness in cotton textile mills of U.P. 
with the help of weighted score. Factors generally 
responsible for sickness, broadly divided into internal 
and external. Internal factors again divided into five 
different heads viz. managerial, financial, marketing, 
productivity and personnel to know the exact factors 
causing sickness in cotton textile mills of U.P. 
In order to analyse the managerial factors 
influencing sickness, a ranking table has been prepared 
by taking upto eight rank of different managerial 
factors. In that it revealed from the data that among 
the ranking factors no proper manpower development 
program has been considered as the first cause of 
sickness by 19.84 per cent of the mills lack of 
management expertise and supervision has been ranking 
secondly by 15.87 per cent of the mills. Timely and 
adequate modernisation has the third rank with a rating 
12.3 per cent as a factors influencing sickness in 
cotton textile mills of uttar pradesh. 
Therefore management of mills should make an 
arrangement to send their employees for training and 
should recruit experienced professional besides they 
should have a research and development cell for finding 
out the possibility of modernisation of the mills. 
To assess the productivity factors causing 
Sickness in Cotton Textile Mills of U.P- We have 
analysed the priority ranking of sample units. 
Priority ranking with weighted score shows, that three 
most important factors such as poor maintanance and 
replacement of machinery, poor quality of products and 
power shortage have score 47 points, 33 paints and 23 
points respectively. We can conclude from the above 
that poor maintance of machinery , poor quality of 
product and power shortage has been the main cause of 
sickness in Cotton Textile Mills of Uttar Pradesh. 
Keeping in view the above noted -finding into 
consideration it can be suggested that management of 
these seven Cotton Textile Mills should give due 
attention to maintenance of machinery and quality 'of 
product. Similarly the Government should care forwai^d 
to solve the problem of poor shortage. 
In order to get weighted score or content 
score' for each personnel factors we have assigned 
weight to each rank and got the weighted score for 
factors. Since we have taken upto <bth rank we have 
assigned 6 points to first rank, 5 points to second 
rank, 4 points to third rank, 3 point to fourth rank, 2 
points to fifth rank and points to sixth rank. 
From the calculated weighted sum of the 
ranking. It can be concluded that absence of manpower 
planning has been the first cause of sickness, bad 
labour relation as the second cause and weak 
organisational set—up has been the third cause of 
sickness in textile mills of Uttar Pradesh. 
Keeping in view the above finding into 
consideration it can be suggested that the management 
of textile mills should give due attention to proper 
manpower planning and should maintain good industrial 
ralat ion. 
In order to analyse the financial factors 
causing siqikness, we have prepared ranking table by 
taking upto lO ranks of different financial factors. 
It is revealed from the data presented in the 
table that lack of finance and working capital has been 
considered as the first cause of sickness by 5 units 
out of 7 units and secured 50 points. The second most 
important factor ( second Rank) was continuous loss and 
poor cash management which has been the cause of the 
sickness in cotton textile mills of Uttar Pradesh. Too 
much dependence on borrowed money has been the third 
cause of sickness and secured 35 points according to 
the weighted score. Inappropriate financial structum^ 
and too much bad debts have got fourth and iifth rant;: 
among the causes of sickness. Thus it can be said that; 
lack of finance and working capital, continuous losses/ 
poor cash management and too much dependence on 
borrowed money have been the main causes of sickness. 
Therefore, the management of mills should 
find some solution to the problem. Sick units need 
time to generate surplus and build up themselves when 
remedial measures are applied. Ihey would, there forr-, 
need concessions in interest, mat-gin money and time for 
the repayment of debts. 
The Government may come up with the 
proposals, if necessary through legislation to protect 
the interest of small industry. 
Marketing factors are one of the main factors 
causing sickness in industries. We have therefore 
attempted to assess the influence of marketing factors 
on cotton textile mills of U.P. A limited sample of 
sick cotton teKtile mills has been drawn from Uttar 
Pradesh. According to the calculated weighted score 
lack of sales promotion has been the first cause of 
sickness <Ist rank) fallowed by selection of 
inadequate product mix <IInd rank) inaccurate demand 
forcasting ( I I I rd rank) and lacV^ of market feed back 
(IVth rank) . 
Thus, it can be said that lacfc of sales 
pramatian, selection of inadequate product mi;<, 
inaccurate demand forcastinq and lack of market fopd 
back are the main causes of sickness in cotton textile 
mills of Uttar Pradesh. Therefore, the management of 
these mills should give due importance to sale 
promotion programmes and product mix. They must also 
make necessary arangement to forecast the demand and 
other market information. 
The external factors causing sickness in 
cotton textile mills of U.P. has been observed through 
weighted score that diversification/expansion imposed 
by the Government has emerged as the first cause of 
sickness by scoring 69 points. The second highest point 
was secured by market recession <50 points). The third 
and fourth position according to weighted score went 
to non availability of skilled manpower (49 points) and 
change in. economic and social policies of the 
Bovernment (46 points). It is therefore, revealed that 
restraint on diversification/expansion imposed by the 
government, market recession, non availability of 
skilled manpower and change in economic and social 
policies of the Government secured 214 points having 
emerged as the most important factors causing sickness 
in the cotton textile mills of Uttar Pradesh. 
It seems from the above discussion that the 
phenomenon of sickness among industries is a complex 
one and a number of factors ranging from disparrities 
between costs and prices to mis—management and some 
Government policies aire involved. There cannot be one 
single solution for revival of sickness. Problems have 
to be identify industrywise and unitwise and remedial 
measures initiated. The units which have been mis-
managed will haye to change hands, and a proper scheme 
of reconstruction would have to be devised. In 
deserving cases, mergers and amalgamation should be 
allowed rather than take—over of the management by 
Government. Wherever Government policy is responsible 
for maVcing an industry sick, it would be advisable to 
modify the policy taking into account the broader 
objecttives of growth. in some case a unit may not be 
viable inspite of any assistance that can be given fnr 
temporary sustenace. Such units should be allowed to 
close down. Qf course, this will ct-'eate the problem of 
displacement of labour, but this will have to be 
sorted out rather than creating further difficulties by 
merely keeping the units alive. 
In the revival of sick units banks and 
financial institutions have a great role to play. 
They have to strengthen their monitoring system and 
initiate early steps before the units reach a stage 
that they cannot be revived. In fact, the banks and 
financial institutions have not been properly able to 
organise their monitoring system and they do not have 
up—to—date information about the assisted units. 
What is required is closer cooperation 
through mutual assistance between management. 
Government, banks and financial institutions to restoi^e 
the health of weak and sick units. 
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PART •A * 
Ql. Name of the unit : 
Q2. Type of ownership : 
(1). Cooperative Society 
i'Z) Partnership 
(3) Joint stock company 
Q.3. Production performance : 
Quantity of Production 1985 19S<b 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Item wise In metre/ In value(Rs 
production quantity 











Q4. Utilisation of Installed Capacity. 
u - 20y. 
21 - 507. 
51 - 757-
76 - 1UU7. 
Q5. Number of Employees. Numbers. 
1. Supervisor 
2. Skilled 
3. Unsk i1 led 
4. Office staff 
5. Officers 
06. Salary and Wages paid 
1. Salary 
Wages 




Q7. Are Salaries and Wages paid ta the workers? 
1. In t ime 
2. Little lats 
3. As S'. when fund available 
OS. Financial Performance 
I 
1985 86 87 88-89 89-90 90 




Qll. Is there Continuous losses for the past; 
One Year Two Year-s Three Yearns 
012. Is your unit able to yield a remarkable return 
say 15'/. on Capital. 
013. Is your units need external funds? 
a. Some times. 
b. Frequently. 
c. Not at all. 
014. Whether your unit incured losses? 
a. during previous year 
b. during current year 
PART ^ B 
Causes of Industrial SxcJ'ness 
Internal Causes ; 
Manaqerial factors ; 
Ql. Which of the followiOQ managerxal factors have 
been the cause of Industrial Sickness. Please 
rank any fifteen accordino to priority. 
1. No proper manpower development proqamme. 
2. Is it due to lack of manaoemnet expertise and 
Supervision. 
3. Frequent sickness of owner/manager. 
4. Inability to maintain proper accounts. 
5. Improper projet planning. 
6. Inefficient wording Capital management. 
7. Lack of coordination in various functional areas, 
8. Improper wage and salary administration. 
9. Lack of professionalisation. 
10. Incompetent and dishonest management. 
11. Absence of Control, 
12. Lac^ of timely S< adequate modernisation. 
13. Poorlv cancieved Schemr*. 
14. Uver ambitious programe. 
1 5 . I n a p p r o p r " l a t e C o l l a t a o r - a t i o n . 
16. Over Centralisation. 
17. Heavy expenditure on research and development. 
18. Improper corporate planning. 
19. lack of integerity. 
Financial factors; 
Ull. Which of the following financial factors have 
influenced your unit badly. Please rank any ten 
in order. 
1. Lack of finance asnd working Capital. 
2. Too much dependence on borrowed money. 
3. Too many bad debts. 
4. Inappropriate financial structure. 
5. Absence ai financial planning 5 budgeting. 
6. Absence ot costing and pricing. 
7. Diversion of funds. 
a. Low capital base and/or inadequate/or 
inappropriate financial arrangements. 
9. Continuous Loss and/or poor cash management. 
10. Over run in the cost of Installation. 
11. Inexpedient distribution of profit. 
12. Unrealistic pricing policy. 
13. Unsound financial planning. 
14. Faulty costinq-
15. Liberal dividend policy. 
16. Insufficient funds. 
17. Over trading. 
18. Adverse debt equity ratio. 
1*?. Sympathy of funds. 
20. Unplanned payment to creditori 
21. Poor Utilisation of assets. 
Productivity factors; 
QIIX. Which of the following factors afffected the 
productivity of your unit. Please rank any ten 
factors according to priority. 
1. Wrong selection of sight for industrial Unit. 
2. Poor quality of raw materials. 
3. Lack of raw material due to high cost.-^ 
4. Poor maintenance and replacement of 
mach inery. 
5. Power shortage. 
6. Delayed supples from Sub Contractors. 
7. Lack of product diversifeat ion. 
8. Improper planning for the life of the 
product. 
9. Lack of quality control. 
10. Poor industrial relation. 
11. Lack of order due to competition. 
12. Poor quality of product. 
13. Irregular deliveries. 
14. Lack of raw material due to high c o s t . — 
15. Sudden increase in cost of production. 
16. Heavy borrowing — higher interest charges. 
17. Unplanned Capital expenditure. 
18. Unplanned payment to creditors. 
19. Absence of manpower planning and 
overstaff ing. 
20. Increased cost not recovered in selling price 
due to faulty costing. 
Marketing Factors 
QIV. Is your Unit fails due to tho following marketing 
factors. If Yes, rank any ten according to priority, 
Inaccurate demand forecasting. 
Selection of inadequate product mi-,;. 
Lack of sales promotion. 
4. Lack of sufficient advertisement. 
5. Lack of market feed back. 




l O . 
1 1 . 
1 2 . 
1 3 . 
1 4 . 
Lack of sales promotion. 
Absence of product plannina. 
Dependence on few buyers. 
Lack of market research. 
Pricing of product. 
Lack of knowledge of marketing technique, 
Weak market Organisation. 
Poor sales realisation. 
Personnel Facors; 
QV. Is your unit became 
personnel problem. If 
order to performance. 
sich: due to 
yes kindly rank 
to 1 low IIIQ 
them in 
1. Bad Labour relations. 
2. Inappropriate wage and salary administration. 
3. Absence of manpower planning. 
4. Continuous Labour strike or Lock out 
result xng. 
5. Stoppage of work and low productivity. 
6. Internal quarrel. 
7. Weak Organisational set up. 
8. Labour Absentism/Labour turnover. 
9. Inefficient handling of Labour problems, 
lu. Low Labour productivity. 
11. Lack of trained/ski11ed Labour. 
PART 
EXTERNAL CAUSES 
Which of the follawina E:<ternal factot-s effected 
badly your unit. Rank any twenty according to 
priority. 
1. Government policy regarding prices ?'. 
distribut ion. 
2. Resraint on diversification/expansion imposed 
by the Government. 
3. Liberalised licensing policy for a single 
product resulting in excessive supply and 
unhealthy competition. 
4. Taxation policy of the Government. 
5. Import restraints on essential inputs. 
<b. Change in International marketing Scene. 
7. Change in Government's purchasing policy. 
8. Change in economic and Social policies of the 
Government. 
9. Change in fiscal imposition. 
10. Devaluation. 
11. Failure of state institution V I S - A - V I S export-
orders on deffered payment Basis. 
12. Various unwelcomrs compu 1 IT; j otT-. ituzlmimu 
pricing policy etc. 
13. Credit Squeeze, high inter-est rates. 
14. Shairp fluctuation in exchange rates. 
15. Credit restraintr.. 
16. Delay in disbursement of Loans. 
17. Unfavourable investment climate. 
18. Shortage of inputs. 
19. Delay in release of promised funds by the 
Financial Institution. 
20. Adverse and uncertain mari^ -.et conditions due 
to change in Government policies, emergence 
in subsidies, changing consumer's preference. 
21. Lack of availability of credit at an 
appropriate time. 
Market recession. 
Non availability of skilled manpower. 
24. Inter union rivalry. 
2b. Decline in the marlcet demands for" tfie goods. 
26. Storage of/or interruptions in power supply. 
27. Inability to reduce unit cost in a 
competitive market. 
28. Receiving transport bottleneck. 
29- Unrealistic price control. 
30. Dependence on few buyers. 
31. CJianges ir\ International marl^.et canditians-




.'•~i « Higher turnover of labour and staff. 
34. Low productivity of Labour. 
35. General Labour unrest. 
36. Waoe disparities in similar industry. 
37. Sudden strikes/Lock outs. 
30. Litigations. 
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SCHEDULE 6 
Investment 
P A R T I C U L A R S 
Current Previous 
Year Year 
(Rs. in Lacs) 
INVESTMENT (AT COST) 
A. Trade (Quoted) 
Swadeshi Poiytex Ltd. 
British India Corpn. Ltd. 
Kohinoor Mills Co. Ltd. 
Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd. 
Indore Malwa United Mills 
Standard Mills Co. Ltd. 
Mettur Beardsell Ltd. 
Dhanlaxmi Mills Ltd. 
Sri Krishna Rajendra Mills 
Binny Ltd. 
B. Non Trade 
1. Govt. Securities 
3% Conversion Loan 1946/86 
12 years National Saving Certificate 
12 years National Defence Certificate 

























2. Share in Joint Stock Companies 
Quoted : 
Mafatlal Engg. Industries Ltd. 
Elgin Mills Co. Ltd. 
Cawnpore Textile Mills 
Unquoted : 
Swadeshi Minning & Mfg. Ltd, 
C. P. Properties Ltd. 
Dalhousie Holding Ltd. 

































Cost Market Cost Market 
Value Value 
(Rs. in lacs) 
Aggregate value of quoted Investments 
Aggregate value of unquoted Investments 
100.00 
176.64 
340.10 '100.20 315.09 
— 176.64 ~ 
( 40 ) 
SCHEDULE 6 
(Contd.) < « ' 
» » * 
P A R T I C U L A R S 
Current Previous 
Year Year 
(Rs. in Lacs) 
Notes : 
Incase Investments of four Swadeshi Mil ls : 
1. The Shares of M/s Kohinoor Mil ls Co, Ltd. for Rs. 317.00 and the share of M/s Indore Malwa 
United Mills Ltd. for Rs. 113.00 since the entire undertaking of these companies have been 
Nationalised, have been valued at Rs. 1.00 each, 
2. The Central Govt, has taken over the undertaking of the British India Corporation Ltd., under the 
Acquisition and Transfer of undertaking Act and fixed the compensation of Rs. 0.25 P. per share 
Since the shares have not been surrendered til l now to the Company concerned, only Rs. 408.25 
P. is realisable value. 
3. In persuance to the judgement of the Supreme Court on 12-2-88 M/s. Swadeshi Mining & Mfg. 
Co. Ltd, wi th whom 17,18,344 shares value Rs. 165.80 stands mvested, has become the subsidi-
ary of this Corporation. 
SCHEDULE 7 
Inventories 
Current Assets : 
V Inventories (As taken, valued and 
certified by the Management) 
a) Stores & Spares 
(Incl. Stores-in-Transit 0.93 lacs) 
Less : Provision for obsolete stores 
b) Tools 
c) Raw Material 
Raw Material in Transit 
d) Finished Stock 
Finished Stock in Transit 
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SCHEiULE 8 
Sundry Debtors 
Sundry Debtors : 
a) Debts outstanding for a period 
exceeding six months : 
Secured 
Unsecured Considered Good 
Unsecured Considered Doubtful 
Less : Provision for Doubtful 
P A R T I C U L A R S 
Current Previous 
Year year 










b) Other Debts : 
Secured 
Unsecured Considered Good 
Unsecured Considered Doubtful 













Cash b Bank Balancts 
Cash & Bank Balances : 
Cash In Hand 
(including Cheques & Stamps) 
Remittance in transit 
Banlc Balance with : 
a) Schedule Banks : 
-4 
In Current Account 
In Saving Bank Account 
In Fixed Deposits 
IrJ^Margin Money Deposit 














. . . - . 0 . 3 1 ^ -
' 109.56 
- .3.22 ^: 
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SCHEDULE 10 
Loans b Advancss 
P A R T I C U L A R S 
Current Previous 
Year Year 
(Rs, \n Lacs) 
Loans b Advances : 
(Unsecured considered good unless 
otherwise stated) 
a) Advance recoverable in cash or 
kind or for value to be received 
Secured 
Considered Doubtful 
Less i Provision for Doubtful 
b) Balance with Customs, Port & Govt. Bodies 
Balance wi th Excise Authorities 
Deposit wi th Govt. Bodies 
Considered Good 
Considered Doubtful 
Less : Provision for Doubtful 
Intt. accrued on Fixed Deposit 
c) Others 
From Claim Commissioner 
From Provident Fund Commissioner 
From Banks 
From Others 




Tax deducted at source 
Sundry Deposit 
Advance recoverable from 
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SCHEDULE 11 
Current Liabilities 
P A R T I C U L A R S 
Current Previous 
Year year 
(Rs. in Lacs) 






Due to other subsidiary Corporation of 
Holding Company 
Security Deposit 
Trade Deposits (Incl. Advance against Sales) 






















As per Last Balaece Sheet 
Add : Provision made during the year 
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SCHEDULE 13 
Sales 
P A R T I C U L A R S 
Current Previous 
Year Year 
(Rs. In Lacs) 
Cloth 
Less : Excise 
Yarn 



























i) On Govt. Securities 
ii) On Others 
Dividend 
Rent & Compensation 
Profit on Sale of Assets 
Insurance & Other Claims 
Sales of Scrap & Unserviceable Stores 
iVIiscellaneous Receipt 
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BALANCE SHEET 
As 3t 31st March, 1988 
P A R T I C U L A R S 
SOURCES OF FUNDS 
Shareholders ' Funds 
Share Capitat 
Advance against Equfty 




APPLICATION OF FUNDS 
Fixed Assets 
Gross Block 




Cur ren t 'Asse ts , Loans and Advances 
Inventories 
Sundry Debtors 
Cash it Bank Balances 
Loans & Advances 
LESS : 
Cur ren t L iab i l i t i es Ef Provisions 
• Current Liabilities 
Provisions 
Net Current Assets 
Pre-lncorporation Loss 
Profit & Loss Account 
Statement of Account ing Policies. 
Notes Forming part of the Accounts 
RAVI PRAKASH 
Joint Manager (F & A) 


































































,Dated October 14. 1988 
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21 
22 
S. N. AGARWAL 
Secretary 
M. M. S. RANA 
Chairman-cum-Managing Director 
As per our report of even date attached hereto 




PROFIT & LOSS A C C O U N T 
For the yeai ended on 31st March, 1988 
P A R T I C U L A R S Schedule 
Current previous 
year year 
(Rs, in Lakhs) 
EARNINGS 
V-Sales • 13 
Other Income 14 
lncrease/(Decrease) in Stock 15 
^ U T GOINGS 
Consumption of Raw Materials - 16 
Purchase of finished Goods 
Employees Remuneration and Benefits 17 
Manufacturmg, Administrative Selling & 
Distrib. Expenses 18 
Finance Charges 19 
PROVISIONS FOR 




Shortage Written off 
Depreciation 
Profit/(Loss) for the year 
Net Prior period Expenses / (Income) 20 
r 
Provision Written Back 
Net Profit (Loss) for the year 
Balance of Profit '(Loss) brought 
forward from the last year 
Balance Profit (Loss) Carried 
forward to Blance Sheet 
Total 


















































Joint Manager (F a A) 
K. S. SATHYANARAYANA 
Director (Finance) 
Kanpur : ' 
Dated : October 14, 1988 
M. M. S. RANA 
Chairman-cum-Managing Director 
As per our report of even date attached hereto 
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SCHEDULE 1 
Share Capi ta l 
P A R T I C U L A R S 
Current Previous 
year year 
(Rs. in Lakhs^ 
AUTHORISED 
Equity shares of 4,00,000 (previous year 4,00,000) of 
Rs 1,000;- each. 
Issued Subscribed and paid up : 
3,38,935 (previous year 3,24,935) Equity Shares of Rs.1000/-
each fully paid up. 
The above includes : „ " 
338835 (previous year 324835) Equity Shares of Rs. 1000 / -
each alloted as ful ly paid up w i thou t payment being received 
in cash 
The above have been subscribed by : 
a, NTC Ltd., 322007 (Previous year 308007) 
b U.P. Govt. 16,928 (Previous year 16,928) 
SCHEDULE 2 
Reserve & Surplus 
1. CAPITAL RESERVE ; 
As per last Balance Sheet 
Add . Adjustment dur ing the year 
2. CAPITAL SUBSIDY 
As per last Balance Sheet 





















'" 'Secured Loans 
P A R T I C U L A R S 
1. From Banks 
Secured by Hypothication / pledge of 
finished goods, raw material, loose 
stock, stores and work in process. 
2. From Financial Institutions : 
Secured by first charge on Building and 
Plant & Machinery and on guarantee 
of NTC Ltd., New Delhi for purchase of 
machihery under Soft loan Scheme 
i) . F . C . L 
II) i D. B I. r-






1 Shor t Term Loans 
orri 
Banks 





For Managed Mills 
Less : Released to Managed Mills 
FronijU, P. State Textile Corpn Ltd, 
2. t n t e N s t Accrued and due-on above Loans 
.1 
For N V T . C Ltd. 
Less,I For Managed Mil ls 
For h\ P. S. T. C. Ltd. 
-~- -i»f-
Total 
( 53 ) 
C u " e n t Previous 
year year 
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SCHEDULE 6 
Inves tment 
P A R T I C U L A R S 
Current Previous 
year Year 
{Rs. in lacs) 
INVESTMENT (AT COST) 
A. Trade (Quoted) No. o f Share Pa id up 
Swadeshi Polytex Ltd. 10,00,000 10 
British India Corpn. Ltd. 1,633 5 
Kohinoor Mil ls Co. Ltd. 1 100 
Century Spg. & ^Afg. Co. L td . 4 100 
Indore Malwa United Mil ls 1 100 
Standard Mil ls Co. Ltd. 2 100 
Mettur Beardsell Ltd. 7 100 
Dhanlaxmi Mi l ls Ltd. 12 100 
Sri Krishna Rajendra Mil ls 6 50 
Binny Ltd. 47 100 





1, Govt. Securities 
3% Conversion Loan 1946/86 
12 years National Saving Certificate 
12 years National Defence Certificate 
2. Shares in Jo in t Stock Companies 
Quoted : 
Mafatlal Engg. Industries Ltd. 100 
Elgin Mills Co. Ltd. _ 50 
Cawnpore Textile Mil ls 25 
Unquoted : 
Swadeshi Min ing & Mfg . Ltd. 1718344 
C. P. Properties Ltd. 6900 
Dalhousie Holding Ltd. 3650 

























Aggregate value of quoted Investments 
Aggregate value of unquoted Investments 
Cost Market Cost Market 
Value Value 
(Rs. in lacs) 
100.20 315.09 100.20 610.20 
176.62 176.62 — 
( 56 ) 
SCHEDULE 6 
(Contd.) "if*" 
P A R T I C U L A R S 
Current 
year 




Incase Inves tments o f f ou r Swadeshi fVlills ; 
1 . The Shares of M/s. Kohinoor Mil ls Co. Ltd. for Rs, 317.00 and the share of M/s. Indore Malwa 
United Mil ls L td . for Rs. 113.00 since the entire undertaking of these companies have been 
Nationalised, have been valued at Rs. 1.00 each. 
2. The Central Govt, has taken over the undertaking of the British India Corporation Ltd., under 
the Acquisit ion and Transfer of undertaking Act and fixed the compensation of Rs. 0.25 P. per 
share since the share have not been surrendered t i l l now to the Company concerned, only 
Rs. 408.25 P. is realisable value. 
3. In persuance to the judgement of the Supreme Court on 12-2-88 M/s. Swadeshi Mining & 
Mfg . Co. Ltd. w i t h whom 17,18,344 shares valued Rs. 165.80 stands invested, has become the 
subsidiary of this Corporation. 
SCHEDULE 7 
Inventor ies 
Cur ren t Assets : 
Inventories (As taken, valued and 
certified by the Management) 
(a) Stores & Spares 
(Incl. Stores-in-Transit Rs.2.09 lacs) 
Less : Provision for obsolete stores 
(b) Tools 
(c) Raw Materials 
Raw Material in Transi t 
(d) Finished Stock 
Finished Stock in Transit 
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SCHEDULE 8 
Sundry Debtors 
P A R T I C U L A R S 
Current Previous 
year year 
(Rs. in lacs) 
Sundry Deb to rs : 
(a) Debts outstanding for a period 
exceeding six months : 
Secured 
Unsecured Considered Good 
Unsecured Considered Doubtful 









(b) Other Debts : 
Secured 
Unsecured Considered Good 
Unsecured Considered Doubtful 










Total 476.76 485.58 
SCHEDULE 9 
Cash & Bank Balances 
Cash Ef Bank Balances : 
Cash in Hand 
(Including Cheques & Stamps) 
Remittances in transit 
Bank Balance w i th : 
a) Schedule Banks : 
'n Current Account 
In Saving bank Account 
In Fixed Deposits 
In Margin Money Deposit 


















( 58 ) 
SCHEDULE 10 
Loans £t Advances 
P A R T l C U L A B S 
LOANS ft ADVANCES : 
(Unsecured considered good 
unless otherwise stated) 
a) Advance recoverable in cash or kind or for 
'tfaJvie t o be received 
~;^Se<ajred 
"."Ccmsidered Doubtful _ 




b ) . Balance with Customs, Port & Govt. Bodies 
Balance with Excise Authorities 
' Detabsit wi th Govt. Bodies 
* .Considered good 
Considered doubtful 
\^S% : Provision for doubtful 
Intt^accrued on fixed deposit 
..1, w ^ 
2.78 
2.78 
-cT " ^ t f i e r s 
^ Erqn;> Claim Commissioner 
T r a m Provident Fund Commissioner 
TFyom Banks 
FrbrtJ Others 




' prepaid Expenses 
T^cxleducted at sources 
Suj^^ry Deposit 
„Adji/ance recoverable f rom other Subsidiary 
"Corporation of Holding Company 
2,71 a ,3Z -
Current Previous 
year year 
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SCHEDULE 11 
Cur ren t L iab i l i t ies 
iff* 
P A R T l C U L A R S 
Current Previous 
year Year 
(Rs. in Lacs) 






Due to other subsidiary Corporation of Holding Company 
Security Deposit 
Trade Deposits (Incl. Advance against sates) 



















Prov is ions 
Prov is ions 
i) Gratuity : 
For Prenationalisation period 
As per Last Balance Sheet 
Add : Provision taken back 














( eo ) 
SCHEDULE 13 
Sales 
P A R T I C U L A R S 
Cloth 
Less : Excise 
Yarn 








i) On Govt. Securities 
ii) On Others 
Dividend 
Rent & Compensation 
Profit on Sale of Assets 
insurance & Other Claims 
Sales of Scrap & Unserviceable Stores 
Miscellaneous Receipt 














































( 61 ) 
